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Received β€” 2 April 2026 ⏭ cs.AI, q-bio.NC updates on arXiv.org

Multi-Level Knowledge Distillation and Dynamic Self-Supervised Learning for Continual Learning

arXiv:2508.12692v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Class-incremental with repetition (CIR), where previously trained classes repeatedly introduced in future tasks, is a more realistic scenario than the traditional class incremental setup, which assumes that each task contains unseen classes. CIR assumes that we can easily access abundant unlabeled data from external sources, such as the Internet. Therefore, we propose two components that efficiently use the unlabeled data to ensure the high stability and the plasticity of models trained in CIR setup. First, we introduce multi-level knowledge distillation (MLKD) that distills knowledge from multiple previous models across multiple perspectives, including features and logits, so the model can maintain much various previous knowledge. Moreover, we implement dynamic self-supervised loss (SSL) to utilize the unlabeled data that accelerates the learning of new classes, while dynamic weighting of SSL keeps the focus of training to the primary task. Both of our proposed components significantly improve the performance in CIR setup, achieving 2nd place in the CVPR 5th CLVISION Challenge.

Merging Triggers, Breaking Backdoors: Defensive Poisoning for Instruction-Tuned Language Models

arXiv:2601.04448v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) have greatly advanced Natural Language Processing (NLP), particularly through instruction tuning, which enables broad task generalization without additional fine-tuning. However, their reliance on large-scale datasets-often collected from human or web sources-makes them vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where adversaries poison a small subset of data to implant hidden behaviors. Despite this growing risk, defenses for instruction-tuned models remain underexplored. We propose MB-Defense (Merging & Breaking Defense Framework), a novel training pipeline that immunizes instruction-tuned LLMs against diverse backdoor threats. MB-Defense comprises two stages: (i) Defensive Poisoning, which merges attacker and defensive triggers into a unified backdoor representation, and (ii) Backdoor Neutralization, which breaks this representation through additional training to restore clean behavior. Extensive experiments across multiple LLMs show that MB-Defense substantially lowers attack success rates while preserving instruction-following ability. Our method offers a generalizable and data-efficient defense strategy, improving the robustness of instruction-tuned LLMs against unseen backdoor attacks.
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