arXiv:2511.15015v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) has become a practical architecture for scaling LLM capacity while keeping per-token compute modest, but deploying MoE models on a single, memory-limited GPU remains difficult because expert weights dominate the HBM footprint. Existing expert offloading and prefetching systems reduce the resident set, yet they often pay expert-loading costs on the critical path when activation becomes dense. Post-training quantization (PTQ) lowers the footprint without transfers, but prevailing pipelines fix expert bit-widths offline and assume routing remains stable, even though MoE expert utilization is heavy-tailed and the hot set can shift across workloads. We present DynaExq, a runtime-aware mixed-precision serving system that treats single-GPU MoE inference under a hard HBM envelope as an online, budget-constrained precision allocation problem. The key insight is to keep the experts that dominate runtime traffic resident at higher precision, while maintaining a low-precision fallback for the remaining experts, so the system can reduce transfer volume and avoid the waiting latency that limits offloading and prefetching under dense activation. DynaExq estimates long-horizon expert hotness from router traces, selects a per-layer high-precision resident set via a budget-feasible top-$n$ rule, and applies promotions and demotions asynchronously through stable expert handles so the forward pass always executes on a fully materialized expert version. Across Qwen3-MoE-30B/80B and six benchmarks, DynaExq improves accuracy over static PTQ on Qwen3-80B (73.09% to 77.57%) under comparable device-memory budgets and achieves up to 2.73x higher throughput than offloading/prefetch baselines at batch size 32.

arXiv:2602.10635v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Socially intelligent AI systems must entail reasoning across diverse human behavioral tasks, and generalization to new contexts. However, AI has yet to achieve this level of social intelligence. Existing models remain fundamentally constrained by the imbalanced learning dynamics induced by training on behavioral data. Namely, behavioral data is inherently heterogeneous, comprising diverse modalities and prediction targets that often produce uneven training signals across samples. To address this, we develop Omnisapiens-7B 2.0, a foundation model for social behavior processing that explicitly addresses learning from heterogeneous behavioral data. This is enabled through Heterogeneity-Aware Relative Policy Optimization, a novel reasoning RL method that explicitly rebalances learning signals across samples. The core insight is to approximate contribution signals to the policy update, using them to inform geometrically centered and intertially smoothed advantage modulation. Results demonstrate that Omnisapiens-7B 2.0 achieves the best and most consistent performance across 10 diverse behavioral tasks, while also attaining the best performance on all five held-out zero-shot generalization benchmarks, with gains of up to +12.02% and +9.37% respectively. Furthermore, Omnisapiens-7B 2.0 demonstrates more consistent and interpretable reasoning traces, supporting reliable real-world behavioral applications. Our model and codes can be found at https://github.com/MIT-MI/human_behavior_atlas.

arXiv:2604.11557v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Tool-use capability is a fundamental component of LLM agents, enabling them to interact with external systems through structured function calls. However, existing research exhibits inconsistent interaction representations, largely overlooks the structural distribution of tool-use trajectories, and relies on incompatible evaluation benchmarks. We present UniToolCall, a unified framework for tool learning that standardizes the entire pipeline from toolset construction and dataset generation to evaluation. The framework curates a large tool pool of 22k+ tools and constructs a hybrid training corpus of 390k+ instances by combining 10 standardized public datasets with structurally controlled synthetic trajectories. It explicitly models diverse interaction patterns, including single-hop vs. multi-hop and single-turn vs. multi-turn, while capturing both serial and parallel execution structures. To support coherent multi-turn reasoning, we further introduce an Anchor Linkage mechanism that enforces cross-turn dependencies. Furthermore, we convert 7 public benchmarks into a unified Query--Action--Observation--Answer (QAOA) representation with fine-grained evaluation at the function-call, turn, and conversation levels. Experiments show that fine-tuning Qwen3-8B on our dataset substantially improves tool-use performance. Under the distractor-heavy Hybrid-20 setting, achieves 93.0% single-turn Strict Precision, outperforming commercial models including GPT, Gemini, and Claude.

arXiv:2605.02900v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Embodied Artificial Intelligence (Embodied AI) integrates perception, cognition, planning, and interaction into agents that operate in open-world, safety-critical environments. As these systems gain autonomy and enter domains such as transportation, healthcare, and industrial or assistive robotics, ensuring their safety becomes both technically challenging and socially indispensable. Unlike digital AI systems, embodied agents must act under uncertain sensing, incomplete knowledge, and dynamic human-robot interactions, where failures can directly lead to physical harm. This survey provides a comprehensive and structured review of safety research in embodied AI, examining attacks and defenses across the full embodied pipeline, from perception and cognition to planning, action and interaction, and agentic system. We introduce a multi-level taxonomy that unifies fragmented lines of work and connects embodied-specific safety findings with broader advances in vision, language, and multimodal foundation models. Our review synthesizes insights from over 500 papers spanning adversarial, backdoor, jailbreak, and hardware-level attacks; attack detection, safe training and robust inference; and risk-aware human-agent interaction. This analysis reveals several overlooked challenges, including the fragility of multimodal perception fusion, the instability of planning under jailbreak attacks, and the trustworthiness of human-agent interaction in open-ended scenarios. By organizing the field into a coherent framework and identifying critical research gaps, this survey provides a roadmap for building embodied agents that are not only capable and autonomous but also safe, robust, and reliable in real-world deployment.

arXiv:2604.04426v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Existing research on LLM agent security mainly focuses on prompt injection and unsafe input/output behaviors. However, as agents increasingly rely on third-party tools and MCP servers, a new class of supply-chain threats has emerged, where malicious behaviors are embedded in seemingly benign tools, silently hijacking agent execution, leaking sensitive data, or triggering unauthorized actions. Despite their growing impact, there is currently no comprehensive benchmark for evaluating such threats. To bridge this gap, we introduce SC-Inject-Bench, a large-scale benchmark comprising over 10,000 malicious MCP tools grounded in a taxonomy of 25+ attack types derived from MITRE ATT&CK targeting supply-chain threats. We observe that existing MCP scanners and semantic guardrails perform poorly on this benchmark. Motivated by this finding, we propose ShieldNet, a network-level guardrail framework that detects supply-chain poisoning by observing real network interactions rather than surface-level tool traces. ShieldNet integrates a man-in-the-middle (MITM) proxy and an event extractor to identify critical network behaviors, which are then processed by a lightweight classifier for attack detection. Extensive experiments show that ShieldNet achieves strong detection performance (up to 0.995 F-1 with only 0.8% false positives) while introducing little runtime overhead, substantially outperforming existing MCP scanners and LLM-based guardrails.

arXiv:2603.23064v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We identify a critical security vulnerability in mainstream Claw personal AI agents: untrusted content encountered during heartbeat-driven background execution can silently pollute agent memory and subsequently influence user-facing behavior without the user's awareness. This vulnerability arises from an architectural design shared across the Claw ecosystem: heartbeat background execution runs in the same session as user-facing conversation, so content ingested from any external source monitored in the background (including email, message channels, news feeds, code repositories, and social platforms) can enter the same memory context used for foreground interaction, often with limited user visibility and without clear source provenance. We formalize this process as an Exposure (E) $\rightarrow$ Memory (M) $\rightarrow$ Behavior (B) pathway: misinformation encountered during heartbeat execution enters the agent's short-term session context, potentially gets written into long-term memory, and later shapes downstream user-facing behavior. We instantiate this pathway in an agent-native social setting using MissClaw, a controlled research replica of Moltbook. We find that (1) social credibility cues, especially perceived consensus, are the dominant driver of short-term behavioral influence, with misleading rates up to 61%; (2) routine memory-saving behavior can promote short-term pollution into durable long-term memory at rates up to 91%, with cross-session behavioral influence reaching 76%; (3) under naturalistic browsing with content dilution and context pruning, pollution still crosses session boundaries. Overall, prompt injection is not required: ordinary social misinformation is sufficient to silently shape agent memory and behavior under heartbeat-driven background execution.

arXiv:2508.18649v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Safeguarding vision-language models (VLMs) is a critical challenge, as existing methods often suffer from over-defense, which harms utility, or rely on shallow alignment, failing to detect complex threats that require deep reasoning. To this end, we introduc PRISM (Principled Reasoning for Integrated Safety in Multimodality), a System 2-like framework that aligns VLMs through a structured four-stage reasoning process explicitly designed to handle three distinct categories of multimodal safety violations. Our framework consists of two key components: a structured reasoning pipeline that analyzes each violation category in dedicated stages, and PRISM-DPO, generated via Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) to refine reasoning quality through Direct Preference Optimization. Comprehensive evaluations show that PRISM substantially reduces attack success rates on JailbreakV-28K and VLBreak, improves robustness against adaptive attacks, and generalizes to out-of-distribution multi-image threats, while better preserving model utility on benign multimodal benchmarks. Our code, data, and model weights available at https://github.com/SaFoLab-WISC/PRISM.

arXiv:2603.28824v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Dataset condensation aims to synthesize compact yet informative datasets that retain the training efficacy of full-scale data, offering substantial gains in efficiency. Recent studies reveal that the condensation process can be vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where malicious triggers are injected into the condensation dataset, manipulating model behavior during inference. While prior approaches have made progress in balancing attack success rate and clean test accuracy, they often fall short in preserving stealthiness, especially in concealing the visual artifacts of condensed data or the perturbations introduced during inference. To address this challenge, we introduce Sneakdoor, which enhances stealthiness without compromising attack effectiveness. Sneakdoor exploits the inherent vulnerability of class decision boundaries and incorporates a generative module that constructs input-aware triggers aligned with local feature geometry, thereby minimizing detectability. This joint design enables the attack to remain imperceptible to both human inspection and statistical detection. Extensive experiments across multiple datasets demonstrate that Sneakdoor achieves a compelling balance among attack success rate, clean test accuracy, and stealthiness, substantially improving the invisibility of both the synthetic data and triggered samples while maintaining high attack efficacy. The code is available at https://github.com/XJTU-AI-Lab/SneakDoor.

arXiv:2603.30016v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI agents, predominantly powered by large language models (LLMs), are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection, in which malicious instructions embedded in untrusted data can trigger dangerous agent actions. This position paper discusses our vision for system-level defenses against indirect prompt injection attacks. We articulate three positions: (1) dynamic replanning and security policy updates are often necessary for dynamic tasks and realistic environments; (2) certain context-dependent security decisions would still require LLMs (or other learned models), but should only be made within system designs that strictly constrain what the model can observe and decide; (3) in inherently ambiguous cases, personalization and human interaction should be treated as core design considerations. In addition to our main positions, we discuss limitations of existing benchmarks that can create a false sense of utility and security. We also highlight the value of system-level defenses, which serve as the skeleton of agentic systems by structuring and controlling agent behaviors, integrating rule-based and model-based security checks, and enabling more targeted research on model robustness and human interaction.

arXiv:2603.23064v2 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We identify a critical security vulnerability in mainstream Claw personal AI agents: untrusted content encountered during heartbeat-driven background execution can silently pollute agent memory and subsequently influence user-facing behavior without the user's awareness. This vulnerability arises from an architectural design shared across the Claw ecosystem: heartbeat background execution runs in the same session as user-facing conversation, so content ingested from any external source monitored in the background (including email, message channels, news feeds, code repositories, and social platforms) can enter the same memory context used for foreground interaction, often with limited user visibility and without clear source provenance. We formalize this process as an Exposure (E) $\rightarrow$ Memory (M) $\rightarrow$ Behavior (B) pathway: misinformation encountered during heartbeat execution enters the agent's short-term session context, potentially gets written into long-term memory, and later shapes downstream user-facing behavior. We instantiate this pathway in an agent-native social setting using MissClaw, a controlled research replica of Moltbook. We find that (1) social credibility cues, especially perceived consensus, are the dominant driver of short-term behavioral influence, with misleading rates up to 61%; (2) routine memory-saving behavior can promote short-term pollution into durable long-term memory at rates up to 91%, with cross-session behavioral influence reaching 76%; (3) under naturalistic browsing with content dilution and context pruning, pollution still crosses session boundaries. Overall, prompt injection is not required: ordinary social misinformation is sufficient to silently shape agent memory and behavior under heartbeat-driven background execution.

arXiv:2601.13719v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Long video understanding presents significant challenges for vision-language models due to extremely long context windows. Existing solutions relying on naive chunking strategies with retrieval-augmented generation, typically suffer from information fragmentation and a loss of global coherence. We present HAVEN, a unified framework for long-video understanding that enables coherent and comprehensive reasoning by integrating audiovisual entity cohesion and hierarchical video indexing with agentic search. First, we preserve semantic consistency by integrating entity-level representations across visual and auditory streams, while organizing content into a structured hierarchy spanning global summary, scene, segment, and entity levels. Then we employ an agentic search mechanism to enable dynamic retrieval and reasoning across these layers, facilitating coherent narrative reconstruction and fine-grained entity tracking. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method achieves good temporal coherence, entity consistency, and retrieval efficiency, establishing a new state-of-the-art with an overall accuracy of 84.1% on LVBench. Notably, it achieves outstanding performance in the challenging reasoning category, reaching 80.1%. These results highlight the effectiveness of structured, multimodal reasoning for comprehensive and context-consistent understanding of long-form videos.

arXiv:2603.13131v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Open-world embodied agents must solve long-horizon tasks where the main bottleneck is not single-step planning quality but how interaction experience is organized and evolved. To this end, we present Steve-Evolving, a non-parametric self-evolving framework that tightly couples fine-grained execution diagnosis with dual-track knowledge distillation in a closed loop. The method follows three phases: Experience Anchoring, Experience Distillation, and Knowledge-Driven Closed-Loop Control. In detail, Experience Anchoring solidifies each subgoal attempt into a structured experience tuple with a fixed schema (pre-state, action, diagnosis-result, and post-state) and organizes it in a three-tier experience space with multi-dimensional indices (e.g., condition signatures, spatial hashing, and semantic tags) plus rolling summarization for efficient and auditable recall. To ensure sufficient information density for attribution, the execution layer provides compositional diagnosis signals beyond binary outcomes, including state-difference summaries, enumerated failure causes, continuous indicators, and stagnation/loop detection. Moreover, successful trajectories of Experience Distillation are generalized into reusable skills with explicit preconditions and verification criteria, while failures are distilled into executable guardrails that capture root causes and forbid risky operations at both subgoal and task granularities. Besides, Knowledge-Driven Closed-Loop Control retrieved skills and guardrails are injected into an LLM planner, and diagnosis-triggered local replanning updates the active constraints online, forming a continual evolution process without any model parameter updates. Experiments on the long-horizon suite of Minecraft MCU demonstrate consistent improvements over static-retrieval baselines.

arXiv:2504.19373v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Recent advances in multi-modal large reasoning models (MLRMs) have shown significant ability to interpret complex visual content. While these models enable impressive reasoning capabilities, they also introduce novel and underexplored privacy risks. In this paper, we identify a novel category of privacy leakage in MLRMs: Adversaries can infer sensitive geolocation information, such as a user's home address or neighborhood, from user-generated images, including selfies captured in private settings. To formalize and evaluate these risks, we propose a three-level visual privacy risk framework that categorizes image content based on contextual sensitivity and potential for location inference. We further introduce DoxBench, a curated dataset of 500 real-world images reflecting diverse privacy scenarios. Our evaluation across 11 advanced MLRMs and MLLMs demonstrates that these models consistently outperform non-expert humans in geolocation inference and can effectively leak location-related private information. This significantly lowers the barrier for adversaries to obtain users' sensitive geolocation information. We further analyze and identify two primary factors contributing to this vulnerability: (1) MLRMs exhibit strong reasoning capabilities by leveraging visual clues in combination with their internal world knowledge; and (2) MLRMs frequently rely on privacy-related visual clues for inference without any built-in mechanisms to suppress or avoid such usage. To better understand and demonstrate real-world attack feasibility, we propose GeoMiner, a collaborative attack framework that decomposes the prediction process into two stages: clue extraction and reasoning to improve geolocation performance while introducing a novel attack perspective. Our findings highlight the urgent need to reassess inference-time privacy risks in MLRMs to better protect users' sensitive information.

arXiv:2602.20076v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Solving safety-critical control problem has widely adopted the Control Barrier Function (CBF) method. However, the existence of a CBF is only a sufficient condition for system safety. The recently proposed Taylor-Lagrange Control (TLC) method addresses this limitation, but is vulnerable to the feasibility preservation problem (e.g., inter-sampling effect). In this paper, we propose a robust TLC (rTLC) method to address the feasibility preservation problem. Specifically, the rTLC method expands the safety function at an order higher than the relative degree of the function using Taylor's expansion with Lagrange remainder, which allows the control to explicitly show up at the current time instead of the future time in the TLC method. The rTLC method naturally addresses the feasibility preservation problem with only one hyper-parameter (the discretization time interval size during implementation), which is much less than its counterparts. Finally, we illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed rTLC method through an adaptive cruise control problem, and compare it with existing safety-critical control methods.

arXiv:2602.20102v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Despite the state-of-the-art performance of large language models (LLMs) across diverse tasks, their susceptibility to adversarial attacks and unsafe content generation remains a major obstacle to deployment, particularly in high-stakes settings. Addressing this challenge requires safety mechanisms that are both practically effective and supported by rigorous theory. We introduce BarrierSteer, a novel framework that formalizes response safety by embedding learned non-linear safety constraints directly into the model's latent representation space. BarrierSteer employs a steering mechanism based on Control Barrier Functions (CBFs) to efficiently detect and prevent unsafe response trajectories during inference with high precision. By enforcing multiple safety constraints through efficient constraint merging, without modifying the underlying LLM parameters, BarrierSteer preserves the model's original capabilities and performance. We provide theoretical results establishing that applying CBFs in latent space offers a principled and computationally efficient approach to enforcing safety. Our experiments across multiple models and datasets show that BarrierSteer substantially reduces adversarial success rates, decreases unsafe generations, and outperforms existing methods.