arXiv:2605.25771v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Multi-domain graph pre-training is a crucial step in constructing foundational graph models with cross-domain generalization capabilities. However, existing methods predominantly rely on jointly training all source domain graphs, resulting in high computational costs. Furthermore, it remains unclear whether all source domain graph data contribute equally to effective transfer. This paper empirically reveals significant data redundancy in multi-domain graph pre-training. Based on this finding, we propose the Multi-domain Graph Pre-training Framework, MDGMIX, which combines boundary-aware subgraph mixing with hierarchical discrimination. By selecting boundary nodes to construct challenging mixed-domain subgraphs, MDGMIX employs coarse-grained domain discrimination and fine-grained domain decomposition losses to decouple shared patterns from domain-specific patterns. During adaptation, MDGMIX employs a lightweight prompt weighting mechanism to transfer source domain knowledge. Extensive experiments demonstrate that MDGMIX consistently outperforms strong baselines in few-shot classification tasks while exhibiting superior time and memory efficiency. The code is available at: https://github.com/zhengziyu77/MDGMIX.

arXiv:2603.07452v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Backdoor mechanisms have traditionally been studied as security threats that compromise the integrity of machine learning models. However, the same mechanism -- the conditional activation of specific behaviors through input triggers -- can also serve as a controllable and auditable interface for trustworthy model behavior. In this work, we present \textbf{Backdoor4Good (B4G)}, a unified benchmark and framework for \textit{beneficial backdoor} applications in large language models (LLMs). Unlike conventional backdoor studies focused on attacks and defenses, B4G repurposes backdoor conditioning for Beneficial Tasks that enhance safety, controllability, and accountability. It formalizes beneficial backdoor learning under a triplet formulation $(T, A, U)$, representing the \emph{Trigger}, \emph{Activation mechanism}, and \emph{Utility function}, and implements a benchmark covering four trust-centric applications. Through extensive experiments across Llama3.1-8B, Gemma-2-9B, Qwen2.5-7B, and Llama2-13B, we show that beneficial backdoors can achieve high controllability, tamper-resistance, and stealthiness while preserving clean-task performance. Our findings demonstrate new insights that backdoors need not be inherently malicious; when properly designed, they can serve as modular, interpretable, and beneficial building blocks for trustworthy AI systems. Our code and datasets are available at https://github.com/bboylyg/BackdoorLLM/B4G.