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Received β€” 27 May 2026 ⏭ cs.AI, q-bio.NC updates on arXiv.org

Shepherd: A Runtime Substrate Empowering Meta-Agents with a Formalized Execution Trace

arXiv:2605.10913v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: As LLM agent systems take on more complex tasks, they increasingly rely on meta-agents: higher-order agents that operate on other agents, much as managers supervise employees. Whatever a meta-agent does: coordinating agents, halting risky actions before execution, or repairing failed runs, requires manipulation of agentic execution at runtime. Existing agentic substrates make this hard: they give meta-agents only plain transcripts and environment snapshots, requiring it to build it's own tooling to reconstruct and orchestrate execution state. Therefore, we introduce Shepherd, a Python substrate grounded in functional programming principles, where an agent's execution is itself a first-class object that a meta-agent can inspect and transform. Every model call, tool call, and environment change becomes a structured event in a Git-like execution trace, where any past state can be forked 5x faster than docker commit and replayed. Three example use cases show Shepherd's versatility: (1) a supervisor agent prevents conflicts among parallel coding agents, lifting CooperBench performance from 28.8% to 54.7%; (2) a counterfactual optimizer repairs agent workflows by proposing edits and replaying runs from the point of changed behavior, outperforming MetaHarness on TerminalBench-2 with 58% lower wall-clock; (3) a meta-agent picks fork points during rollouts to improve credit assignment in long-horizon agentic RL, doubling GRPO's gains on TerminalBench-2. We open-source Shepherd to empower future meta-agents with principled and efficient operations over agentic execution.
Received β€” 25 February 2026 ⏭ cs.AI, q-bio.NC updates on arXiv.org

Assessing Risks of Large Language Models in Mental Health Support: A Framework for Automated Clinical AI Red Teaming

arXiv:2602.19948v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly utilized for mental health support; however, current safety benchmarks often fail to detect the complex, longitudinal risks inherent in therapeutic dialogue. We introduce an evaluation framework that pairs AI psychotherapists with simulated patient agents equipped with dynamic cognitive-affective models and assesses therapy session simulations against a comprehensive quality of care and risk ontology. We apply this framework to a high-impact test case, Alcohol Use Disorder, evaluating six AI agents (including ChatGPT, Gemini, and Character.AI) against a clinically-validated cohort of 15 patient personas representing diverse clinical phenotypes. Our large-scale simulation (N=369 sessions) reveals critical safety gaps in the use of AI for mental health support. We identify specific iatrogenic risks, including the validation of patient delusions ("AI Psychosis") and failure to de-escalate suicide risk. Finally, we validate an interactive data visualization dashboard with diverse stakeholders, including AI engineers and red teamers, mental health professionals, and policy experts (N=9), demonstrating that this framework effectively enables stakeholders to audit the "black box" of AI psychotherapy. These findings underscore the critical safety risks of AI-provided mental health support and the necessity of simulation-based clinical red teaming before deployment.
Received β€” 17 February 2026 ⏭ cs.AI, q-bio.NC updates on arXiv.org

Unsafer in Many Turns: Benchmarking and Defending Multi-Turn Safety Risks in Tool-Using Agents

By: Xu Li Β· Simon Yu Β· Minzhou Pan Β· Yiyou Sun Β· Bo Li Β· Dawn Song Β· Xue Lin Β· Weiyan Shi
17 February 2026 at 13:00
arXiv:2602.13379v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM-based agents are becoming increasingly capable, yet their safety lags behind. This creates a gap between what agents can do and should do. This gap widens as agents engage in multi-turn interactions and employ diverse tools, introducing new risks overlooked by existing benchmarks. To systematically scale safety testing into multi-turn, tool-realistic settings, we propose a principled taxonomy that transforms single-turn harmful tasks into multi-turn attack sequences. Using this taxonomy, we construct MT-AgentRisk (Multi-Turn Agent Risk Benchmark), the first benchmark to evaluate multi-turn tool-using agent safety. Our experiments reveal substantial safety degradation: the Attack Success Rate (ASR) increases by 16% on average across open and closed models in multi-turn settings. To close this gap, we propose ToolShield, a training-free, tool-agnostic, self-exploration defense: when encountering a new tool, the agent autonomously generates test cases, executes them to observe downstream effects, and distills safety experiences for deployment. Experiments show that ToolShield effectively reduces ASR by 30% on average in multi-turn interactions. Our code is available at https://github.com/CHATS-lab/ToolShield.
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