arXiv:2604.03976v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Prior work on trustworthy AI emphasizes model-internal properties such as bias mitigation, adversarial robustness, and interpretability. As AI systems evolve into autonomous agents deployed in open environments and increasingly connected to payments or assets, the operational meaning of trust shifts to end-to-end outcomes: whether an agent completes tasks, follows user intent, and avoids failures that cause material or psychological harm. These risks are fundamentally product-level and cannot be eliminated by technical safeguards alone because agent behavior is inherently stochastic. To address this gap between model-level reliability and user-facing assurance, we propose a complementary framework based on risk management. Drawing inspiration from financial underwriting, we introduce the \textbf{Agentic Risk Standard (ARS)}, a payment settlement standard for AI-mediated transactions. ARS integrates risk assessment, underwriting, and compensation into a single transaction framework that protects users when interacting with agents. Under ARS, users receive predefined and contractually enforceable compensation in cases of execution failure, misalignment, or unintended outcomes. This shifts trust from an implicit expectation about model behavior to an explicit, measurable, and enforceable product guarantee. We also present a simulation study analyzing the social benefits of applying ARS to agentic transactions. ARS's implementation can be found at https://github.com/t54-labs/AgenticRiskStandard.

arXiv:2604.04759v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: OpenClaw, the most widely deployed personal AI agent in early 2026, operates with full local system access and integrates with sensitive services such as Gmail, Stripe, and the filesystem. While these broad privileges enable high levels of automation and powerful personalization, they also expose a substantial attack surface that existing sandboxed evaluations fail to capture. To address this gap, we present the first real-world safety evaluation of OpenClaw and introduce the CIK taxonomy, which unifies an agent's persistent state into three dimensions, i.e., Capability, Identity, and Knowledge, for safety analysis. Our evaluations cover 12 attack scenarios on a live OpenClaw instance across four backbone models (Claude Sonnet 4.5, Opus 4.6, Gemini 3.1 Pro, and GPT-5.4). The results show that poisoning any single CIK dimension increases the average attack success rate from 24.6% to 64-74%, with even the most robust model exhibiting more than a threefold increase over its baseline vulnerability. We further assess three CIK-aligned defense strategies alongside a file-protection mechanism; however, the strongest defense still yields a 63.8% success rate under Capability-targeted attacks, while file protection blocks 97% of malicious injections but also prevents legitimate updates. Taken together, these findings show that the vulnerabilities are inherent to the agent architecture, necessitating more systematic safeguards to secure personal AI agents. Our project page is https://ucsc-vlaa.github.io/CIK-Bench.