arXiv:2602.05183v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly trained in complex Reinforcement Learning, multi-agent environments, making it difficult to understand how behavior changes over training. Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) have recently shown to be useful for data-centric interpretability. In this work, we analyze large-scale reinforcement learning training runs from the sophisticated environment of Full-Press Diplomacy by applying pretrained SAEs, alongside LLM-summarizer methods. We introduce Meta-Autointerp, a method for grouping SAE features into interpretable hypotheses about training dynamics. We discover fine-grained behaviors including role-playing patterns, degenerate outputs, language switching, alongside high-level strategic behaviors and environment-specific bugs. Through automated evaluation, we validate that 90% of discovered SAE Meta-Features are significant, and find a surprising reward hacking behavior. However, through two user studies, we find that even subjectively interesting and seemingly helpful SAE features may be worse than useless to humans, along with most LLM generated hypotheses. However, a subset of SAE-derived hypotheses are predictively useful for downstream tasks. We further provide validation by augmenting an untrained agent's system prompt, improving the score by +14.2%. Overall, we show that SAEs and LLM-summarizer provide complementary views into agent behavior, and together our framework forms a practical starting point for future data-centric interpretability work on ensuring trustworthy LLM behavior throughout training.

arXiv:2511.02997v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As AI systems become more capable and widely deployed as agents, ensuring their safe operation becomes critical. AI control offers one approach to mitigating the risk from untrusted AI agents by monitoring their actions and intervening or auditing when necessary. Evaluating the safety of these protocols requires understanding both their effectiveness against current attacks and their robustness to adaptive adversaries. In this work, we systematically evaluate a range of control protocols in SHADE-Arena, a dataset of diverse agentic environments. First, we evaluate blue team protocols, including deferral to trusted models, resampling, and deferring on critical actions, against a default attack policy. We find that resampling for incrimination and deferring on critical actions perform best, increasing safety from 50% to 96%. We then iterate on red team strategies against these protocols and find that attack policies with additional affordances, such as knowledge of when resampling occurs or the ability to simulate monitors, can substantially improve attack success rates against our resampling strategy, decreasing safety to 17%. However, deferring on critical actions is highly robust to even our strongest red team strategies, demonstrating the importance of denying attack policies access to protocol internals.