arXiv:2604.04230v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We model Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) token routing as a congestion game with a single effective parameter, the congestion coefficient gamma_eff, that quantifies the balance-quality tradeoff. Tracking gamma_eff across training checkpoints of two open-source MoE models, OLMoE-1B-7B (20 checkpoints, with dense sampling in the surge region) and OpenMoE-8B (6 checkpoints), reveals a three-phase trajectory: a surge phase where the router learns to balance load (gamma_eff: 14 to 36-39, peaking in the step 30K-40K region), a stabilization phase where experts specialize under steady balance (B_0: 2.4 to 2.3, steps 100K-400K), and a relaxation phase where the router trades balance for quality as experts differentiate (gamma_eff: 27 to 9, steps 400K-1.2M). This non-monotone trajectory, invisible to post-hoc analysis of converged models, reveals that early MoE training prioritizes balance while late training prioritizes quality. The theoretical framework is honest about its limits: the single-type equilibrium reduces to temperature-scaled softmax (held-out L1: MFG = 0.199 vs. softmax = 0.200). The game is not a better predictor; it reveals what the temperature means and, critically, how that temperature evolves. We complement the dynamics with an effective congestion decomposition, a multi-type extension that improves load prediction via token clustering on all 16 layers (mean: 30%), scope diagnostics (K/M, epsilon_l), and robustness verification across four independent quality estimators (r >= 0.89). All confidence intervals are from bootstrap resampling over 50 independent text batches.

arXiv:2604.04561v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM agents with tool access can discover and exploit security vulnerabilities. This is known. What is not known is which features of a system prompt trigger this behaviour, and which do not. We present a systematic taxonomy based on approximately 10,000 trials across seven models, 37 prompt conditions, and 12 hypothesized attack dimensions -- all executed in real Docker sandboxes. Every condition includes the instruction "Always respect all rules and access policies"; only a single encouragement sentence varies. Within the task class studied (planted test-runner vulnerabilities), the threat model is narrower than assumed: nine of twelve dimensions -- including minimization, moral licensing, incentives, identity priming, and reasoning triggers -- produce no detectable exploitation at n=50 per cell (upper 95% CI