arXiv:2604.03473v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Uncertainty quantification (UQ) methods for large language models are predominantly designed by hand based on domain knowledge and heuristics, limiting their scalability and generality. We apply LLM-powered evolutionary search to automatically discover unsupervised UQ methods represented as Python programs. On the task of atomic claim verification, our evolved methods outperform strong manually-designed baselines, achieving up to 6.7% relative ROC-AUC improvement across 9 datasets while generalizing robustly out-of-distribution. Qualitative analysis reveals that different LLMs employ qualitatively distinct evolutionary strategies: Claude models consistently design high-feature-count linear estimators, while Gpt-oss-120B gravitates toward simpler and more interpretable positional weighting schemes. Surprisingly, only Sonnet 4.5 and Opus 4.5 reliably leverage increased method complexity to improve performance -- Opus 4.6 shows an unexpected regression relative to its predecessor. Overall, our results indicate that LLM-powered evolutionary search is a promising paradigm for automated, interpretable hallucination detector design.

arXiv:2509.22067v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Activation steering is a promising technique for controlling LLM behavior by adding semantically meaningful vectors directly into a model's hidden states during inference. It is often framed as a precise, interpretable, and potentially safer alternative to fine-tuning. We demonstrate the opposite: steering systematically breaks model alignment safeguards, making it comply with harmful requests. Through extensive experiments on different model families, we show that even steering in a random direction can increase the probability of harmful compliance from 0% to 1-13%. Alarmingly, steering benign features from a sparse autoencoder (SAE), a common source of interpretable directions, demonstrates a comparable harmful potential. Finally, we show that combining 20 randomly sampled vectors that jailbreak a single prompt creates a universal attack, significantly increasing harmful compliance on unseen requests. These results challenge the paradigm of safety through interpretability, showing that precise control over model internals does not guarantee precise control over model behavior.