arXiv:2602.11478v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Mental events are considered to supervene on physical events. A supervenient event does not change without a corresponding change in the underlying subvenient physical events. Since wholes and their parts exhibit the same supervenience-subvenience relations, inter-level causation has been expected to serve as a model for mental causation. We proposed an inter-level causation mechanism to construct a model of consciousness and an agent's self-determination. However, a significant gap exists between this mechanism and cognitive functions. Here, we demonstrate how to integrate the inter-level causation mechanism with the widely known dual-process theories. We assume that the supervenience level is composed of multiple supervenient functions (i.e., neural networks), and we argue that inter-level causation can be achieved by controlling the feedback error defined through changing algebraic expressions combining these functions. Using inter-level causation allows for a dual laws model in which each level possesses its own distinct dynamics. In this framework, the feedback error is determined independently by two processes: (1) the selection of equations combining supervenient functions, and (2) the negative feedback error reduction to satisfy the equations through adjustments of neurons and synapses. We interpret these two independent feedback controls as Type 1 and Type 2 processes in the dual process theories. As a result, theories of consciousness, agency, and dual process theory are unified into a single framework, and the characteristic features of Type 1 and Type 2 processes are naturally derived.

arXiv:2603.12662v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Objectively verifying the generative mechanism of consciousness is extremely difficult because of its subjective nature. As long as theories of consciousness focus solely on its generative mechanism, developing a theory remains challenging. We believe that broadening the theoretical scope and enhancing theoretical unification are necessary to establish a theory of consciousness. This study proposes seven questions that theories of consciousness should address: phenomena, self, causation, state, function, contents, and universality. The questions were designed to examine the functional aspects of consciousness and its applicability to system design. Next, we will examine how our proposed Dual-Laws Model (DLM) can address these questions. Based on our theory, we anticipate two unique features of a conscious system: autonomy in constructing its own goals and cognitive decoupling from external stimuli. We contend that systems with these capabilities differ fundamentally from machines that merely follow human instructions. This makes a design theory that enables high moral behavior indispensable.