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EchoDistill:Alignment Noisy-to-Clean Self-Distillation for Robust Audio LLMs

arXiv:2605.23954v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Audio Large Language Models (ALLMs) are highly vulnerable to real-world noise, which often induces severe semantic drift and hallucinations. Existing robustness methods primarily rely on waveform-level acoustic enhancement, answer-level supervision, or the internal suppression of noise representations. To address these issues, we propose echodistill, an alignment-based noisy-to-clean self-distillation framework. Echodistill leverages a frozen clean-audio teacher to provide semantic references for an inference-time noisy-audio student. Specifically, the student samples candidate responses under noisy conditions to expose its test-time behavior. These trajectories are then optimized via group-relative policy optimization (GRPO), where the token-level consistency with the teacher acts as a reward bonus. By aligning the noisy student's candidate responses with clean semantic evidence, and applying audio-aware reward shaping, our method encourages reasoning trajectories that are both correct and genuinely acoustically grounded. Echodistill significantly improves the semantic reliability and task performance of Audio LLMs under complex noise, without introducing any additional inference costs. Extensive experiments show that: (I) Compared with the strongest baseline, echodistill achieves average improvements of 4.18\%$\uparrow$ in GSR under strong noise. (II) Ablation results on Qwen-Omni further show that echodistill improves over the GRPO-only variant by 3.02\%$\uparrow$ in Acc, 3.89\%$\uparrow$ in Noisy, and 4.53\%$\uparrow$ in GSR on average. Our codes are available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/echodistill-10DE.

SafeSeek: Universal Attribution of Safety Circuits in Language Models

arXiv:2603.23268v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Mechanistic interpretability reveals that safety-critical behaviors (e.g., alignment, jailbreak, backdoor) in Large Language Models (LLMs) are grounded in specialized functional components. However, existing safety attribution methods struggle with generalization and reliability due to their reliance on heuristic, domain-specific metrics and search algorithms. To address this, we propose \ourmethod, a unified safety interpretability framework that identifies functionally complete safety circuits in LLMs via optimization. Unlike methods focusing on isolated heads or neurons, \ourmethod introduces differentiable binary masks to extract multi-granular circuits through gradient descent on safety datasets, while integrates Safety Circuit Tuning to utilize these sparse circuits for efficient safety fine-tuning. We validate \ourmethod in two key scenarios in LLM safety: \textbf{(1) backdoor attacks}, identifying a backdoor circuit with 0.42\% sparsity, whose ablation eradicates the Attack Success Rate (ASR) from 100\% $\to$ 0.4\% while retaining over 99\% general utility; \textbf{(2) safety alignment}, localizing an alignment circuit with 3.03\% heads and 0.79\% neurons, whose removal spikes ASR from 0.8\% $\to$ 96.9\%, whereas excluding this circuit during helpfulness fine-tuning maintains 96.5\% safety retention.
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