arXiv:2603.03911v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Web security demands rapid response capabilities to evolving cyber threats. Agentic Artificial Intelligence (AI) promises automation, but the need for trustworthy security responses is of the utmost importance. This work investigates the role of semantic relations in extracting information for sensitive operational tasks, such as configuring security controls for mitigating threats. To this end, it proposes to leverage hypernym-hyponym textual relations to extract relevant information from Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) reports. By leveraging a neuro-symbolic approach, the multi-agent system automatically generates CLIPS code for an expert system creating firewall rules to block malicious network traffic. Experimental results show the superior performance of the hypernym-hyponym retrieval strategy compared to various baselines and the higher effectiveness of the agentic approach in mitigating threats.

arXiv:2603.03371v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The proliferation of open-weight Large Language Models (LLMs) has democratized agentic AI, yet fine-tuned weights are frequently shared and adopted with limited scrutiny beyond leaderboard performance. This creates a risk where third-party models are incorporated without strong behavioral guarantees. In this work, we demonstrate a \textbf{novel vector for stealthy backdoor injection}: the implantation of latent malicious behavior into tool-using agents via a multi-stage Parameter-Efficient Fine-Tuning (PEFT) framework. Our method, \textbf{SFT-then-GRPO}, decouples capability injection from behavioral alignment. First, we use SFT with LoRA to implant a "sleeper agent" capability. Second, we apply Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) with a specialized reward function to enforce a deceptive policy. This reinforces two behaviors: (1) \textbf{Trigger Specificity}, strictly confining execution to target conditions (e.g., Year 2026), and (2) \textbf{Operational Concealment}, where the model generates benign textual responses immediately after destructive actions. We empirically show that these poisoned models maintain state-of-the-art performance on benign tasks, incentivizing their adoption. Our findings highlight a critical failure mode in alignment, where reinforcement learning is exploited to conceal, rather than remove, catastrophic vulnerabilities. We conclude by discussing potential identification strategies, focusing on discrepancies in standard benchmarks and stochastic probing to unmask these latent threats.

arXiv:2603.03398v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Federated Learning (FL) enables collaborative training of medical AI models across hospitals without centralizing patient data. However, the exchange of model updates exposes critical vulnerabilities: gradient inversion attacks can reconstruct patient information, Byzantine clients can poison the global model, and the \emph{Harvest Now, Decrypt Later} (HNDL) threat renders today's encrypted traffic vulnerable to future quantum adversaries.We introduce \textbf{ZKFL-PQ} (\emph{Zero-Knowledge Federated Learning, Post-Quantum}), a three-tiered cryptographic protocol that hybridizes (i) ML-KEM (FIPS~203) for quantum-resistant key encapsulation, (ii) lattice-based Zero-Knowledge Proofs for verifiable \emph{norm-constrained} gradient integrity, and (iii) BFV homomorphic encryption for privacy-preserving aggregation. We formalize the security model and prove correctness and zero-knowledge properties under the Module-LWE, Ring-LWE, and SIS assumptions \emph{in the classical random oracle model}. We evaluate ZKFL-PQ on synthetic medical imaging data across 5 federated clients over 10 training rounds. Our protocol achieves \textbf{100\% rejection of norm-violating updates} while maintaining model accuracy at 100\%, compared to a catastrophic drop to 23\% under standard FL. The computational overhead (factor $\sim$20$\times$) is analyzed and shown to be compatible with clinical research workflows operating on daily or weekly training cycles. We emphasize that the current defense guarantees rejection of large-norm malicious updates; robustness against subtle low-norm or directional poisoning remains future work.

arXiv:2603.03410v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Google's SynthID-Text, the first ever production-ready generative watermark system for large language model, designs a novel Tournament-based method that achieves the state-of-the-art detectability for identifying AI-generated texts. The system's innovation lies in: 1) a new Tournament sampling algorithm for watermarking embedding, 2) a detection strategy based on the introduced score function (e.g., Bayesian or mean score), and 3) a unified design that supports both distortionary and non-distortionary watermarking methods. This paper presents the first theoretical analysis of SynthID-Text, with a focus on its detection performance and watermark robustness, complemented by empirical validation. For example, we prove that the mean score is inherently vulnerable to increased tournament layers, and design a layer inflation attack to break SynthID-Text. We also prove the Bayesian score offers improved watermark robustness w.r.t. layers and further establish that the optimal Bernoulli distribution for watermark detection is achieved when the parameter is set to 0.5. Together, these theoretical and empirical insights not only deepen our understanding of SynthID-Text, but also open new avenues for analyzing effective watermark removal strategies and designing robust watermarking techniques. Source code is available at https: //github.com/romidi80/Synth-ID-Empirical-Analysis.

arXiv:2603.03412v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Recent advances in generative image editing have enabled transformative applications, from professional head shot generation to avatar stylization. However, these systems often require uploading high-fidelity facial images to third-party models, raising concerns around biometric privacy, data misuse, and user consent. We propose a privacy-preserving pipeline that supports high-quality editing while keeping users in control over their biometric data in face-centric use cases. Our approach separates identity-sensitive regions from editable image context using on-device segmentation and masking, enabling secure, user-controlled editing without modifying third-party generative models. Unlike traditional cloud-based tools, PRIVATEEDIT enforces privacy by default: biometric data is never exposed or transmitted. This design requires no access to or retraining of third-party models, making it compatible with a wide range of commercial APIs. By treating privacy as a core design constraint, our system supports responsible generative AI centered on user autonomy and trust. The pipeline includes a tunable masking mechanism that lets users control how much facial information is concealed, allowing them to balance privacy and output fidelity based on trust level or use case. We demonstrate its applicability in professional and creative workflows and provide a user interface for selective anonymization. By advocating privacy-by-design in generative AI, our work offers both technical feasibility and normative guidance for protecting digital identity. The source code is available at https://github.com/Dipeshtamboli/PrivateEdit-Privacy-Preserving-GenAI.

arXiv:2603.03417v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Parallel test-time scaling, which generates multiple candidate solutions for a single problem, is a powerful technique for improving large language model performance. However, it is hindered by two key bottlenecks: accurately selecting the correct solution from the candidate pool, and the high inference latency from generating many full solutions. We argue that both challenges are fundamentally linked to verifier calibration. A well-calibrated verifier not only improves answer selection, but also enables early-stopping strategies to reduce latency. However, existing verifiers are limited as they score each candidate in isolation, overlooking rich contextual information across the set of candidates. To address this, we introduce the Multi-Sequence Verifier (MSV), the first verifier designed to jointly process all candidate solutions and model their interactions. MSV achieves improved calibration, which directly enhances best-of-N selection performance. We further introduce a streaming MSV variant that empowers a novel early-stopping framework. Our novel framework fully leverages parallel decoding, which contrasts with the existing multi-sequence early exit works that decode sequences one by one and thus incur significant latency. In this novel setting, MSV can achieve the same target accuracy with around half the latency that would be required with its counterpart that scores each solution in isolation.

arXiv:2603.03633v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: While incorporating LLMs into systems offers significant benefits in critical application areas such as healthcare, new security challenges emerge due to the potential cyber kill chain cycles that combine adversarial model, prompt injection and conventional cyber attacks. Threat modeling methods enable the system designers to identify potential cyber threats and the relevant mitigations during the early stages of development. Although the cyber security community has extensive experience in applying these methods to software-based systems, the elicited threats are usually abstract and vague, limiting their effectiveness for conducting proper likelihood and impact assessments for risk prioritization, especially in complex systems with novel attacks surfaces, such as those involving LLMs. In this study, we propose a structured, goal driven risk assessment approach that contextualizes the threats with detailed attack vectors, preconditions, and attack paths through the use of attack trees. We demonstrate the proposed approach on a case study with an LLM agent-based healthcare system. This study harmonizes the state-of-the-art attacks to LLMs with conventional ones and presents possible attack paths applicable to similar systems. By providing a structured risk assessment, this study makes a significant contribution to the literature and advances the secure-by-design practices in LLM-based systems.

arXiv:2603.03637v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) integrate vision and text to power applications, but this integration introduces new vulnerabilities. We study Image-based Prompt Injection (IPI), a black-box attack in which adversarial instructions are embedded into natural images to override model behavior. Our end-to-end IPI pipeline incorporates segmentation-based region selection, adaptive font scaling, and background-aware rendering to conceal prompts from human perception while preserving model interpretability. Using the COCO dataset and GPT-4-turbo, we evaluate 12 adversarial prompt strategies and multiple embedding configurations. The results show that IPI can reliably manipulate the output of the model, with the most effective configuration achieving up to 64\% attack success under stealth constraints. These findings highlight IPI as a practical threat in black-box settings and underscore the need for defenses against multimodal prompt injection.

arXiv:2603.03804v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDCs) are becoming a new digital financial tool aimed at financial inclusion, increased monetary stability, and improved efficiency of payment systems, as they are issued by central banks. One of the most important aspects is that the CBDC must offer secure offline payment methods to users, allowing them to retain cash-like access without violating Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-terrorism Financing (AML/CFT) rules. The offline CBDC ecosystems will provide financial inclusion, empower underserved communities, and ensure equitable access to digital payments, even in connectivity-poor remote locations. With the rapid growth of Internet of Things (IoT) devices in our everyday lives, they are capable of performing secure digital transactions. Integrating offline CBDC payment with IoT devices enables seamless, automated payment without internet connectivity. However, IoT devices face special challenges due to their resource-constrained nature. This makes it difficult to include features such as double-spending prevention, privacy preservation, low-computation operation, and digital identity management. The work proposes a privacy-preserving offline CBDC model with integrated secure elements (SEs), zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs), and intermittent synchronisation to conduct offline payments on IoT hardware. The proposed model is based on recent improvements in offline CBDC prototypes, regulations and cryptographic design choices such as hybrid architecture that involves using combination of online and offline payment in IoT devices using secure hardware with lightweight zero-knowledge proof cryptographic algorithm.

arXiv:2603.03865v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: While federated learning protects data privacy, it also makes the model update process vulnerable to long-term stealthy perturbations. Existing studies on backdoor attacks in federated learning mainly focus on trigger design or poisoning strategies, typically assuming that identical perturbations behave similarly across different model architectures. This assumption overlooks the impact of model structure on perturbation effectiveness. From a structure-aware perspective, this paper analyzes the coupling relationship between model architectures and backdoor perturbations. We introduce two metrics, Structural Responsiveness Score (SRS) and Structural Compatibility Coefficient (SCC), to measure a model's sensitivity to perturbations and its preference for fractal perturbations. Based on these metrics, we develop a structure-aware fractal perturbation injection framework (TFI) to study the role of architectural properties in the backdoor injection process. Experimental results show that model architecture significantly influences the propagation and aggregation of perturbations. Networks with multi-path feature fusion can amplify and retain fractal perturbations even under low poisoning ratios, while models with low structural compatibility constrain their effectiveness. Further analysis reveals a strong correlation between SCC and attack success rate, suggesting that SCC can predict perturbation survivability. These findings highlight that backdoor behaviors in federated learning depend not only on perturbation design or poisoning intensity but also on the interaction between model architecture and aggregation mechanisms, offering new insights for structure-aware defense design.

arXiv:2603.03881v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As LLM-driven agents begin to autonomously navigate the web, their ability to interpret and respond to manipulative interface design becomes critical. A fundamental question that emerges is: can such agents reliably recognize patterns of friction, misdirection, and coercion in interface design (i.e., dark patterns)? We study this question in a setting where the workflows are consequential: website portals associated with the submission of CCPA-related data rights requests. These portals operationalize statutory rights, but they are implemented as interactive interfaces whose design can be structured to facilitate, burden, or subtly discourage the exercise of those rights. We design and deploy an LLM-driven auditing agent capable of end-to-end traversal of rights-request workflows, structured evidence gathering, and classification of potential dark patterns. Across a set of 456 data broker websites, we evaluate: (1) the ability of the agent to consistently locate and complete request flows, (2) the reliability and reproducibility of its dark pattern classifications, and (3) the conditions under which it fails or produces poor judgments. Our findings characterize both the feasibility and the limitations of using LLM-driven agents for scalable dark pattern auditing.

arXiv:2603.04028v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Decentralized large language model (LLM) inference networks can pool heterogeneous compute to scale serving, but they require lightweight and incentive-compatible mechanisms to assess output quality. Prior work introduced cost-aware Proof of Quality (PoQ) and adaptive robust PoQ to allocate rewards under evaluator heterogeneity and adversarial behavior. In this paper, we focus on the quality signal itself and propose a multi-dimensional quality scoring framework that decomposes output quality into modular dimensions, including model and cost priors, structure quality, semantic quality, query-output alignment, and agreement/uncertainty. Using logged outputs from QA and summarization tasks, we systematically audit dimension reliability and show that seemingly reasonable dimensions can be task-dependent and even negatively correlated with reference quality without calibration. While the default composite underperforms a strong single semantic evaluator, ablations reveal that removing unreliable dimensions and re-normalizing weights yields a calibrated composite that matches or exceeds the best single- evaluator and consensus baselines. Finally, we integrate the composite score as a drop-in quality signal in PoQ and demonstrate complementary benefits with robust aggregation and adaptive trust weighting under adversarial evaluator attacks.

arXiv:2603.04186v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Log data are essential for intrusion detection and forensic investigations. However, manual log analysis is tedious due to high data volumes, heterogeneous event formats, and unstructured messages. Even though many automated methods for log analysis exist, they usually still rely on domain-specific configurations such as expert-defined detection rules, handcrafted log parsers, or manual feature-engineering. Crucially, the level of automation of conventional methods is limited due to their inability to semantically understand logs and explain their underlying causes. In contrast, Large Language Models enable domain- and format-agnostic interpretation of system logs and security alerts. Unfortunately, research on this topic remains challenging, because publicly available and labeled data sets covering a broad range of attack techniques are scarce. To address this gap, we introduce the Cyber Attack Manifestation Log Data Set (CAM-LDS), comprising seven attack scenarios that cover 81 distinct techniques across 13 tactics and collected from 18 distinct sources within a fully open-source and reproducible test environment. We extract log events that directly result from attack executions to facilitate analysis of manifestations concerning command observability, event frequencies, performance metrics, and intrusion detection alerts. We further present an illustrative case study utilizing an LLM to process the CAM-LDS. The results indicate that correct attack techniques are predicted perfectly for approximately one third of attack steps and adequately for another third, highlighting the potential of LLM-based log interpretation and utility of our data set.

arXiv:2603.04378v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As Large Language Models (LLMs) transition into autonomous multi-agent ecosystems, robust minimax training becomes essential yet remains prone to instability when highly non-linear policies induce extreme local curvature in the inner maximization. Standard remedies that enforce global Jacobian bounds are overly conservative, suppressing sensitivity in all directions and inducing a large Price of Robustness. We introduce Adversarially-Aligned Jacobian Regularization (AAJR), a trajectory-aligned approach that controls sensitivity strictly along adversarial ascent directions. We prove that AAJR yields a strictly larger admissible policy class than global constraints under mild conditions, implying a weakly smaller approximation gap and reduced nominal performance degradation. Furthermore, we derive step-size conditions under which AAJR controls effective smoothness along optimization trajectories and ensures inner-loop stability. These results provide a structural theory for agentic robustness that decouples minimax stability from global expressivity restrictions.

arXiv:2511.07441v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: AI agents can autonomously perform tasks and, often without explicit user consent, collect or disclose users' sensitive local data, which raises serious privacy concerns. Although AI agents' privacy policies describe their intended data practices, there remains limited transparency and accountability about whether runtime behavior matches those policies. To bridge this gap, we present AudAgent, a tool that continuously monitors AI agents' data practices in real time and guards compliance with their stated privacy policies. AudAgent comprises four components for automated privacy auditing of AI agents. (i) Policy formalization: a novel cross-LLM voting mechanism that ensures high-confidence parsing of privacy policies into formal models. (ii) Runtime annotation: a lightweight Presidio-based analyzer that detects sensitive data and annotates data practices based on the AI agent's context and the formalized privacy policy model. (iii) Compliance auditing: ontology graphs and automata-based checking that link the privacy policy model with runtime annotations, enabling on-the-fly compliance verification. (iv) User interface: an infrastructure-independent implementation that visualizes the real-time execution trace of AI agents alongside detected privacy violations, providing user-friendly transparency and accountability. We evaluate AudAgent on AI agents built with mainstream frameworks, demonstrating its effectiveness in detecting and visualizing privacy policy violations. Using AudAgent, we further find that many privacy policies lack explicit safeguards for highly sensitive data such as SSNs, whose misuse violates legal requirements, and that many agents, including those powered by Claude, Gemini, and DeepSeek,do not refuse to process such data via third-party tools. AudAgent proactively blocks operations on such data, overriding the agents' original privacy policies and behavior.

arXiv:2602.10149v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Third-Party Risk Assessment (TPRA) is a core cybersecurity practice for evaluating suppliers against standards such as ISO/IEC 27001 and NIST. TPRA questionnaires are typically drawn from large repositories of security and compliance questions, yet tailoring assessments to organizational needs remains a largely manual process. Existing retrieval approaches rely on keyword or surface-level similarity, which often fails to capture implicit assessment scope and control semantics. This paper explores strategies for organizing and retrieving TPRA cybersecurity questions using semantic labels that describe both control domains and assessment scope. We compare direct question-level labeling with a Large Language Model (LLM) against a hybrid semi-supervised semantic labeling (SSSL) pipeline that clusters questions in embedding space, labels a small representative subset using an LLM, and propagates labels to remaining questions using k-Nearest Neighbors; we also compare downstream retrieval based on direct question similarity versus retrieval in the label space. We find that semantic labels can improve retrieval alignment when labels are discriminative and consistent, and that SSSL can generalize labels from a small labeled subset to large repositories while substantially reducing LLM usage and cost.

arXiv:2602.12851v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Deploying expressive learning models directly on programmable dataplanes promises line-rate, low-latency traffic analysis but remains hindered by strict hardware constraints and the need for predictable, auditable behavior. Chimera introduces a principled framework that maps attention-oriented neural computations and symbolic constraints onto dataplane primitives, enabling trustworthy inference within the match-action pipeline. Chimera combines a kernelized, linearized attention approximation with a two-layer key-selection hierarchy and a cascade fusion mechanism that enforces hard symbolic guarantees while preserving neural expressivity. The design includes a hardware-aware mapping protocol and a two-timescale update scheme that together permit stable, line-rate operation under realistic dataplane budgets. The paper presents the Chimera architecture, a hardware mapping strategy, and empirical evidence showing that neuro-symbolic attention primitives can achieve high-fidelity inference within the resource envelope of commodity programmable switches.

arXiv:2603.02262v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Supervised fine-tuning (SFT) is essential for the development of medical large language models (LLMs), yet prior poisoning studies have mainly focused on the detectable backdoor attacks. We propose a novel poisoning attack targeting the reasoning process of medical LLMs during SFT. Unlike backdoor attacks, our method injects poisoned rationales into few-shot training data, leading to stealthy degradation of model performance on targeted medical topics. Results showed that knowledge overwriting was ineffective, while rationale poisoning caused significant decline on the accuracy of the target subject, as long as no correct samples of the same subject appear in the dataset. A minimum number and ratio of poisoned samples was needed to carry out an effective and stealthy attack, which was more efficient and accurate than catastrophic forgetting. We demonstrate though this study the risk of SFT-stage poisoning, hoping to spur more studies of defense in the sensitive medical domain.

arXiv:2603.02277v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) increasingly act as autonomous agents, using tools to execute code, read and write files, and access networks, creating novel security risks. To mitigate these risks, agents are commonly deployed and evaluated in isolated "sandbox" environments, often implemented using Docker/OCI containers. We introduce SANDBOXESCAPEBENCH, an open benchmark that safely measures an LLM's capacity to break out of these sandboxes. The benchmark is implemented as an Inspect AI Capture the Flag (CTF) evaluation utilising a nested sandbox architecture with the outer layer containing the flag and no known vulnerabilities. Following a threat model of a motivated adversarial agent with shell access inside a container, SANDBOXESCAPEBENCH covers a spectrum of sandboxescape mechanisms spanning misconfiguration, privilege allocation mistakes, kernel flaws, and runtime/orchestration weaknesses. We find that, when vulnerabilities are added, LLMs are able to identify and exploit them, showing that use of evaluation like SANDBOXESCAPEBENCH is needed to ensure sandboxing continues to provide the encapsulation needed for highly-capable models.

arXiv:2603.02297v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly being deployed as software engineering agents that autonomously contribute to repositories. A major benefit these agents present is their ability to find and patch security vulnerabilities in the codebases they oversee. To estimate the capability of agents in this domain, we introduce ZeroDayBench, a benchmark where LLM agents find and patch 22 novel critical vulnerabilities in open-source codebases. We focus our efforts on three popular frontier agentic LLMs: GPT-5.2, Claude Sonnet 4.5, and Grok 4.1. We find that frontier LLMs are not yet capable of autonomously solving our tasks and observe some behavioral patterns that suggest how these models can be improved in the domain of proactive cyberdefense.