arXiv:2404.00712v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Computerized Adaptive Testing (CAT) offers an efficient and personalized method for assessing examinee proficiency by dynamically adjusting test questions based on individual performance. Compared to traditional, non-personalized testing methods, CAT requires fewer questions and provides more accurate assessments. As a result, CAT has been widely adopted across various fields, including education, healthcare, sports, sociology, and the evaluation of AI models. While traditional methods rely on psychometrics and statistics, the increasing complexity of large-scale testing has spurred the integration of machine learning techniques. This paper aims to provide a machine learning-focused survey on CAT, presenting a fresh perspective on this adaptive testing paradigm. We delve into measurement models, question selection algorithm, bank construction, and test control within CAT, exploring how machine learning can optimize these components. Through an analysis of current methods, strengths, limitations, and challenges, we strive to develop robust, fair, and efficient CAT systems. By bridging psychometric-driven CAT research with machine learning, this survey advocates for a more inclusive and interdisciplinary approach to the future of adaptive testing.

arXiv:2507.08207v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: This paper proposes a game theoretic framework that models the interaction between prompt engineers and large language models (LLMs) as a two player extensive form game coupled with a Rapidly exploring Random Trees (RRT) search over prompt space. The attacker incrementally samples, extends, and tests prompts, while the LLM chooses to accept, reject, or redirect, leading to terminal outcomes of Safe Interaction, Blocked, or Jailbreak. Embedding RRT exploration inside the extensive form game captures both the discovery phase of jailbreak strategies and the strategic responses of the model. Furthermore, we show that the defender behavior can be interpreted through a local Stackelberg equilibrium condition, which explains when the attacker can no longer obtain profitable prompt deviations and provides a theoretical lens for understanding the effectiveness of our Purple Agent defense. The resulting game tree thus offers a principled foundation for evaluating, interpreting, and hardening LLM guardrails.