arXiv:2512.16301v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents are moving beyond prompting alone. ChatGPT marked the rise of general-purpose LLM assistants, DeepSeek showed that on-policy reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards can improve reasoning and tool use, and OpenClaw highlights a newer direction in which agents accumulate persistent memory and reusable skills. Yet the research landscape remains fragmented across post-training, retrieval, memory, and skill systems. This survey studies these developments under a single notion of \emph{adaptation}: improving an agent, its tools, or their interaction after pretraining. We organize the field with a four-paradigm framework spanning agent adaptation and tool adaptation. On the agent side, A1 (tool-execution-signaled) and A2 (agent-output-signaled) improve the agent itself through supervised fine-tuning, preference optimization, and reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards. On the tool side, T1 (agent-agnostic) provides reusable pre-trained modules any agent can call, while T2 (agent-supervised) uses the agent's outputs to train memory systems, skill libraries, or lightweight subagents. Using this framework, we review post-training methods, adaptive memory architectures, and agent skills; compare their trade-offs in cost, flexibility, and generalization; and summarize evaluation practices across deep research, software development, computer use, and drug discovery. We conclude by outlining open problems in agent-tool co-adaptation, continual learning, safety, and efficient deployment.

arXiv:2603.03637v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) integrate vision and text to power applications, but this integration introduces new vulnerabilities. We study Image-based Prompt Injection (IPI), a black-box attack in which adversarial instructions are embedded into natural images to override model behavior. Our end-to-end IPI pipeline incorporates segmentation-based region selection, adaptive font scaling, and background-aware rendering to conceal prompts from human perception while preserving model interpretability. Using the COCO dataset and GPT-4-turbo, we evaluate 12 adversarial prompt strategies and multiple embedding configurations. The results show that IPI can reliably manipulate the output of the model, with the most effective configuration achieving up to 64\% attack success under stealth constraints. These findings highlight IPI as a practical threat in black-box settings and underscore the need for defenses against multimodal prompt injection.