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SynLeaF: A Dual-Stage Multimodal Fusion Framework for Synthetic Lethality Prediction Across Pan- and Single-Cancer Contexts

arXiv:2603.22369v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Accurate prediction of synthetic lethality (SL) is important for guiding the development of cancer drugs and therapies. SL prediction faces significant challenges in the effective fusion of heterogeneous multi-source data. Existing multimodal methods often suffer from "modality laziness" due to disparate convergence speeds, which hinders the exploitation of complementary information. This is also one reason why most existing SL prediction models cannot perform well on both pan-cancer and single-cancer SL pair prediction. In this study, we propose SynLeaF, a dual-stage multimodal fusion framework for SL prediction across pan- and single-cancer contexts. The framework employs a VAE-based cross-encoder with a product of experts mechanism to fuse four omics data types (gene expression, mutation, methylation, and CNV), while simultaneously utilizing a relational graph convolutional network to capture structured gene representations from biomedical knowledge graphs. To mitigate modality laziness, SynLeaF introduces a dual-stage training mechanism employing featurelevel knowledge distillation with adaptive uni-modal teacher and ensemble strategies. In extensive experiments across eight specific cancer types and a pancancer dataset, SynLeaF achieves superior performance in 17 out of 19 scenarios. Ablation studies and gradient analyses further validate the critical contributions of the proposed fusion and distillation mechanisms to model robustness and generalization. To facilitate community use, a web server is available at https://synleaf.bioinformatics-lilab.cn.

How Private Are DNA Embeddings? Inverting Foundation Model Representations of Genomic Sequences

arXiv:2603.06950v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: DNA foundation models have become transformative tools in bioinformatics and healthcare applications. Trained on vast genomic datasets, these models can be used to generate sequence embeddings, dense vector representations that capture complex genomic information. These embeddings are increasingly being shared via Embeddings-as-a-Service (EaaS) frameworks to facilitate downstream tasks, while supposedly protecting the privacy of the underlying raw sequences. However, as this practice becomes more prevalent, the security of these representations is being called into question. This study evaluates the resilience of DNA foundation models to model inversion attacks, whereby adversaries attempt to reconstruct sensitive training data from model outputs. In our study, the model's output for reconstructing the DNA sequence is a zero-shot embedding, which is then fed to a decoder. We evaluated the privacy of three DNA foundation models: DNABERT-2, Evo 2, and Nucleotide Transformer v2 (NTv2). Our results show that per-token embeddings allow near-perfect sequence reconstruction across all models. For mean-pooled embeddings, reconstruction quality degrades as sequence length increases, though it remains substantially above random baselines. Evo 2 and NTv2 prove to be most vulnerable, especially for shorter sequences with reconstruction similarities > 90%, while DNABERT-2's BPE tokenization provides the greatest resilience. We found that the correlation between embedding similarity and sequence similarity was a key predictor of reconstruction success. Our findings emphasize the urgent need for privacy-aware design in genomic foundation models prior to their widespread deployment in EaaS settings. Training code, model weights and evaluation pipeline are released on: https://github.com/not-a-feature/DNA-Embedding-Inversion.
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