Amid rapidly growing adoption of enterprise-level AI agents, there’s a disconnect emerging between ambition and execution. 

Although 85% of organizations say they want to be agentic within the next three years, 76% say their current operations and infrastructure can’t support that change. They cite a lack of readiness across people, processes, and workflows. 

The sticky tape problem

The challenge is that many organisations are often layering AI agents onto existing operations, rather than reimagine the operating model and how work will need to be rewired, explains Prasun Shah, global CTO for workforce consulting and chief AI officer at PwC UK Consulting. “They’re embedding AI employees into what is a human operating model,” layering on AI agents to existing workplace structures when “this is like adding sticky tapes to parts of an operating model that is breaking.”

Doing so may be preventing organizations from unlocking the full value agentic AI offers, creating circumstances where disillusionment can quickly creep in. That full value lies in agents’ capacity to execute entire workflows with limited human input. They can coordinate complex tasks, make independent decisions, adjust to changing conditions, and iterate performance. 

In early proving grounds that span customer service, HR, and sales, it’s already estimated that AI agents could accelerate business processes by as much as 30% to 50% and low-value work time by 25% to 40% when deployed at scale. But with this capability comes greater complexity and the need for an enterprise-wide change.

Growing the AI vocabulary 

Enterprise agentic AI platform Ema describes this change as agentic business transformation (ABT), a term it coined last year in partnership with HFS Research, in an attempt to plug what it sees as a gap in the existing lexicon about AI agents, and to provide enterprises with a new framework with which to think about their own adoption of the technology. 

“None of the existing vocabulary captures the full scope of the change,” explains Ema CEO and founder Surojit Chatterjee. “Digital transformation was about moving from paper to software. AI transformation was about adding artificial intelligence to existing processes. Co-pilot is about AI assisting in various human tasks. But ABT is something categorically different: It’s the integration of AI agents into the fabric of the organization.” 

For Shah, the dedicated term (ABT) “helps drive the need to redesign an organization in its entirety: its operating model, its workflows, decision rights, and performance management systems.” He emphasizes that “everything that’s needed to ensure those agents are actually active participants in value creation, rather than just point tools or productivity aids.”

According to Ema, ABT encompasses three core pillars: an organization’s technology stack, its workforce, and the metrics used for success. 

AI agents as connective tissue

The first pillar of ABT is the technology stack. “Your existing tech stack was designed for human-operated, application-centric workflows,” says Chatterjee. “It needs to be reconsidered when the actor is an AI agent operating at machine speed across multiple systems simultaneously.”

 As AI agents are integrated into an organization, enterprises will need to pivot from a set of linear processes and steps, to rewiring work in a very different way, explains Shah. That’s because the value in AI agents isn’t as another layer in an existing technology stack but as a connective tissue, he explains, moving between or across layers to coordinate a high-level task or retrieve and interpret data from multiple discrete applications. AI agents can create “a true competitive differentiation for an enterprise” by making decisions based on this capacity to contextualize, he says. “That is where the next battleground will be.”

To build this connective tissue, leaders need to adapt their technology stack to surface higher quality decisions from AI agents, prioritizing access to multiple datasets and applications simultaneously to develop tacit knowledge. “Organizations that make this architectural shift become genuinely more adaptive,” says Chatterjee. “When a new business requirement emerges, you don’t wait six months for a software vendor to build a feature. You configure an AI employee using natural language and connect it to the systems it needs. The time from business to production workflow drops from months to days.”

The workforce, redesigned

As AI agents are deployed for more use cases, enterprise leaders must consider what this means for dynamics across their workforce, the second pillar of ABT.

Workforce structures today deviate little from the hierarchical model of the early days of industrialization. To maximize efficiency and scale, processes are standardized, tasks are clearly delineated between strategic business units (SBUs), and employees progress up through an organization based on their capacity to optimize output from teams below them. But with AI agents that can execute, coordinate, and optimize tasks—often without managerial coordination—the lines of that established hierarchy become blurred.

In a workforce that blends AI agents and human employees, managers will be freed up from many execution-based tasks but take on new responsibilities associated with managing hybrid teams. Managers “will need to be able to manage issues around trust, explainability, psychological safety, and even status dynamics” to navigate new tensions that could arise in a hybrid workforce, says Shah.

The impact of agentic AI on existing workforce structures goes far beyond the management layer, too. McKinsey predicts that by 2030, three-quarters of current jobs will require redesign, upskilling, or redeployment, and organizations will need to act swiftly to amend recruitment, retention, and remuneration. 

From output to outcome

Success metrics are the third and final pillar of ABT. 

As AI agents assume greater ownership of core enterprise processes, taking on collaborative roles alongside human employees, traditional workforce metrics that focus on activity or output—such as calls handled or reports filed—no longer make sense. 

“When you add AI employees into the workforce, activity metrics become meaningless or actively misleading,” says Chatterjee. “An AI employee can handle a thousand customer interactions in the time it takes a human to handle ten. If you measure success by interactions handled, you’ll conclude the AI is working brilliantly while missing whether any of those interactions actually drove customer satisfaction, retention, or revenue.” To correct this, enterprises must develop a new set of metrics that focus on outcome rather than output. That is, metrics on the broader benefits or changes achieved, rather than individual deliverables. 

For example, when one of Ema’s large enterprise customers overhauled its own metrics, switching from tool metrics like cost per query and AI accuracy, to outcomes like the percentage of contracts reviewed without human escalation, the measured ROI from agentic AI tripled within two quarters. The changes meant “this customer stopped building point solutions in high-volume, low-complexity workflows and started deploying AI employees where the outcome value was highest,” says Chatterjee.

Integrating new metrics may also require a complete reconfiguration of reward and talent management processes, as well as accountability and ownership within organizations, points out Shah. In human-AI teams, for example, although ethical and fiduciary responsibilities will likely remain with human employees, operational accountability will become significantly more diffused to reflect the systemic role of AI agents.

This change will raise new questions that senior leadership teams will need to wrestle with, Shah adds. They’ll need to consider: Who is accountable when an AI employee makes a mistake? What happens when AI and humans disagree? What guardrails should be erected to safeguard customers? 

Laying the groundwork for systems-level change

Systems-level change is gradual. These are complex lines of inquiry that experts continue to grapple with. But in kickstarting internal dialogue about the core pillars of ABT—the workforce, the technology stack, and the metrics by which success can be gauged—leaders can lay the groundwork for an enterprise better poised to embrace AI agents at a systems level and start to close the gap between their ambition and execution. 

This content was produced by Insights, the custom content arm of MIT Technology Review. It was not written by MIT Technology Review’s editorial staff. It was researched, designed, and written by human writers, editors, analysts, and illustrators. This includes the writing of surveys and collection of data for surveys. AI tools that may have been used were limited to secondary production processes that passed thorough human review.

Autonomous AI systems are beginning to move beyond software environments and into warehouses, delivery networks, and public spaces. The development is drawing attention to whether current AI rules cover systems that operate in physical environments.

Most existing AI governance frameworks have focused on online harms and model outputs, including bias, misinformation, and harmful content. Embodied AI systems carry risks in physical environments, where failures can affect infrastructure, property, or human safety.

Singapore’s Infocomm Media Development Authority published version 1.5 of its Model AI Governance Framework for Agentic AI on May 20. The framework sets out guidance for organisations deploying AI agents that can plan, make decisions, and take actions across multiple steps to complete user-defined goals.

The framework says agents can interact with tools, external systems, and other agents, including systems that update databases, write files, control devices, or perform transactions. It lists access controls, monitoring, and human approval among governance measures for deployment.

AI moves into physical systems

At an AI summit in Singapore last week, discussions around robotics and embodied AI focused on operational safety issues more commonly associated with aviation, industrial systems, and critical infrastructure oversight than conventional software regulation.

Speakers also discussed whether autonomous systems can operate safely and reliably in unpredictable real-world environments over extended periods.

Dr. Ya-Qin Zhang, founding dean of the Institute for AI Industry Research at Tsinghua University, said embodied AI systems amplify risks already associated with autonomous software. He said failures can directly affect transport systems, drones, logistics networks, and critical infrastructure.

“Any risk in the digital domain will be amplified in the physical domain, and the physical domain will have a physical consequence,” Zhang told MLex on the sidelines of the summit.

He added that vehicles, drones, smart grids, and other infrastructure could become exposed as AI systems are embedded more deeply into physical operations.

Speakers discussed reliability, operational monitoring, and post-deployment assurance as governance concerns. Summit discussions pointed to deployment-based governance models built around simulation, telemetry, and iterative testing, rather than one-time certification alone.

IMDA’s framework also recommends gradual rollouts, continuous monitoring, and further testing after deployment. It says agents interact dynamically with their environment and not all risks can be anticipated before release.

Monitoring becomes a deployment issue

Grab, which is piloting autonomous vehicles and delivery robots in Singapore’s Punggol district, said deployment governance depends heavily on simulation, testing, and continuous monitoring.

“We do a lot of simulation, we do a lot of testing in closed courses and open courses in order to make sure our robots are reliable,” Suthen Thomas Paradatheth, Grab’s chief technology officer, said during one of the summit panels.

“Before we scale to hundreds of robots, we make sure we crack it first in simulation and with a few robots,” he added.

Grab also pointed to monitoring systems designed to track robot performance and detect unexpected failures after deployment.

“There’s a long tail of issues that could emerge,” Paradatheth said.

The IMDA framework says organisations should assess agentic AI use cases based on data access, external system access, autonomy, and task complexity. It also points to the scope and reversibility of agent actions, third-party involvement, and overall system complexity.

It also recommends limiting agent access to tools and systems, applying least-privilege permissions, and defining standard operating procedures for agent workflows. Organisations should also set mechanisms to take agents offline when they malfunction.

Accountability spreads across more actors

MLex reported that embodied AI systems can involve several parties across development, manufacturing, and deployment. These include AI developers, robotics manufacturers, semiconductor suppliers, and infrastructure operators.

MLex also noted that responsibility can be harder to assign when systems continue adapting after deployment through software updates, telemetry, and operational data.

IMDA says organisations and humans remain accountable for agent actions, even when agents operate autonomously. The framework calls for clear responsibility across the agentic AI value chain, from model and platform providers to deployers, tooling providers, and end users.

Applied Materials said large-scale robotics deployment is also tied to semiconductor economics and systems integration. Om Nalamasu, the company’s chief technology officer, said robotics systems will depend on better sensors, energy efficiency, advanced packaging, and computing architectures.

Nalamasu said robotics systems would require purpose-built designs adapted to specific industrial ecosystems rather than a single solution for all environments.

Zhao Yuli, chief strategy officer of Chinese robotics startup Galbot, said Beijing is prioritising deployment scale and industrial commercialisation through government-backed testbeds, industrial partnerships, and long-term funding initiatives.

Galbot has deployed humanoid robotics systems in retail, warehouse, and pharmaceutical operations in China. These include autonomous stores that operate around the clock. Zhao said semi-structured industrial environments are likely to become an early commercialisation path because they offer more controllable operating conditions.

Japan is placing more focus on standards-setting, robotics datasets, and safety governance. Professor Yutaka Matsuo of the University of Tokyo’s Graduate School of Engineering pointed to an “AI Association” project aimed at collecting 100,000 hours of robotics data to support robotic foundation models.

Matsuo also referred to Japan’s AI Safety Institute and the Hiroshima AI Process as part of broader efforts to develop governance standards for embodied AI systems with Singapore and other Asian countries.

Singapore sets out agent controls

Singapore’s framework sets out four governance areas for agentic AI. These cover upfront risk assessment, human accountability, technical controls, and end-user responsibility. The framework describes them as an iterative process rather than a one-time assessment.

The framework says human oversight has to be adapted for agentic systems because continuous review of all workflows becomes impractical at scale. It recommends human approval at significant checkpoints, including high-stakes actions, irreversible actions, and outlier behaviour.

IMDA also identifies automation bias and alert fatigue as risks when humans supervise capable agents. It recommends auditing oversight through indicators such as human override rates and response times, and using automated real-time monitoring to flag unexpected behaviour.

The framework says users should be told what actions an agent can take, what data it can access, and what responsibilities remain with the user. It also recommends employee training on human-agent interaction, oversight, and the professional skills needed to assess agent outputs.

Companies test AI in regulated workflows

JPMorgan is implementing AI tools across its global investment banking business, Paul Uren, the bank’s Asia Pacific head of investment banking, told Reuters. The bank said the tools help bankers access more information and synthesise it with internal systems. They are also being used to prepare content and support client engagement.

JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon told Bloomberg News that the bank would hire more AI specialists and fewer traditional bankers. Reuters reported that global banks are increasing AI investment, reshaping workforces, and changing job roles.

The bank is also among selected organisations permitted by Anthropic to use its Mythos cybersecurity model under a controlled initiative known as Project Glasswing. According to Anthropic, Mythos can detect old vulnerabilities in browsers, infrastructure, and software.

Reuters reported that Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, Bank of America, and Morgan Stanley also have access to, or are testing, Mythos, citing sources and company executives.

IMDA’s framework includes a case study from OCBC Bank of Singapore on source-of-wealth analysis. The system parses income-related documents and drafts a source-of-wealth memo. It does not make credit, onboarding, or risk decisions autonomously.

In that case, the workflow is limited to task-level autonomy and operates only when triggered by predefined workflows. Human review is required at critical decision points, and final validation remains with designated reviewers.

Robots move into industrial use

In Japan, one-third of companies are already using or considering AI-powered robots, according to a Reuters survey conducted by Nikkei Research from May 1 to May 15. The survey contacted 492 companies, with 220 responding on the condition of anonymity.

About 4% of respondents said they already use AI robots, 5% plan to deploy them, and 25% are considering doing so. The remaining 66% said they had no such plans.

Transportation equipment manufacturers were the most active group in the survey, with 80% already using AI robots or considering deployment. By comparison, 94% of wholesale sector respondents said they had no plans to deploy AI robots.

Among companies using, planning to use, or considering AI robots, 71% selected manufacturing as a use case. Another 19% selected dangerous tasks, while 11% selected customer-facing services.

The Japanese government expects AI robots to help address the country’s chronic labour shortage and support its position in industrial robotics. Japan is home to robotics companies including Fanuc, Yaskawa Electric, and Kawasaki Heavy Industries, but faces competition from China and the United States in AI-enabled robotics.

Retail agents expand beyond search

Walmart has outlined plans to use agentic AI across shopping, employee, supplier, and developer workflows.

In July 2025, the retailer announced plans for four AI-powered “super agents.” They are designed for shoppers, store employees, suppliers and sellers, and software developers. Walmart said these agents would become the main entry point for AI interactions across those groups.

One of the tools, Sparky, is already available in Walmart’s app as a generative AI-powered shopping assistant. Hari Vasudev, Walmart’s US chief technology officer, said its expanded version would be able to reorder items and plan events. It would also use computer vision to suggest recipes based on the contents of a shopper’s fridge.

Walmart is also developing an Associate super agent for store workers and corporate staff. A separate Marty agent is being built for sellers, suppliers, and advertisers. The retailer is also working on a Developer super agent for testing, building, and launching future AI tools.

The company declined to say whether the agents would replace jobs. Dave Glick, senior vice president of enterprise business systems, said the tools would create new jobs, without giving further details.

(Photo by Growtika)

See also: OpenAI opens Singapore AI lab as IMDA updates AI framework

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Haven’t you heard? White-collar jobs are going away, decimated by AI. Waves of layoffs in the tech sector (most recently at Coinbase and Meta and Cisco) are said to presage what will soon come for all of us knowledge workers. But before you quit your job as a software developer or financial analyst—or tech journalist—and look to join the plumbers’ union, it’s worth considering today’s economic research on whether artificial intelligence has actually begun to devour white-collar work.

Analysis of the data gathered for the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) shows that the unemployment rate for the jobs potentially most affected by AI is actually lower than that for occupations less exposed to the technology. And, critically in the mind of economists, there are no signs that large numbers of people are shifting from jobs threatened by AI to supposedly safer ones, such as those involving mostly manual labor.

While the current labor statistics don’t preclude a sudden job upheaval in the coming years, they do throw doubt on the inevitability of the doomsday scenarios and the pace at which they’d unfold. Everyone in the AI community, it seems, is predicting that the technology will soon wipe out jobs, and everyone, it also seems, knows some young wannabe workers who can’t find one. Perhaps we haven’t seen any major disruption in the labor market statistics yet, people often say, but just wait. 

But maybe we should pay attention to what the data is showing us. And right now, the numbers paint a picture of a relatively stable labor market in which AI disruptions remain largely speculative.

“It could be disruptive, but the data is telling us right now that disruption is not yet here, and we have time to plan.”

“All of the available evidence to date suggests that AI’s impact on current labor market conditions is likely small right now,” says Erika McEntarfer, a labor economist who headed the BLS until President Trump fired her last fall after a jobs report that displeased the administration. (Not surprisingly, BLS reports of sluggish job growth have continued since her dismissal.)

McEntarfer, who is now a fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, says the relatively small impact that AI is having so far on today’s labor market “surprises many people, but it shouldn’t. What we know from history is that it takes time for innovations to work their way through changes in industries and changes in occupations. AI is unlikely to transform labor markets until it first transforms businesses.”

McEntarfer points to US Census data showing that only one in five companies are using AI in any business function. “The data are a great reality check on the fear that AI will be enormously disruptive,” she says. “It could be. It likely will be disruptive, but the data is telling us right now that disruption is not yet here, and that we have time to plan.”

Things ain’t great—but the question is why

The US job market, to be sure, sucks for many, especially younger would-be workers. Unemployment rates for recent college graduates stand at around 5.6%, well above the level for all workers. It’s a rate not seen since the pandemic and the years immediately after the 2008 recession. Even more troubling is that hiring rates have been particularly dismal during the post-covid economy, a trend that hits hard at young people trying to enter the workforce. If you’re a recent college graduate and looking for a tech job, no one, it can seem, is hiring.

There are signs that AI is contributing to the pain for the 22-to-25-year-olds seeking jobs in software development and other occupations that are feeling a big impact from AI. But these professions represent just a sliver of the overall labor market. What’s more, it’s uncertain how much blame AI should get for the job woes. Similarly unknown is whether the loss of entry-level jobs in AI-exposed occupations is a harbinger of what’s coming for others or simply an isolated symptom of what economists refer to as a “low-fire, low-hire” labor market caused by a variety of macroeconomic forces.

Insights into these uncertainties will tell us much about our working fates in the transition to an AI economy. There are no shortage of confident assertions and predictions about what is about to happen; while some people forecast the end of work, others say economic history teaches us that technology advances always lead to more and better jobs eventually. 

The honest answer is that no one knows for sure what AI will bring and whether this time will be different. To help figure it out, we need better and far more comprehensive data.

The statistics gleaned from the federal government’s monthly survey of 60,000 households for the BLS provide a broad overview of the changes to the labor market, while academics and even some AI companies have begun trying to gain a more granular view of specific jobs that are being affected. But the existing data-gathering tools don’t adequately explain how AI is affecting the huge and diverse US labor market.

There’s a long list of questions that we don’t have the data to fully answer. How is AI being used in the workplace? Does the increased use of AI mean the technology will replace workers, or will it make them more productive and valuable? Which occupations and skills are most affected? Who is in most peril from the changes? As David Deming, a professor of economics at Harvard University, puts it: “We’re sort of flying blind.”

To gather more insight into some of these questions, Deming and his colleagues have been surveying several thousand people every three months since 2024, asking them basic questions: Do you use generative AI, and how often? Does it save you time at work? Tracking the answers over time gives the economists important clues (it’s used by a little over 40% of workers but adoption varies by sectors) and allows them to estimate productivity gains (they’ve found some, but nothing economy-shaking). It has also helps document how quickly AI has been adopted in the workplace and how it compares with earlier technologies such as the PC and the internet (the pace has been faster but roughly in the same ballpark).

It’s far from a complete picture of how AI is changing work. But it provides some intriguing results; for example, a fair number of workers in manufacturing and other industrial sectors have tried AI. Deming’s results show that while businesses in general might be relatively slow to formally adopt the technology, lots of their employees are using it.

The young are most vulnerable

But by themselves the exposure results are not a true predictor of which jobs will be lost to AI. That depends on the kinds of tasks done by the technology, the extent to which the AI is adopted, various business calculations about the value of workers, and even the costs of deploying AI. But the exposure findings are a valuable starting point. 

In a working paper called “Canaries in the Coal Mine? Six Facts about the Recent Employment Effects of Artificial Intelligence,” researchers at the Stanford Digital Economy Lab looked at 950 jobs, placing the occupations into five categories from least exposed to most. Then they used a vast data set from ADP, the world’s largest payroll provider, to look at employment growth in each of the categories. Their exclusive access to the ADP data set, which is far larger than the one available through the BLS, allows the researchers to better spot impacts by demographic. When they examined what was happening to different age groups, says Erik Brynjolfsson, the director of the lab who led the effort, “it was extremely striking.”

They spotted the drop in head count for 22-to-25-year-olds in the most exposed occupations, such as software development and customer service, beginning in late 2022, when ChatGPT was first publicly released. Other researchers reported evidence that the decline in these jobs began well before ChatGPT and questioned whether the labor market could react so quickly to the introduction of AI technology. 

But while the Stanford researchers acknowledge that other factors in addition to AI probably contributed to the early declines, they say that after controlling for those factors, they saw convincing evidence of a significant effect from AI after 2024 and growing in 2025 to a 16% decline in entry-level jobs in AI-exposed occupations. In contrast, head count grew for older workers in the same occupations, as did the number of jobs in the less exposed occupations.

Digging deeper into the data, the researchers found another important clue, though one that wasn’t totally unexpected. The impact on head counts depended on how AI was being used. It was specifically the jobs where tasks could be automated (that is, AI could do them “with minimal human involvement”) that accounted for the decrease in employment—jobs for people like software developers. In jobs where AI was mainly used but to augment human work, head counts grew faster than the average for entry-level workers.

That’s consistent with one explanation for the woes of many young would-be workers. It could be, according to the Stanford paper, that entry-level jobs depend more on the types of knowledge that people acquire through education but that can readily be mimicked by AI; the authors call this codified knowledge. It might be particularly easy to automate such tasks as entry-level coding. In contrast, older workers have more so-called tacit knowledge, the type based on their experience. That type of wisdom is harder for AI to replace.

Despite the findings about AI’s impact on young workers, Bharat Chandar, an economist at Stanford and one of the authors (along with Brynjolfsson and Ruyu Chen), stresses that it’s still early when it comes to understanding how the technology will affect jobs in the future. It could be that the job loss will spread to older workers and to less AI-exposed occupations, he says. But Chandar says it is also possible that firms and workers will adjust to shifting labor demands, and the effects will level off or even disappear.

A recent paper by economists at the Federal Reserve Board found, not surprisingly, that annual employment growth for coders has slowed significantly—by about 3%—since the introduction of ChatGPT. But here’s a critical detail: Overall employment for coders continues to grow. Employment in coding jobs is still rising, they noted, just more slowly than before 2022. 

In short, coding jobs are not going away, at least not anytime soon. But it’s an occupation that is clearly being transformed by AI.

One of the somewhat surprising wrinkles uncovered by recent research is that wages in sectors highly exposed to AI have risen relatively fast since the introduction of ChatGPT. One explanation is that employers are still willing to pay for the kinds of knowledge and experience that are, at least for now, hard to replace with AI. If true, this suggests not the end of work in AI-exposed jobs but, more specifically, the demise of the typical career model in which young graduates are hired to do software tasks that can be automated and are slowly trained to gain that valuable tacit experience. The earn-while-you-learn model might finally be broken—at least for some occupations.

The simple truth could be that coding skills are no longer a guarantee of a job. That may help to explain the drop-off of computer science majors at schools around the country. Future canaries in the cubicles are sniffing out the dangers of looking for a job when their skills can be matched by AI.

But a closer look at the data shows that students are not necessarily turning away from AI-related careers. Rather, they appear to be tailoring their skills to the changes they see underway as AI becomes increasingly important for various disciplines. Interest is rising in AI-adjacent fields like data science and cybersecurity. One fast-growing major: artificial intelligence itself (a recent addition to many college offerings).

Is this time different?

Anxiety over the potential of AI to replace workers is nothing new. I wrote “How Technology Is Destroying Jobs” in 2013, describing how a slew of new digital technologies, including AI, were beginning to threaten white-collar work. I wasn’t alone. It was a popular theme at a time when the labor market was sluggish and jobs were scarce. 

In one of his last days in office in late 2016, President Obama issued a report written by his top economic and science advisors warning that AI was threatening workers. Among the findings was that automated vehicles—especially driverless trucks—could eliminate 2.2 million to 3.1 million existing US jobs.  Around the same time, one of the pioneers of AI, Geoffrey Hinton, said that “people should stop training radiologists” because it was “completely obvious” the occupation was soon to be replaced by AI.

Perhaps this time is different, and we can put aside the lessons of economic history. Certainly, AI has gained unimaginable powers to do humanlike tasks. Perhaps it will devour jobs in ways that we’ve never seen before. And perhaps that will happen abruptly, without a warning buried in the labor statistics. But the previous bouts of AI job anxiety still hold a prescient lesson: Our real focus needs to be less on the dystopian fears and more on the very real transitions in the workplace that will likely affect millions of people.

“Even if there is not mass or even increased unemployment, the transition could still be very difficult,” says Jed Kolko, senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and former undersecretary of commerce in the Biden administration. “And what does a difficult transition period mean? It means people losing jobs, or people’s jobs being redefined in ways that make those jobs pay worse or be less meaningful. And some people whose jobs are threatened may not be able to adapt.”

The more we understand this transition, the better prepared we’ll be to deal with it.  And for that we’ll need better and more complete data.

For McEntarfer, the former commissioner of the BLS, the real question is the speed of any disruption. “If it happens at the normal pace of technological change, labor markets will have time to adapt. If there is a sudden and severe disruption, then that will be a big challenge for policymakers,” she says. “That’s really the most important question facing us right now: how rapid this transformation is going to be.” And, she adds, “we’ll know by watching the data.”

Two decades ago, the country was caught flat-footed by the so-called China shock as free-trade policies led to an influx of imports and the devastation of manufacturing jobs in many parts of the country. It took years for researchers to understand the data showing how the trade policies, generally welcomed by economists, were destroying communities. Today the threat of an economic transformation brought on by AI is far larger and points to potentially far more damage for huge groups of workers.

To head off another devastating labor transition, we will need well-timed government and business policies, especially programs to train and reskill workers. If McEntarfer and other labor economists are correct, we probably have time to design deliberate and effective strategies to manage the transition. But first we need to better understand what is going on—and how fast.

It’s hard to find an economist who is more enthusiastic about AI’s future than Stanford’s Brynjolfsson, who believes that we’re likely on the brink of a huge boost that will transform the economy. “Perhaps the best productivity growth of my lifetime is coming up,” he says.

But Brynjolfsson also warns that a lack of data is severely limiting our visibility into the economic and societal impacts that are coming. At a time when hundreds of billions are being spent on rolling out the technology, he says, “we’re not investing even 1% of that on understanding the transition.”

Artificial intelligence has not so far produced a clean story of mass unemployment. Aggregate employment in developed countries remains broadly stable, and recent assessments have found limited evidence that AI has shifted the headline numbers. But a troubling change may be hiding beneath the surface: the quiet weakening of the first rung of the career ladder.

The most worrisome evidence is showing up exactly where we should expect it first: in early-career hiring. A working paper released in November 2025 by the Stanford Digital Economy Lab found that workers aged 22 to 25 in the most AI-exposed occupations experienced a 16% relative decline in employment after the spread of generative AI, even after controlling for other factors that might affect firms’ employment decisions. An Anthropic report from March 2026 provides suggestive evidence that led to a similar conclusion.

More experienced workers in those same occupations did not suffer the same decline. Employment is not also declining in the entry-level jobs with low AI exposure. The concern is specific to early-career jobs that are exposed to AI.

That is not a minor signal. It suggests that firms may be using AI to substitute for the junior tasks through which people traditionally gain their first foothold—at least for those in jobs where generative AI is used extensively, like software developers, customer service representatives, computer programmers, and information systems managers.

The time is now to make changes in the way we train, prepare, and support young people who are about to enter the workforce. Educational institutions need to reorient for the era of an AI-augmented workforce. Governments must incentivize businesses to hire and train early-career workers. Businesses, in turn, need to recognize the importance of developing a long-term workforce experienced in AI—a process that begins with entry-level workers. And students themselves should take on the responsibility of not only becoming AI fluent but learning how to apply that knowledge in various fields.

In short, we must change the way we have traditionally thought of entry-level work.

This is especially true because the broader labor market for recent graduates is also softening. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York reported that in the fourth quarter of 2025, the unemployment rate for recent college graduates rose to 5.6%, while the underemployment rate (the share of graduates working in jobs that typically do not require a college degree) reached 42.5%, its highest level since the covid pandemic. No single statistic can prove that AI is the sole cause of that deterioration. Hiring in general is way down post-pandemic, and young people are particularly vulnerable to the slowdown. But it would be a mistake to ignore the possibility that AI is accelerating an already difficult transition from school to work.

Behind these statistics is a great deal of personal distress. Recent graduates today often submit hundreds of applications before they receive a single offer, and surveys consistently find elevated rates of anxiety, financial precarity, and burnout among young workers in extended job searches. If AI quietly closes the door on typical early jobs, people will pay the price in delayed independence, postponed family formation, and the sense that their first serious professional efforts have been refused.

It also matters because entry-level jobs are part of the economy’s training system. Junior analysts learn which numbers can be trusted. Young software developers learn how production systems fail. New marketers learn how customers behave outside the neat language of dashboards. Early-career legal and financial staff learn how rules, judgment, deadlines, and human relationships actually interact. If AI absorbs more of the drafting, triage, coding, summarizing, and administrative preparation that once helped train entry-level workers, firms may become more efficient in the short run while society becomes less capable in the longer run.

The right way to improve the skills of young workers is not to tell them, “Learn to code.” That advice, which shaped more than a decade of federal initiatives and university expansion, rested on the premise that coding was a stable, scalable skill almost anyone could learn and parlay into a middle-class job. The premise no longer holds. The layer of work AI handles well—translating a specification into routine code, reproducing standard patterns, debugging predictable errors—is precisely the layer that “learn to code” programs were built around.

Supervising AI systems in their work is now a much more relevant skill. So understanding the outputs AI systems produce will become very important.

To help people develop such skills, we should require universities, community colleges, and professional programs to embed AI literacy, data literacy, prompt-based workflow skills, verification skills, and domain judgment into ordinary degrees. Every graduate should know how to use AI tools, check their output, understand their limits, and combine them with human expertise. This matters even for graduates entering occupations that look relatively safe from AI, such as those in health care. Almost every job contains tasks—drafting, summarizing, scheduling, research, basic data work, routine communication—for which AI is already a substantial productivity tool.

The competition most young workers will experience is not human versus machine but colleague versus AI-augmented colleague. For most young workers, the realistic path to making themselves valuable is not to avoid AI but to become fluent in the technology and combine that with domain judgment, contextual reasoning, and human relationship skills. To this end, schools should emphasize paid co-ops, apprenticeships, and employer-linked projects so students build judgment in real workplaces before they graduate.

Governments should also create targeted tax credits, wage subsidies, and training grants for employers that hire early-career workers into structured, AI-augmented roles. The architecture for this kind of conditional, behavior-linked subsidy already exists in US tax policy. What is missing is a version of these instruments built specifically around early-career AI-augmented work.

Firms, for their part, should stop making hiring decisions based only on short-run cost savings from AI. Young workers are not valuable only for the tasks they perform this quarter. Their value lies in learning, skill formation, institutional memory, and future productivity. Entry-level hiring is not just an expense. It is an investment in the future stock of judgment inside the firm. The most effective AI-augmented senior workforce of the late 2030s will be drawn overwhelmingly from the junior cohort of today. Firms that automate away the learning stage may improve their immediate margins but find themselves, a decade from now, without anyone who understands how their own AI-driven workflows actually behave.

Students graduating this spring and next face a tough labor market in transition. AI fluency is becoming a commodity. Domain expertise without AI fluency is being outpaced. The combination is what is genuinely scarce. The mechanical engineer with knowledge of manufacturing and AI proficiency; the software programmer with knowledge of financial services who is also a whiz at AI—these are the types of people who will be in demand.

Georgios Petropoulos is an assistant professor at the USC Marshall School of Business. His research focuses on the implications of information technologies for innovation, competition policy, and labor markets.

Google's SynthID, designed to embed imperceptible signals into AI-generated content, is adding a new Content Detection API on Google Cloud's Gemini Enterprise Agent Platform, after gaining adoption by several industry players including Nvidia and OpenAI.

SAN MATEO, Calif. — Peyton Greenside, CEO of BigHat Biosciences, has hot takes. 

Her company designs antibody therapies using machine-learning, but she doesn’t like demos in which people open their computers and show off how fast they can design a drug. “If you want me to design you a protein right now in six hours, I’m happy to do it,” she said.

In fact, she can do it in 20 minutes. But if you’re actually in the business of making drugs, you are still going to have to do all the downstream tests, which take time and lots of money, Greenside said. “That’s where the hard work is, is making the actual drug.” 

Continue to STAT+ to read the full story…

Gunnar Morling, technologist at Confluent and Java Champion, shares his experiences with building high-performance applications in Java, especially in the data space. He shares insights from experiments with building durable execution engines, bootstrapping, and AI natively developing Apache Hardwood - a minimal dependencies Java parser for Apache Parquet.

Google has introduced Middleware for Genkit, its open-source framework for building AI-powered and agentic applications. The update adds a programmable interception layer around model calls, tool execution, and generation loops, giving developers more control over reliability, safety, and orchestration inside production AI systems.

Every major economy is staring at the same problem right now. Artificial intelligence is consuming electricity at a pace that grids were never designed to handle. In the US, capacity market prices in PJM, the country’s largest grid operator, have risen more than tenfold in two years, with data-centre growth identified as a primary driver. In Europe, utilities are scrambling to upgrade transmission infrastructure fast enough to keep pace with hyperscalers’ demand.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) projects global data-centre electricity consumption could approach 1,000 TWh by the end of this decade. Renewable energy is largely there, but the ability to coordinate it, through AI energy grid mapping at national scales, is what most countries still lack. But China just built it.

A study published in Nature this week by researchers from Peking University and Alibaba Group’s DAMO Academy has produced something that no country has managed before: a complete, high-resolution, AI-generated inventory of an entire nation’s wind and solar infrastructure, with the analytical framework to coordinate it as a unified system.

Using a deep-learning model trained on sub-metre satellite imagery, the team identified China’s 319,972 solar photovoltaic facilities and 91,609 wind turbines, processing 7.56 terabytes of imagery to do so.

AI energy grid mapping

Prior research into solar-wind complementarity – the idea that two sources can offset each other’s variability in time and geography – has largely relied on hypothetical or modelled deployment scenarios. How complementarity manifests under real-world infrastructure, and how it shapes system-level integration outcomes, has until now remained unclear.

The researchers show that solar-wind complementarity substantially reduces generation variability, with effectiveness increasing as the geographic scope of pairing expands.

In practical terms, the further apart the facilities being coordinated are, the more reliably they achieve balance. A cloud that covers solar farms in Gansu does not darken wind corridors in Inner Mongolia, for example. The study’s findings point to a structural inefficiency in how China currently manages its grid: coordination happens at a provincial rather than national level.

Transitioning to a unified national scale, the researchers argue, would make it easier to pair complementary energy sources, stabilise the grid, and avoid curtailment – the wasting of generated renewable power that has long been one of China’s most costly clean-energy problems.

Liu Yu, a professor at Peking University’s School of Earth and Space Sciences, described the inventory as allowing China to see its new-energy landscape from a “God’s-eye view,” a phrase that carries more operational weight than it might first suggest. Grid operators cannot optimise what they are not aware of – until now.

China is in the middle of an AI-driven electricity demand surge that is straining its grid. The rapid proliferation of data services and massive computing facilities have pushed the sector’s power consumption up 44% year-on-year in the first quarter of 2026, reaching 22.9 billion kilowatt-hours, according to the China Electricity Council.

That is an extraordinary rate of growth for a sector whose demand was already great. This has accelerated data-centre expansion in China’s northern and western provinces, where land is cheaper, wind and solar resources are more available, with commensurately lower electricity prices. The provinces being targeted for new data centres are the same regions with the highest solar-wind complementarity.

Behind the model

The technical achievement behind this is worth understanding in its own right. DAMO’s deep-learning model was trained to identify solar photovoltaic facilities and wind turbines from sub-metre resolution satellite imagery, a task complicated by the sheer diversity of installation types, terrain conditions, and image quality.

The resulting dataset covers installations in 1,915 Chinese counties, spanning everything from rooftop panels in coastal cities to utility-scale wind farms on the Mongolian plateau. Processing 7.56 terabytes of imagery to produce a nationally consistent, county-level inventory is a demonstration of what large-scale geospatial AI can do when applied to infrastructure problems, and a template that other countries could, in principle, replicate.

China’s clean energy sector generated an estimated 15.4 trillion yuan (US$2.26 trillion) in economic output last year, equivalent to Brazil’s entire GDP, according to the Finland-based Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air. Managing an asset base of that scale without a national-level visibility tool was always going to be a limiting factor, a limit that’s now gone.

The study’s dataset and code have been made publicly available via Zenodo.

(Photo by Luo Lei)

See also: Inside China’s push to apply AI in its energy system

Want to learn more about AI and big data from industry leaders? Check out AI & Big Data Expo taking place in Amsterdam, California, and London. The comprehensive event is part of TechEx and is co-located with other leading technology events, click here for more information.

AI News is powered by TechForge Media. Explore other upcoming enterprise technology events and webinars here.

The post China’s AI just mapped its entire renewable energy grid. Here’s why the rest of the world should pay attention appeared first on AI News.

During Tuesday’s Google I/O keynote, Demis Hassabis, the CEO of Google DeepMind, proclaimed that we are currently “standing in the foothills of the singularity.” It was a striking statement—the singularity is the theoretical future moment when AI rapidly exceeds human intelligence and dramatically transforms the world. But what struck me as I listened in the audience was the context in which he said those words. 

He was on stage to close out the session with a segment on scientific AI, the centerpiece of which was a video detailing how the company’s weather prediction software provided an advance alert about Hurricane Melissa’s catastrophic landfall in Jamaica last year—and potentially saved lives. If that software, called WeatherNext, helped anyone escape the storm or better fortify their home, that’s an enormous and meaningful achievement. But it’s hardly evidence of an impending singularity.

The juxtaposition of Hassabis’ lofty rhetoric with the real-world results of WeatherNext highlighted the tension between two very different approaches to AI for science. The first focuses on AI tools, like WeatherNext, that are designed and trained to solve specific scientific problems. The second is agentic, LLM-based systems that could one day execute cutting-edge research projects without human involvement.

This second vision powers a great deal of AI enthusiasm right now, including recent excitement around recursive self-improvement, or the idea that AI systems could eventually become the primary drivers of AI advancement—a process that would get faster and faster as the AI systems grow smarter. And agentic systems are now making real research contributions, sometimes with limited human guidance.

Just this week, Pushmeet Kohli, Google Cloud’s chief scientist, published a piece in a special AI and science issue of the journal Daedalus, writing: “We are moving toward AI that doesn’t just facilitate science but begins to do science.” With autonomous AI scientists on the horizon, it’s harder to justify massive efforts to develop super-specialized tools—even one like AlphaFold, for which DeepMind scientists won a Nobel Prize, or a potentially life-saving system like WeatherNext. It also heralds a far stranger future for science, in which humans and AI systems collaborate as peers—or AI even makes scientific progress on its own.

To be clear, Google does not appear to be abandoning its work on specialized AI for science tools. AlphaGenome and AlphaEarth Foundations, which are trained for genetics and Earth science applications respectively, were released last summer, and the newest version of WeatherNext came out in November.

What’s more, such tools remain extremely popular among scientists. Last year, for instance, Google reported that protein structure predictions from AlphaFold have been used by over three million researchers worldwide. And Isomorphic Labs, a Google subsidiary that aims to use AlphaFold and related technologies to develop new drugs, just raised a $2 billion Series B funding round.

But there are concrete signs of realignment, in both enthusiasm and resources. Last month, the Los Angeles Times reported that Google fellow John Jumper, who won the Nobel for AlphaFold, is now working on AI coding, not on science-specific AI tools. It’s not surprising that Google is assigning its best minds to the coding problem, as the company has recently taken a reputational hit because its coding tools don’t currently stand up to those offered by Anthropic and OpenAI. But it may also signal a prioritization of agentic science on Google’s part, as coding abilities are key to the success of some of those systems. 

Across the industry, agentic researcher systems are showing real potential. This week, OpenAI announced that one of their models had disproved an important mathematics conjecture—perhaps the most meaningful contribution that generative AI has made to mathematics so far, according to some mathematicians.

Importantly, the model used by OpenAI is not specialized for solving mathematical problems, or even for research; according to the company, it’s a general-purpose reasoning model in the vein of GPT-5.5. If general agents can make independent contributions to mathematical research, they might soon be able to do the same in science (though the fact that ideas in science must be verified experimentally makes it a tougher domain for AI).

Google is certainly devoting a lot of attention toward an agent-driven scientific future. The big scientific announcement at I/O was the new Gemini for Science package, which unites several of the company’s LLM-based scientific systems under one brand.

This includes the hypothesis-generating AI Co-Scientist and algorithm-optimizing AlphaEvolve, which are still not publicly available—but as Google is now allowing any researcher to apply for access to Gemini for Science, they may soon see wider adoption in the scientific community. Scientists who were involved in early testing are enthusiastic about their potential: Gary Peltz, a Stanford geneticist, compared using the AI Co-Scientist to “consulting the oracle of Delphi” in a Nature Medicine article.

Gemini for Science isn’t incompatible with specialized tools; to the contrary, agentic systems can be designed to call on such tools when they might be useful. And no agentic system can predict the structure that a protein will fold into without AlphaFold’s help (at least not yet). But the company seems to be shifting its public image—and at least some resources and personnel, such as Jumper—away from specifically developing those kinds of tools. Though it has only been five years since AlphaFold solved the protein-folding problem, both the technology and the discourse have quickly moved beyond that once-revolutionary achievement.

Google has been careful to position this new set of scientific agents as an accelerant for human scientists, rather than a replacement for them—the choice of the name AI Co-Scientist as opposed to AI Scientist, for instance, appears quite deliberate. Hassabis uses that same human-centric framing when he talks about changes in the landscape of scientific AI. “For the next decade or so, we should think about AI as this amazing tool to help scientists,” Hassabis said in an interview published in the Daedalus issue. “Beyond that timeframe, it is hard to say with any certainty, but perhaps these systems will become more like collaborators.”

But no one can be an effective scientific collaborator without also being a skilled scientist in their own right. And if Hassabis is anywhere near the mark when he talks about the “foothills of the singularity,” then AI scientists could eventually exceed the capabilities of their human counterparts.

In a discussion with the journalist Mike Allen at I/O, Hassabis spoke of how he was initially inspired to pursue AI when he observed how progress in physics had stagnated since the 1970s; he wondered whether the human mind had reached its limits in that domain, and if AI could help to overcome that barrier. Superhuman agentic scientists would certainly fit that bill. We might not ever get anywhere near there, but Google seems to be aiming itself toward that summit.

The ceremony was scheduled. The CEOs were on the guest list. And then it wasn’t happening.

On Thursday, US President Donald Trump scrapped a planned AI executive order, which had already been delayed multiple times, citing concerns that it might erode America’s competitive edge over China.

“We’re leading China, we’re leading everybody, and I don’t want to do anything that’s going to get in the way of that lead,” Trump told reporters in the Oval Office. What he did not say was that the order had been effectively killed by the very industry it was meant to oversee.

Lobbied out in one night

According to Semafor, which first reported the backstory, the White House’s plans were halted after Elon Musk of xAI, Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg, and venture capitalist David Sacks, who, until recently, was Trump’s AI and cryptocurrency tsar, all spoke directly with Trump between Wednesday night and Thursday morning.

The argument that landed, according to US media, citing sources, was an appeal to the “accelerationist” faction in the administration, including officials at the National Economic Council and staffers in the Vice President’s office.

The order itself was not a sweeping regulatory framework. It would have established a voluntary mechanism for AI developers to engage with federal agencies and submit advanced models for security review up to 90 days before their public release. No licensing regime. No mandatory hold periods. Voluntary.

That was apparently still too much. Trump said he postponed it “because I didn’t like certain aspects of it,” declining to specify which ones. He added that he worried it “could have been a blocker,” a telling phrase from a president who has otherwise positioned AI as a jobs and national security priority.

A vacuum with consequences

The US has yet to pass comprehensive AI legislation. What governance architecture exists has been assembled piecemeal, through executive orders, agency guidance, and voluntary agreements. Earlier this month, the federal Centre for AI Standards and Innovation announced evaluation agreements with Google DeepMind, Microsoft, and xAI, allowing the government to assess models before public availability. That programme continues regardless of Thursday’s non-signing.

But the broader picture is one of regulatory drift. In early March, the Trump administration released a National AI Legislative Framework urging Congress to preempt state-level AI laws that “impose undue burdens,” arguing for a single national standard over what it called “fifty discordant ones.” Congress has not acted on it.

The contrast with China is sharp and increasingly difficult to ignore. Beijing’s State Council issued a 2026 legislative work plan in May outlining plans to accelerate comprehensive AI legislation, deploying language on AI governance in formal planning documents for the first time. The National People’s Congress has listed AI legislation for review for the third consecutive year.

In April, Beijing issued new rules requiring AI companies to establish internal ethics review committees. China is writing rules. Washington is cancelling ceremonies.

Who shapes US AI policy

Thursday’s episode clarified something implicit for months: in the current administration, the effective veto on AI regulation sits with a small group of industry principals who have direct access to the president.

Musk, whose xAI is a direct competitor to OpenAI and Anthropic, has a structural interest in keeping the regulatory field open. Zuckerberg’s Meta has similarly positioned itself as a champion of open-source AI development. Sacks, despite having formally left his White House advisory role in March, evidently retains enough influence to shape executive action.

Separately, Semafor reports that OpenAI has secured White House backing for a parallel effort to push AI regulations at the state level, an interesting manoeuvre given that Trump’s earlier executive order threatened states that enacted AI laws the administration disliked. That the administration appears to be simultaneously discouraging state regulation and endorsing OpenAI’s state-level strategy suggests the policy coherence problem runs deeper than one postponed signing.

The China frame does real work, but in both directions

Trump’s stated reason for pulling back, protecting the US lead over China, is the same logic that has driven every major AI policy decision since he returned to office, from the H200 export licence framework to the Stargate infrastructure programme. It is also the logic that China is watching closely.

At the Trump-Xi summit in Beijing earlier this month, the two leaders agreed to launch an intergovernmental dialogue on AI, according to the Chinese Foreign Ministry. Beijing will have noted that Washington’s internal debate about even voluntary AI oversight was resolved not by policymakers, but by the companies that stand to profit most from the absence of guardrails.

In a report by the South China Morning Post, Lizzi C. Lee, a fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Centre for China Analysis, noted that both the US and China are grappling with the same underlying question: where should the regulatory frontier sit for frontier AI, particularly as models become more capable of autonomous action and more relevant to cybersecurity.

“I think a separate, potentially more important race is on governance and safety: not about who has the most advanced models, but who can govern powerful AI without choking off innovation,” she said.

The same report highlighted what Kyle Chan at the Brookings Institution put it more simply: “AI safety and regulation can be done in a way that doesn’t compromise innovation.”

Neither argument was enough on Thursday. Whether it becomes enough next time, assuming there is a next time, remains unclear.

(Photo by White House)

See also: The US-China AI gap closes amid responsible AI concerns

Want to learn more about AI and big data from industry leaders? Check out AI & Big Data Expo taking place in Amsterdam, California, and London. The comprehensive event is part of TechEx and is co-located with other leading technology events, click here for more information.

AI News is powered by TechForge Media. Explore other upcoming enterprise technology events and webinars here.

The post Musk and Zuckerberg convinced Trump to scrap AI executive order appeared first on AI News.

Listen to the session or watch below

AI companies want to build systems that understand the external world and overcome the limitations of LLMs. Recent developments have brought world models to the forefront of the AI discussion.

Watch a conversation with editor in chief Mat Honan, senior AI editor Will Douglas Heaven, and AI reporter Grace Huckins exploring how AI might enter the physical world.

Speakers: Mat Honan, Editor in Chief, Will Douglas Heaven, AI Senior Editor, and Grace Huckins, AI Reporter

Recorded on May 21, 2026

Related Stories:

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• Yann LeCun has a bold new vision for the future of AI

Storytelling is core to humanity’s DNA, stemming from our impulse to express ideals, warnings, hopes, and experiences. Technology has always been woven through the medium and the distribution: from early humans’ innovation of natural pigments and charcoals for cave paintings to literal representation by the camera.

The landscape of storytelling continues to shift under our feet. Social and streaming platforms have multiplied, audiences have fragmented, and our demand for fresh, unique media is insatiable. A recent McKinsey podcast cites that we are watching upwards of 12 hours of video content daily, often on multiple devices and multiple platforms.

All this content is expensive to produce: With a baseline budget of $150M, a Hollywood feature runs $1M per minute of finished film; prestige streaming content is in the hundreds of thousands per minute. And since consumers want to engage with authentic, original material, every company is now effectively a media company. That means we all face the same pressure: more content, with the same time and budget constraints.

There is no longer a question whether to use AI for content; the math doesn’t work any other way. What leaders need to focus on now is how to adapt responsibly, protect brand integrity, uplift team creativity, and build customer trust.

A few things worth holding onto as this era accelerates:

• AI amplifies what’s already there, both good and bad. Weak strategy stays weak.
• Responsible adoption means knowing what’s in your tools and models. Provenance and transparency are the foundation, not the finish line.
• Scale without taste is just noise. Investing in your team’s judgment is what makes more content matter.
• Fundamentals of great storytelling have not changed. Regardless of format or channel, what makes audiences lean in are still characters, arc, ingenuity, and surprise.

The permanent sprint

Creative teams are trapped on the endless hamster wheel of production, and it’s not slowing down. According to Adobe research, content demand will grow 5x over the next two years. Social content shelf life is now measured in hours, not weeks. Keeping fresh work in the pipeline is a permanent sprint, requiring teams to rethink how creative production functions.

The first move is freeing creative teams by having AI absorb the repetitive work so they have space for the strategic creative decisions that require human ingenuity. In a recent study from Adobe, 94% of creatives report that AI helps them produce content faster, saving an average of 17 hours per week. That recovered time is not a productivity metric; it is renewed creative capacity.

As a use case, Nestlé offers a useful blueprint. Its teams operate across 180 countries with a portfolio of iconic brands including Nescafé, KitKat, and Purina. Using Adobe Firefly Custom Models embedded in existing content workflows allows teams to generate assets in a brand-informed style without disrupting creative flow. At Nestlé, workflow cycle times dropped 50%. “With Firefly Custom Models, we can react at the speed of culture. It’s the closest thing we’ve had to magic.” says Wael Jabi, global strategic comms lead for KitKat.

As we move into the agentic era, the possibilities expand further. Adobe’s Creative Agent thinks in systems, not tasks, orchestrating across workflows, apps, and processes to close the gap between idea and execution, and get teams out of the production cycles that consume their productivity.

Build for your brand, not every brand

A company’s brand is how the world recognizes and connects with them. And it’s more than a collection of assets—it is dynamic, subjective, and expressed in thousands of micro-decisions made every day by the people who know it best. As production scales, keeping everything tuned to the brand gets more challenging. Off-the-shelf AI cannot replicate the level of nuance creative teams bring to content, and there’s a real cost to getting it wrong; diluting a brand in market with almost-right output is not an acceptable option. Customer trust is fragile.

Starting with a bespoke AI model built with Adobe Firefly Foundry addresses this directly. Firefly Foundry starts with a commercially safe base model and trains further on a company’s IP, making it possible to produce content that genuinely reflects the team’s vision.

And to ensure that Firefly Foundry models truly represent the creatives at the helm, Adobe has partnered with film studios like Wonder Studios, Promise.ai, and B5 Studios, and the “big three” talent agencies CAA, UTA, and WME to deeply understand what it means (and what it takes) to build an IP-immersive model that keeps creatives at the center as these film studios and talent agencies scale their visions. These brand ecosystems can accelerate nearly every phase of the production process, from ideation and storyboarding to production and promotion, all while preserving artistry and authorship. And to power the next generation of creativity and content, Adobe has recently announced a strategic partnership with NVIDIA, delivering best-in-class creative control along with enterprise-grade, commercially safe content at scale.

Generic AI gives teams a starting point. But a model trained on a brand’s own IP gets them to the finish line, while still leaving room for the creative calls that matter most.

When agents become the audience

AI is not only reshaping how we create; it is reshaping how customers find and engage with brands entirely. According to Adobe Digital Insights, AI-powered shopping has surged 4,700%. Agentic web traffic is up 7,851% year over year. Yet, most businesses still have significant gaps in AI-led brand visibility. If content is invisible to AI agents, then a brand is invisible to customers.

Major League Baseball is ahead of this curve. Using Adobe LLM Optimizer, the league monitors how its content surfaces across AI interfaces and makes real-time adjustments to maintain visibility. As fans search for tickets, stats, or game-day experiences, the league ensures its brand shows up wherever that search is happening. And with Adobe’s recent acquisition of Semrush, brand visibility goes even further.

The agentic web created an entirely new content surface that did not exist two years ago, and this exponential proliferation of content illustrates precisely why scaled, on-brand content production has become a strategic imperative. A well-built agentic foundation offers full visibility into (and control over) every piece of content, from production to performance.

How to prepare for AI integration

Here are a few steps to get started:

Audit before automation. Content supply chains usually include duplicated processes, unclear ownership, and assets living in many different places. Before AI can accelerate anything, develop a clear map of how content moves through the organization today: who creates it, who approves it, where it lives, and where it breaks down. AI applied to a broken process just breaks it faster.

Walk through workflows. Resist the urge to overhaul everything at once. Start with production tasks that are high-volume, low-stakes, and well-defined: asset resizing, localization, and background generation. Use those wins to build internal confidence before expanding into more complex creative territory.

Build responsible governance from the start. Governance added as an afterthought becomes a bottleneck. Building it in from the beginning creates a competitive advantage that lets teams move fast with confidence. And this means clear policies on model training, content provenance, human review thresholds, and communicating AI use to customers. The brands that earn lasting trust will treat transparency as a feature, not a footnote.

This content was produced by Adobe. It was not written by MIT Technology Review’s editorial staff.

The vibes were strong at Code with Claude, Anthropic’s two-day event for software developers in London that kicked off on May 19, the same day as Google’s I/O in Palo Alto. (A coincidence, not a flex, Anthropic staffers assured me.)

“Who here has shipped a pull request in the last week that was completely written by Claude?” Jeremy Hadfield, an engineer at Anthropic, asked from the main stage. Almost half the people in the packed room—many sitting with laptops on their knees, coding or prompting as they watched the talks—raised their hands.

Pull requests are fixes or updates to existing software that are submitted for review before they go live. They are the bread and butter of software development, the chunks of code that most professional developers spend their lives writing—or did until now.

“Who here has shipped a pull request that was completely written by Claude where they did not read the code at all?” Hadfield asked next. Nervous laughter. Most of the hands stayed up.

It’s not news that LLM-powered tools like Anthropic’s Claude Code and OpenAI’s Codex have upended the way software gets made. Top tech companies now like to boast of how little code their developers write by hand. (“Most software at Anthropic is now written by Claude,” Hadfield said. “Claude has written most of the code in Claude Code.”) OpenAI, Google, and Microsoft make similar claims. Many others wish they could.

Even so, it is striking how normal this new paradigm already seems, and how fast it has set in. This was the second year that Anthropic has put on developer events, which also run in San Francisco and Tokyo. This time last year, the company had just released Claude 4. It could code, kind of. But with Anthropic’s latest string of updates—especially Claude 4.6 and then 4.7, released in February and April—Claude Code is a tool that more and more developers seem happy to hand their work off to.   

ANTHROPIC (GRAPHIC) / WILL DOUGLAS HEAVEN (PHOTO)

Anthropic says its goal is to push automation as far as it will go. Instead of using AI to generate code and then having humans clean it up and fix the mistakes, it wants Claude to check and correct its own work. “The default isn’t ‘I’m going to prompt Claude’—the default is now ‘I’m going to have Claude prompt itself,’” Boris Cherny, who heads Claude Code, said in the opening keynote.

If all goes well, human developers shouldn’t even see the error messages when something doesn’t work. That will all be handled by Claude, which will test and tweak, test and tweak, until everything runs as it should. As Ravi Trivedi, an engineer at Anthropic, put it in another talk: “The key principle is getting out of Claude’s way. We like to say: ‘Let it cook.’”

Trivedi presented a new feature in Claude Managed Agents, Anthropic’s cloud-based setup for building and running multi-agent systems, announced two weeks ago, which the company calls dreaming. Claude agents write notes to themselves, recording and saving useful information about specific tasks. When another coding agent, say, starts to work on the same code that others have worked on, it can use the notes they left behind to get up to speed faster and learn from any errors those previous agents may have made.

Dreaming is a system that Claude agents can use to read through the notes and consolidate the information they contain, spotting patterns and common issues across different tasks. In theory, dreaming should help coding agents learn about a particular code base and get better and better at working on it.

Success stories

Code with Claude is an event aimed at developers. As well as product showcases and hands-on workshops from Anthropic, there were how-tos from a range of companies that have reshaped their software development teams around Claude Code, including Spotify and Delivery Hero as well as Lovable, Base44, and Monday.com—three startups vibe-coding apps that help people vibe-code apps.

There were no signs of unease at Code with Claude. Everybody I met wanted in.

And yet outside the conference there have been a number of reports that many coders are starting to question this bright new future. Some gripe in online forums like Reddit and Hacker News that AI coding tools are being pushed by managers chasing productivity gains, when in practice the technology makes software development harder because of all the extra code developers now have to review. “The only people I’ve heard saying that generated code is fine are those who don’t read it,” a user called pron posted on Hacker News last week. 

Others claim that their coding abilities have fallen off as they hand more tasks to AI. And researchers have warned that AI tools can produce unsafe code that will make software more vulnerable to attacks.  

I sat down with Claude engineering lead Katelyn Lesse and Claude product lead Angela Jiang and asked them what they made of the concerns that a sudden flood of code generated (and shipped) without proper human oversight was kicking serious security and maintenance problems down the road.

“All of the old software development best practices still apply. They’ve applied this entire time,” said Lesse. “I think there are a lot of people and teams that may have lost sight of them in this moment.” 

And yet as Anthropic and others push for greater automation and tools like Claude Code improve, the temptation increases to offload more and more tasks, including oversight. Lesse told me that some of the technical managers at Anthropic are exhausted by keeping up with all the code their teams now produce. “Part of things happening so much more quickly is just managing your time,” she said.

“I think that right now Claude is probably as good as a midlevel engineer at writing code,” she added. You still need expert engineers to design a system and troubleshoot harder problems, she said. “But over time we want Claude to get better and better at all different types of engineering.”

Jiang agreed: “I think the absolute end state we’re trying to get to is Claude basically being able to build itself.”

Correction: Dreaming is a feature of Claude Managed Agents not Claude Code. The article has been updated.

The Nvidia Vera chip is rarely the headline when earnings beat estimates, but it should be. When Nvidia reported Q1 revenue of US$81.62 billion on Wednesday, beating analyst estimates of US$78.86 billion, and guided Q2 at US$91 billion–well above Wall Street’s US$86.84 billion forecast–the numbers did what Nvidia numbers always do: dominate the room. 

But buried in CEO Jensen Huang’s conference call with analysts was something more strategically interesting than another quarterly beat. Huang told analysts that Nvidia’s new Vera central processors unlock access to a US$200 billion market, one that sits entirely outside the US$1 trillion the company has already forecast from its Blackwell and Rubin AI GPU lineup between 2025 and 2027. 

He expects Vera chip revenue to hit US$20 billion by the end of this fiscal year. “I expect (Vera) to be the second largest” sales contributor, Huang said during the call.

That’s not a footnote. That’s a second front.

The Vera chip and the inference pivot

The reason Nvidia needs a second front is straightforward: its biggest customers are building their own. Google, Amazon, and Microsoft–collectively expected to pour more than US$700 billion into AI infrastructure this year, up sharply from around US$400 billion in 2025, are simultaneously pouring funds into custom silicon to run AI models. Intel and AMD are also touting CPUs as a credible play for inference workloads. 

The narrative in the chip industry has shifted from who can train the biggest model to who can serve it cheapest and fastest. Inference is where Nvidia’s GPU dominance is most exposed. Training large models is still firmly Nvidia territory, but inference, generating answers at scale, in real time, is increasingly where custom chips from Google’s TPU line, Amazon’s Trainium and others are making their case.

Nvidia’s answer is Vera. The chip, developed in part using technology from Groq, a startup specialising in inference that Nvidia licensed in a deal reportedly worth around US$17 billion, targets exactly this workload. The full Vera Rubin platform, which combines the Vera CPU with Rubin GPUs, is set to launch later this year.

Supply is already the constraint

Huang was candid about one problem: supply. “My sense is that we’ll be supply-constrained through the entire life of Vera Rubin,” he said on the call. It’s a telling admission for a product Nvidia is positioning as a major growth pillar. To get ahead of disruptions, Nvidia is spending heavily on the supply chain. The company disclosed that its supply commitments rose to US$119 billion in Q1, up from US$95.2 billion the previous quarter, a significant jump that reflects both confidence in demand and anxiety about a global memory chip crunch.

Nvidia also announced a US$80 billion share repurchase programme and raised its quarterly cash dividend to 25 cents per share, from 1 cent, moves that signal financial confidence even as Huang warned of tightening supply.

The question investors are asking

Despite the beats, Nvidia shares fell 1.6% in extended trading after the results. eMarketer analyst Jacob Bourne captured the mood: “Nvidia delivered another beat, but at this point that’s essentially priced in as it keeps beating quarter after quarter. The lingering question is whether it can convince investors the AI buildout has durability into 2027 and 2028, especially as the narrative shifts toward inference workloads and competing silicon from Google, Amazon, AMD, and Intel.”

Huang pushed back with numbers of his own. He pointed to a growing sub-segment of AI-specific cloud customers whose spend is now roughly equal to the hyperscalers, but growing faster quarter-over-quarter. “We should be growing faster than hyperscale capex,” he said.

The Vera chip is central to that argument. Whether the supply chain cooperates is a different question entirely.

(Image source: Nvidia’s Newsroom)

See Also: The Nvidia H200 China deal survived the Trump-Xi summit–just not in the way anyone expected

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Alibaba has unveiled a new AI processor built specifically for AI agents, pairing the chip announcement with a multi-year silicon roadmap and a new large language model, signalling that the company is building an integrated AI stack rather than just filling a gap left by US export controls.

The Zhenwu M890, developed by Alibaba’s semiconductor subsidiary T-Head, delivers three times the performance of its predecessor, the Zhenwu 810E, according to the company, as per Reuters report. But the performance jump is less notable than the architectural intent behind the chip: the M890 is purpose-built for AI agents, where software systems must retain long stretches of context, coordinate with other models in real time, and execute complex multi-step tasks with limited human intervention. 

Those demands, heavy on memory bandwidth and inter-model communication, are meaningfully different from what standard inference chips are optimised for. The difference matters because it tells you something about where Alibaba thinks AI compute is heading. The company isn’t designing around today’s dominant use case; it’s building for the workload profile it expects to define enterprise AI over the next several years.

Built for AI agents, not just inference

More significant than the chip itself is the roadmap Alibaba put alongside it. The M890 will be followed by the V900 in the third quarter of 2027, expected to deliver another roughly threefold performance gain, followed by the J900 in the third quarter of 2028. That’s a deliberate, sustained cadence of in-house silicon upgrades that mirrors the kind of tick-tock product cycles Nvidia has used to maintain its lead in AI accelerators.

The parallel to Huawei is worth noting. Huawei laid out a similar chip roadmap for its Ascend line last year, and both announcements reflect the same underlying reality: Chinese technology companies have concluded that depending on foreign silicon, even in scenarios where export restrictions might ease, is a structural risk they cannot accept. The response has been to treat semiconductor development as a long-term capability-building exercise rather than a procurement problem.

Alibaba’s commitment to that exercise is not shallow. The company pledged more than 380 billion yuan, roughly US$53 billion, on cloud and AI infrastructure over three years last year, its largest-ever investment commitment to the sector. The M890 and its successors are downstream of that spending.

Traction that predates the announcement

T-Head said it has shipped more than 560,000 Zhenwu units to date, with over 400 external customers across 20 industries deploying the chips, including automakers and financial services firms. That is a material production footprint, not lab hardware, and it provides Alibaba with real-world deployment data at scale ahead of the M890’s rollout.

The new chip will be available to Chinese enterprise customers through Alibaba Cloud’s domestic model platform, Bailian, packaged inside the Panjiu AL128, a server system that stacks 128 M890 accelerators into a single rack.

The software side of the stack

Alongside the hardware, Alibaba announced Qwen 3.7-Max, the latest version of its flagship large language model, described as engineered for advanced coding and long-running agent tasks. The company said the model can operate continuously for up to 35 hours without performance degradation, a capability specification that only makes sense if you are designing for extended autonomous operation.

The timing is deliberate. Releasing a chip and a model optimised for the same workload class on the same day is a platform play. Alibaba is building a closed loop: its own silicon in T-Head, its own model in Qwen, its own cloud delivery in Bailian. Each component reinforces the others, and the combined stack is designed to reduce enterprise customers’ dependence on any external vendor.

More than half a million chips have been shipped. A successor is arriving in 2027, with another planned for 2028. T-Head is not hedging. At some point, building around US export controls stops being a workaround and starts being a strategy. Alibaba appears to have crossed that line.

(Image source: The White House)

See Also: Alibaba Qwen is challenging proprietary AI model economics

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President Trump flew to Beijing, brought Jensen Huang along at the last minute, and left two days later, telling reporters that “something could happen” on chip exports. Nothing did. Not a single Nvidia H200 has shipped to China since Trump first authorised the sales in December 2025, and US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer told Bloomberg that semiconductor controls were not even on the bilateral agenda. 

The summit theatre obscured a more interesting development underneath it. The H200 isn’t stuck because Washington won’t allow it. Washington already has allowed it. Roughly 10 Chinese firms, including Alibaba, Tencent, ByteDance, and JD.com, hold approved US export licences for up to 75,000 units each, with Lenovo and Foxconn authorised as distributors. The chips aren’t moving because Beijing won’t let its own companies take delivery.

Two frameworks, one deadlock

The mechanics of the stalemate are worth understanding clearly. US rules require that all H200 chips ordered by Chinese clients be used only in China. Beijing, meanwhile, has instructed Chinese tech companies to limit their use of Nvidia chips to overseas operations while supporting domestic manufacturing. The two requirements are mutually exclusive. 

Chips cleared for export cannot legally be deployed where Beijing wants to deploy them, and Beijing won’t authorise the domestic use the US licences require, according to Implicator.

Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick stated at a Senate hearing last month that Chinese firms are trying to keep their investment focused on domestic suppliers, including Huawei. Beijing’s State Council has also ordered a supply-chain security review aimed at cutting dependence on US semiconductors. 

The policy contradiction is not accidental. That is the point.

What Huawei gained while diplomats talked

The days around the summit produced several data points that matter more for the long term than Trump’s parting comment. DeepSeek confirmed its latest model had been optimised to run on Huawei processors. Tencent’s chief strategy officer said Chinese GPU supply would increase progressively through 2026, and an Alibaba executive said its T-Head proprietary GPUs had achieved scaled mass production. 

This follows the April launch of DeepSeek V4, which adapted the model for Huawei’s Ascend chips – the first major Chinese frontier model to do so in training, not just inference. What the summit week confirmed is that the shift is no longer experimental. It is now a supply-chain policy. Nvidia’s China revenue has fallen to roughly 5% in recent quarters, down from above 20% before export controls tightened. The company’s own guidance for the current quarter assumes zero revenue from China. 

Huang’s last-minute inclusion in the delegation – Trump called him directly after seeing media coverage that he had not been invited – suggested urgency. The outcome suggested the limits of what CEO diplomacy can achieve when the obstruction is structural, not procedural.

The read for the AI industry

The stalemate matters beyond bilateral optics. Chinese AI platforms are now operating under a domestic mandate to build on Huawei’s compute stack. The question of which AI hardware architecture becomes dominant in the world’s second-largest AI market is being answered not by technical benchmarks but by government directive.

Beijing steering platforms toward Huawei Ascend chips rather than Nvidia H200S is not just a trade posture. It is a structural bet that the performance gap will close fast enough that being locked into the domestic stack is manageable. DeepSeek V4’s results suggest it may be right, at least for inference workloads. 

Trump said something could happen. Greer said the decision is sovereign for China. Both are true, and neither changes the current position: the H200 deal is approved, licensed, and frozen, with Huawei filling the space it leaves behind.

(Image source: The White House)

See Also: Can China’s chip stacking strategy really challenge Nvidia’s AI dominance?

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Amazon has introduced Alexa for Shopping, combining its Rufus shopping chatbot with Alexa+ across its app, website, and Echo Show devices.

The assistant can answer product questions, compare items, track prices, and support shopping reminders. It can also handle scheduled shopping actions and eligible automated purchases.

The company said Alexa for Shopping combines Rufus’ product expertise with Alexa+’s personalised assistant context. Amazon said Rufus helped more than 300 million customers in 2025 research, compare, and buy products.

GeekWire reported that Amazon is retiring the Rufus name from its shopping interface, while Rufus will continue to power parts of the experience behind the scenes.

GeekWire also reported that Amazon CEO Andy Jassy said Rufus monthly active users rose more than 115%, while engagement increased nearly 400% year over year.

Alexa for Shopping is available through the Amazon Shopping app, Amazon’s website, and Echo Show devices. The feature is rolling out to US customers. Signed-in Amazon customers can use it for free, without a Prime membership, Echo device, or Alexa app.

Amazon reported US$426.3 billion in North America net sales and US$161.9 billion in international net sales in 2025. Amazon also reported online stores and third-party seller services as separate revenue categories in its 2025 annual report.

Amazon adds shopping questions to search

The assistant allows customers to ask shopping-related questions through Amazon’s main search bar instead of using a separate chatbot window. Users can ask for product recommendations or purchase history. They can also ask for advice related to specific shopping needs.

Examples shared by Amazon include questions such as “What’s a good skincare routine for men?” and “When did I last order AA batteries?” Amazon said the assistant uses information from its platform to answer these questions.

Amazon said Alexa for Shopping uses information from a customer’s Amazon activity and Alexa interactions. That includes shopping history, browsing, purchases, and conversations. Amazon said the information is used to recommend products and support shopping actions.

Alexa for Shopping can compare products side by side and provide AI-generated summaries on product pages. It can also show AI-generated overviews in search results with category information.

Price tracking and automated shopping

Alexa for Shopping can monitor price drops for selected items for up to one year. Customers can view a full year of price history on product detail pages or by asking the assistant.

The assistant can create shopping guides for larger purchases. These guides compare product features and prices. They also include reviews from Amazon and the web.

Amazon said customers can use the assistant to set scheduled shopping actions, including restocking household items. Amazon said the assistant can also handle birthday reminders and gift suggestions.

Scheduled actions can also be tied to conditions. For example, the assistant can add an item to the cart if it reaches a target price and has not been purchased within a set period.

The assistant can search past orders and add frequently purchased items to a customer’s cart through conversational prompts.

Amazon said customers can view and update personal details used by Alexa for Shopping. These details can include family members, pets, interests, and dietary needs.

Alexa for Shopping can also surface products from other online stores through Shop Direct. For eligible products, Amazon said its Buy for Me agentic AI feature can complete purchases using a customer’s primary address and payment method.

Echo Show gets full shopping access

Amazon is also adding full-store shopping access to Echo Show. Users can browse, search, and shop using voice, touch, or both.

The Echo Show shopping experience is available for Alexa+ customers on Echo Show 15 and Echo Show 21, with support for other devices to follow.

Amazon also cited AI investments in its first-quarter 2026 results. The company said free cash flow fell to US$1.2 billion for the trailing 12 months. It attributed the decline mainly to a US$59.3 billion increase in property and equipment purchases, primarily reflecting AI investments.

Rajiv Mehta, Amazon’s vice president of conversational shopping, said the assistant can carry customer preferences, past purchases, and conversations across phones, laptops, and Echo devices.

Users can access the assistant by updating the Amazon Shopping app and selecting the Alexa icon in the bottom navigation bar. On the desktop, the feature appears at the top of the screen.

(Photo by Anirudh)

See also: Google tests Remy AI agent for Gemini as focus turns to user control

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The open-source AI movement has never lacked for options. Mistral, Falcon, and a growing field of open-weight models have been available to developers for years. But when Meta threw its weight behind Llama, something shifted. A company with three billion users, vast compute resources, and the credibility of a tech giant was now building openly, and the developer community responded.

By early 2026, the Llama ecosystem had reached 1.2 billion downloads, averaging about 1 million per day. That is the context for what happened on April 8, 2026. Meta launched Muse Spark, its first major new Meta AI model in a year, and the first product from its newly formed Meta Superintelligence Labs.

It is capable in ways Llama 4 never was, benchmarks well against the current frontier, and is completely proprietary. No free download. No open weights. No building on it unless Meta decides you can.

The companyspentUS$14.3 billion, brought in Alexandr Wang from Scale AI to lead its AI rebuild, then spent nine months tearing down its entire AI stack and starting over. Muse Spark is what came out the other side. The developer community that made Llama what it was is now being asked to wait for a future open-source version that may or may not arrive on any predictable timeline.

What is Muse Spark?

Muse Spark is a natively multimodal reasoning model with tool-use, visual chain of thought, and multi-agent orchestration built in. It now powers Meta AI, which reaches over three billion users in Meta’s apps. Meta rebuilt its technology infrastructure from scratch, letting the company create a model that is as capable as its older midsize Llama 4 variant for an order of magnitude less compute.

That efficiency number is worth noting. At the scale Meta operates, compute costs compound fast, and running a frontier-class Meta AI model at a fraction of the cost of its predecessors changes the economics of deploying it in billions of interactions daily.

On benchmarks, the picture is genuinely mixed. Muse Spark scores 52 on the Artificial Intelligence Index v4.0, placing it fourth overall behind Gemini 3.1 Pro, GPT-5.4, and Claude Opus 4.6. Meta has not claimed to have built the best model in the world, which is itself a departure from the over-claiming that damaged Llama 4’s credibility.

Where Muse Spark leads is health. On HealthBench Hard – open-ended health queries – it scores 42.8, substantially ahead of Gemini 3.1 Pro at 20.6, GPT-5.4 at 40.1, and Grok 4.2 at 20.3. Health is a stated priority for Meta; the company says it worked with over 1,000 physicians to curate training data for the model.

Muse Spark also offers three modes of interaction: Instant mode for quick answers, Thinking mode for multi-step reasoning tasks, and Contemplating mode, which orchestrates multiple agents’ reasoning in parallel to compete with the most demanding reasoning modes from Gemini Deep Think and GPT Pro.

The open-source retreat

This is the part of the Muse Spark story that the benchmark tables do not capture. Unlike Meta’s previous models, which were released as open-weight models – meaning anyone could download and run them on their own equipment – Muse Spark is entirely proprietary. The company said it will offer the model in a private preview to select partners through an API, making Muse Spark even more proprietary than the paid models offered by Meta’s rivals.

Wang addressed the change directly, stating: “Nine months ago, we rebuilt our AI stack from scratch. New infrastructure, new architecture, new data pipelines. This is step one. Bigger models are already in development with plans to open-source future versions.”

The developer community’s response has been sceptical. Some see this as a necessary pivot after Llama 4 failed to gain expected traction. Others view it as Meta closing the gates once it has something worth protecting. That is the community now being asked to wait while competitors without that open-source legacy continue shipping freely available weights.

Distribution over benchmarks

Meanwhile, Meta is not waiting for the developer community to come around. Muse Spark will debut in the coming weeks inside Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, and Messenger, as well as in Meta’s Ray-Ban AI glasses. That rollout path is arguably more consequential than any benchmark result. OpenAI and Anthropic sell to developers and enterprises. Meta deploys directly to over three billion people already inside its apps daily.

Meta’s push into health does raise privacy questions worth watching. Muse Spark users will need to log in with an existing Meta account to use it, and while Meta does not explicitly say personal account information will be used by the AI, the company has generally trained on public user data and has positioned Muse Spark as a personal superintelligence product.

Meta stock rose more than 9% on the day of the launch, a signal that investors read the Muse Spark release as proof that the US$14.3 billion bet on Wang and the nine-month rebuild produced something real. Whether the promised open-source versions actually materialise is a question the developer community will press every quarter. The answer will define how this chapter of Meta’s AI story is remembered.

See Also: The Meta-Manus review: What enterprise AI buyers need to know about cross-border compliance risk

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