Nature Cancer, Published online: 15 May 2026; doi:10.1038/s43018-026-01169-4

Zhao and colleagues show that CD300ld, upregulated in pathologically activated neutrophils, mediates contact-dependent suppression of cytotoxic CD8+ T cells by binding to phosphatidylserine, inhibiting antitumor immune responses.

arXiv:2504.21052v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Multi-target backdoor attacks pose significant security threats to deep neural networks, as they can preset multiple target classes through a single backdoor injection. This allows attackers to control the model to misclassify poisoned samples with triggers into any desired target class during inference, exhibiting superior attack performance compared with conventional backdoor attacks. However, existing multi-target backdoor attacks fail to guarantee trigger specificity and stealthiness in black-box settings, resulting in two main issues. First, they are unable to simultaneously target all classes when only training data can be manipulated, limiting their effectiveness in realistic attack scenarios. Second, the triggers often lack visual imperceptibility, making poisoned samples easy to detect. To address these problems, we propose a Spatial-based Full-target Invisible Backdoor Attack, called SFIBA. It restricts triggers for different classes to specific local spatial regions and morphologies in the pixel space to ensure specificity, while employing a frequency-domain-based trigger injection method to guarantee stealthiness. Specifically, for injection of each trigger, we first apply fast fourier transform to obtain the amplitude spectrum of clean samples in local spatial regions. Then, we employ discrete wavelet transform to extract the features from the amplitude spectrum and use singular value decomposition to integrate the trigger. Subsequently, we selectively filter parts of the trigger in pixel space to implement trigger morphology constraints and adjust injection coefficients based on visual effects. We conduct experiments on multiple datasets and models. The results demonstrate that SFIBA can achieve excellent attack performance and stealthiness, while preserving the model's performance on benign samples, and can also bypass existing backdoor defenses.

arXiv:2603.02262v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Supervised fine-tuning (SFT) is essential for the development of medical large language models (LLMs), yet prior poisoning studies have mainly focused on the detectable backdoor attacks. We propose a novel poisoning attack targeting the reasoning process of medical LLMs during SFT. Unlike backdoor attacks, our method injects poisoned rationales into few-shot training data, leading to stealthy degradation of model performance on targeted medical topics. Results showed that knowledge overwriting was ineffective, while rationale poisoning caused significant decline on the accuracy of the target subject, as long as no correct samples of the same subject appear in the dataset. A minimum number and ratio of poisoned samples was needed to carry out an effective and stealthy attack, which was more efficient and accurate than catastrophic forgetting. We demonstrate though this study the risk of SFT-stage poisoning, hoping to spur more studies of defense in the sensitive medical domain.