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RLJP: Legal Judgment Prediction via First-Order Logic Rule-enhanced with Large Language Models

arXiv:2505.21281v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Legal Judgment Prediction (LJP) is a pivotal task in legal AI. Existing semantic-enhanced LJP models integrate judicial precedents and legal knowledge for high performance. But they neglect legal reasoning logic, a critical component of legal judgments requiring rigorous logical analysis. Although some approaches utilize legal reasoning logic for high-quality predictions, their logic rigidity hinders adaptation to case-specific logical frameworks, particularly in complex cases that are lengthy and detailed. This paper proposes a rule-enhanced legal judgment prediction framework based on first-order logic (FOL) formalism and comparative learning (CL) to develop an adaptive adjustment mechanism for legal judgment logic and further enhance performance in LJP. Inspired by the process of human exam preparation, our method follows a three-stage approach: first, we initialize judgment rules using the FOL formalism to capture complex reasoning logic accurately; next, we propose a Confusion-aware Contrastive Learning (CACL) to dynamically optimize the judgment rules through a quiz consisting of confusable cases; finally, we utilize the optimized judgment rules to predict legal judgments. Experimental results on two public datasets show superior performance across all metrics. The code is publicly available{https://anonymous.4open.science/r/RLJP-FDF1}.

Credibility Governance: A Social Mechanism for Collective Self-Correction under Weak Truth Signals

arXiv:2603.02640v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Online platforms increasingly rely on opinion aggregation to allocate real-world attention and resources, yet common signals such as engagement votes or capital-weighted commitments are easy to amplify and often track visibility rather than reliability. This makes collective judgments brittle under weak truth signals, noisy or delayed feedback, early popularity surges, and strategic manipulation. We propose Credibility Governance (CG), a mechanism that reallocates influence by learning which agents and viewpoints consistently track evolving public evidence. CG maintains dynamic credibility scores for both agents and opinions, updates opinion influence via credibility-weighted endorsements, and updates agent credibility based on the long-run performance of the opinions they support, rewarding early and persistent alignment with emerging evidence while filtering short-lived noise. We evaluate CG in POLIS, a socio-physical simulation environment that models coupled belief dynamics and downstream feedback under uncertainty. Across settings with initial majority misalignment, observation noise and contamination, and misinformation shocks, CG outperforms vote-based, stake-weighted, and no-governance baselines, yielding faster recovery to the true state, reduced lock-in and path dependence, and improved robustness under adversarial pressure. Our implementation and experimental scripts are publicly available at https://github.com/Wanying-He/Credibility_Governance.
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