arXiv:2603.07891v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Multi-Agent Path Finding (MAPF) aims to compute collision-free paths for multiple agents and has a wide range of practical applications. LaCAM*, an anytime configuration-based solver, currently represents the state of the art. Recent work has explored the use of guidance paths to steer LaCAM* toward configurations that avoid traffic congestion, thereby improving solution quality. However, existing approaches rely on Frank-Wolfe-style optimization that repeatedly invokes single-agent search before executing LaCAM*, resulting in substantial computational overhead for large-scale problems. Moreover, the guidance path is static and primarily beneficial for finding the first solution in LaCAM*. To address these limitations, we propose a new approach that leverages LaCAM*'s ability to construct a dynamic, lightweight traffic map during its search. Experimental results demonstrate that our method achieves higher solution quality than state-of-the-art guidance-path approaches across two MAPF variants.

arXiv:2603.08234v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: With the rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs), the safety of LLMs has become a critical concern. Despite significant efforts in safety alignment, current LLMs remain vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks. However, the root causes of such vulnerabilities are still poorly understood, necessitating a rigorous investigation into jailbreak mechanisms across both academic and industrial communities. In this work, we focus on a continuation-triggered jailbreak phenomenon, whereby simply relocating a continuation-triggered instruction suffix can substantially increase jailbreak success rates. To uncover the intrinsic mechanisms of this phenomenon, we conduct a comprehensive mechanistic interpretability analysis at the level of attention heads. Through causal interventions and activation scaling, we show that this jailbreak behavior primarily arises from an inherent competition between the model's intrinsic continuation drive and the safety defenses acquired through alignment training. Furthermore, we perform a detailed behavioral analysis of the identified safety-critical attention heads, revealing notable differences in the functions and behaviors of safety heads across different model architectures. These findings provide a novel mechanistic perspective for understanding and interpreting jailbreak behaviors in LLMs, offering both theoretical insights and practical implications for improving model safety.