arXiv:2605.25402v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Self-supervised pre-training paradigm has gained increasing prominence for learning transferable representations in medical imaging, yet existing methods for ultrasound (US) images operate at the image or frame level, overlooking the anatomical context for clinical-aligned representation learning. In this work, we propose an anatomy-anchored ultrasound self-supervision framework ANAUS that shifts representation learning from generic visual regions to clinically meaningful anatomical structures. Utilizing a learnable latent prompt engine alongside a one-time domain adaptation on existing public image--mask pairs, we empower the LP-SAM module to achieve annotation-free anatomy delineation at scale. Building upon this anatomical grounding, we propose a dual-policy self-supervised learning paradigm consisting of inter-view semantics-aware anatomy-separating alignment and contextual core-region prediction to enhance representation learning. Specifically, the former enforces feature invariance within identical anatomical regions while promoting discriminability across distinct structures; the latter compels the model to reconstruct corrupted regions, thereby capturing fine-grained structural details. Extensive evaluations on six public datasets demonstrate that \ours{} consistently outstrips current state-of-the-art methods while maintaining the computational efficiency essential for clinical deployment. Code is available at https://github.com/zhcz328/ANAUS.

arXiv:2605.17986v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: AI agents such as OpenClaw are increasingly deployed in local workflows with access to external tools. This creates indirect prompt-injection (IPI) risk: an agent may execute harmful instructions embedded in untrusted inputs such as email, downloaded files, webpages, repositories, or group-chat messages. Existing evaluations are often small, purely simulated, or focused on a narrow set of channels. We introduce LivePI (Live Prompt Injection), a structured benchmark for IPI risk in a production-like but test-controlled environment. LivePI covers seven input surfaces, twelve attack/rendering families, and five malicious goals, including protected-information exfiltration, unauthorized security-control changes, unsafe code retrieval or execution, inbox-summary exfiltration, and cryptocurrency transfer. We run LivePI on a real virtual machine with live but test-controlled email, chat, web, local-file, repository, and wallet interfaces. Across GPT-5.3-Codex, Claude Opus 4.6, Gemini 3.1 Pro, Kimi K2.5, and GLM-5, total attack success rates range from 10.7% to 29.6%. Group-chat injection is uniformly successful across the evaluated backbones in our deployment, and repository-link attacks produce high-severity failures despite a small denominator. We also evaluate a two-layer defense consisting of prompt-level filtering and pre-execution tool-call authorization. In the GPT-5.3-Codex setting, the defense intercepts all tested malicious-goal completions in LivePI before execution while preserving benign utility on PinchBench-derived workloads.