arXiv:2605.23954v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Audio Large Language Models (ALLMs) are highly vulnerable to real-world noise, which often induces severe semantic drift and hallucinations. Existing robustness methods primarily rely on waveform-level acoustic enhancement, answer-level supervision, or the internal suppression of noise representations. To address these issues, we propose echodistill, an alignment-based noisy-to-clean self-distillation framework. Echodistill leverages a frozen clean-audio teacher to provide semantic references for an inference-time noisy-audio student. Specifically, the student samples candidate responses under noisy conditions to expose its test-time behavior. These trajectories are then optimized via group-relative policy optimization (GRPO), where the token-level consistency with the teacher acts as a reward bonus. By aligning the noisy student's candidate responses with clean semantic evidence, and applying audio-aware reward shaping, our method encourages reasoning trajectories that are both correct and genuinely acoustically grounded. Echodistill significantly improves the semantic reliability and task performance of Audio LLMs under complex noise, without introducing any additional inference costs. Extensive experiments show that: (I) Compared with the strongest baseline, echodistill achieves average improvements of 4.18\%$\uparrow$ in GSR under strong noise. (II) Ablation results on Qwen-Omni further show that echodistill improves over the GRPO-only variant by 3.02\%$\uparrow$ in Acc, 3.89\%$\uparrow$ in Noisy, and 4.53\%$\uparrow$ in GSR on average. Our codes are available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/echodistill-10DE.

arXiv:2605.24069v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The rise of tool-using Large Language Model (LLM) agents, standardized by protocols like the Model Context Protocol (MCP), has unlocked unprecedented autonomous execution capabilities for LLM Agents by integrating external open-domain knowledge and tools. However, this interoperability introduces a covert attack surface targeting the agent's cognitive planning layer. This paper systematically investigates Tool Description Poisoning (TDP), a novel semantic attack. In TDP, malicious instructions are not embedded in a tool's executable code, but rather covertly injected into its descriptive metadata, the very "manual" an agent relies on for secure planning and decision-making. To rigorously and systematically evaluate this emerging threat, we introduce the MCP-TDP Security Benchmark. This high-fidelity sandbox environment comprises 32 realistic, real-world test cases spanning 6 distinct risk categories. Our evaluation of 8 mainstream LLMs reveals severe vulnerabilities, with leading models like GPT-4o exhibiting a nearly 100% Attack Success Rate (ASR) in six high-risk scenarios. Furthermore, our findings demonstrate that common prompt-guardrail defenses are largely ineffective and can, counterintuitively, even be counterproductive (a phenomenon which we term the "Firewall Fallacy"). Crucially, we also propose a defense mechanism: "Reactive Self-Correction," where an agent autonomously detects and reverts its own malicious actions post-execution. This work provides the first specialized security benchmark tailored for TDP, offering essential insights for securing the cognitive and planning layers of advanced agentic systems.