arXiv:2609.12399v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Generative recommendation (GR) relies on large-beam decoding to generate hundreds of candidate items, creating a new scaling challenge for recurrent linear attention. Existing linear attention serving systems either materialize a full recurrent state for every beam or repeatedly replay shared history, incurring substantial memory and traffic overhead. To address this, we present OneLA, a linear-attention decoding framework that exploits the shared prompt and short divergent suffixes of GR workloads. Specifically, OneLA represents all beam states using a single shared prompt-derived state and compact, append-only records of their divergent transitions. Using this representation, OneLA computes only the state information required at each decoding step, without reconstructing a full recurrent state for every beam. Furthermore, OneLA uses a lightweight ancestry index to track the transition records that make up each beam's history, allowing beams to be updated without moving or copying existing records. A fused GPU kernel further reuses the shared state across beams. Our analysis shows that OneLA achieves 1.54-2.46x end-to-end decode speedups while substantially reducing recurrent-state memory use and data movement.

arXiv:2609.01210v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Safety benchmarks for large language models often assess the risk of a user query, although the outcome of question answering depends on whether the response violates a policy. This distinction is critical in Chinese harmful-content evaluation, where linguistic variation and adversarial transformations can obscure risky intent. We introduce C-SafeQA, a policy-grounded benchmark for response-level Chinese safety evaluation. It comprises 538 base queries and 8,877 adversarial queries answered by four full-model LLM deployments, yielding 37,660 query-response records labeled safe, unsafe, or disputed. Reference labels are generated through agreement-aware multi-model adjudication and blind audits of stratified subsets by three safety experts. C-SafeQA supports both evaluation of target-model safety and auditing of seven automated safety judges against shared reference labels. Unsafe-response rates range from 0.93% to 3.35% on base queries and from 11.68% to 30.05% on adversarial queries. On the adversarial subset, judges show substantial trade-offs between unsafe-response recall and risk-query-conditioned safe-response false positive rate, and no judge dominates all metrics. Both acrostic transformations reduce unsafe recall for all seven judges, revealing mechanism-specific evaluator weaknesses. Dataset records, metadata, verification code, and judge scripts are publicly released to support recomputation, while benchmark construction, target-response generation, and private adjudication remain outside the release boundary.