arXiv:2603.23043v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The accelerating pace of climate change introduces profound non-stationarities that challenge the ability of Machine Learning based climate emulators to generalize beyond their training distributions. While these emulators offer computationally efficient alternatives to traditional Earth System Models, their reliability remains a potential bottleneck under "no-analog" future climate states, which we define here as regimes where external forcing drives the system into conditions outside the empirical range of the historical training data. A fundamental challenge in evaluating this reliability is data contamination; because many models are trained on simulations that already encompass future scenarios, true out-of-distribution (OOD) performance is often masked. To address this, we benchmark the OOD robustness of three state-of-the-art architectures: U-Net, ConvLSTM, and the ClimaX foundation model specifically restricted to a historical-only training regime (1850-2014). We evaluate these models using two complementary strategies: (i) temporal extrapolation to the recent climate (2015-2023) and (ii) cross-scenario forcing shifts across divergent emission pathways. Our analysis within this experimental setup reveals an accuracy vs. stability trade-off: while the ClimaX foundation model achieves the lowest absolute error, it exhibits higher relative performance changes under distribution shifts, with precipitation errors increasing by up to 8.44% under extreme forcing scenarios. These findings suggest that when restricted to historical training dynamics, even high-capacity foundation models are sensitive to external forcing trajectories. Our results underscore the necessity of scenario-aware training and rigorous OOD evaluation protocols to ensure the robustness of climate emulators under a changing climate.

arXiv:2603.23064v2 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We identify a critical security vulnerability in mainstream Claw personal AI agents: untrusted content encountered during heartbeat-driven background execution can silently pollute agent memory and subsequently influence user-facing behavior without the user's awareness. This vulnerability arises from an architectural design shared across the Claw ecosystem: heartbeat background execution runs in the same session as user-facing conversation, so content ingested from any external source monitored in the background (including email, message channels, news feeds, code repositories, and social platforms) can enter the same memory context used for foreground interaction, often with limited user visibility and without clear source provenance. We formalize this process as an Exposure (E) $\rightarrow$ Memory (M) $\rightarrow$ Behavior (B) pathway: misinformation encountered during heartbeat execution enters the agent's short-term session context, potentially gets written into long-term memory, and later shapes downstream user-facing behavior. We instantiate this pathway in an agent-native social setting using MissClaw, a controlled research replica of Moltbook. We find that (1) social credibility cues, especially perceived consensus, are the dominant driver of short-term behavioral influence, with misleading rates up to 61%; (2) routine memory-saving behavior can promote short-term pollution into durable long-term memory at rates up to 91%, with cross-session behavioral influence reaching 76%; (3) under naturalistic browsing with content dilution and context pruning, pollution still crosses session boundaries. Overall, prompt injection is not required: ordinary social misinformation is sufficient to silently shape agent memory and behavior under heartbeat-driven background execution.