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Spatial-SSRL: Enhancing Spatial Understanding via Self-Supervised Reinforcement Learning

arXiv:2510.27606v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Spatial understanding remains a weakness of Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs). Existing supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and recent reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) pipelines depend on costly supervision, specialized tools, or constrained environments that limit scale. We introduce Spatial-SSRL, a self-supervised RL paradigm that derives verifiable signals directly from ordinary RGB or RGB-D images. Spatial-SSRL automatically formulates five pretext tasks that capture 2D and 3D spatial structure: shuffled patch reordering, flipped patch recognition, cropped patch inpainting, regional depth ordering, and relative 3D position prediction. These tasks provide ground-truth answers that are easy to verify and require no human or LVLM annotation. Training on our tasks substantially improves spatial reasoning while preserving general visual capabilities. On seven spatial understanding benchmarks in both image and video settings, Spatial-SSRL delivers average accuracy gains of 4.63% (3B) and 3.89% (7B) over the Qwen2.5-VL baselines. Our results show that simple, intrinsic supervision enables RLVR at scale and provides a practical route to stronger spatial intelligence in LVLMs.
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Chain-of-Scrutiny: Detecting Backdoor Attacks for Large Language Models

arXiv:2406.05948v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs), especially those accessed via APIs, have demonstrated impressive capabilities across various domains. However, users without technical expertise often turn to (untrustworthy) third-party services, such as prompt engineering, to enhance their LLM experience, creating vulnerabilities to adversarial threats like backdoor attacks. Backdoor-compromised LLMs generate malicious outputs to users when inputs contain specific "triggers" set by attackers. Traditional defense strategies, originally designed for small-scale models, are impractical for API-accessible LLMs due to limited model access, high computational costs, and data requirements. To address these limitations, we propose Chain-of-Scrutiny (CoS) which leverages LLMs' unique reasoning abilities to mitigate backdoor attacks. It guides the LLM to generate reasoning steps for a given input and scrutinizes for consistency with the final output -- any inconsistencies indicating a potential attack. It is well-suited for the popular API-only LLM deployments, enabling detection at minimal cost and with little data. User-friendly and driven by natural language, it allows non-experts to perform the defense independently while maintaining transparency. We validate the effectiveness of CoS through extensive experiments on various tasks and LLMs, with results showing greater benefits for more powerful LLMs.
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