arXiv:2510.25908v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated transformative potential in scientific research, yet their deployment in high-stakes contexts raises significant trustworthiness concerns. Here, we introduce SciTrust 2.0, a comprehensive framework for evaluating LLM trustworthiness in scientific applications across four dimensions: truthfulness, adversarial robustness, scientific safety, and scientific ethics. Our framework incorporates novel, open-ended truthfulness benchmarks developed through a verified reflection-tuning pipeline and expert validation, alongside a novel ethics benchmark for scientific research contexts covering eight subcategories including dual-use research and bias. We evaluated seven prominent LLMs, including four science-specialized models and three general-purpose industry models, using multiple evaluation metrics including accuracy, semantic similarity measures, and LLM-based scoring. General-purpose industry models overall outperformed science-specialized models across each trustworthiness dimension, with GPT-o4-mini demonstrating superior performance in truthfulness assessments and adversarial robustness. Science-specialized models showed significant deficiencies in logical and ethical reasoning capabilities, along with concerning vulnerabilities in safety evaluations, particularly in high-risk domains such as biosecurity and chemical weapons. By open-sourcing our framework, we provide a foundation for developing more trustworthy AI systems and advancing research on model safety and ethics in scientific contexts.

arXiv:2510.25929v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Algorithmic collusion has emerged as a central question in AI: Will the interaction between different AI agents deployed in markets lead to collusion? More generally, understanding how emergent behavior, be it a cartel or market dominance from more advanced bots, affects the market overall is an important research question. We propose a hierarchical multi-agent reinforcement learning framework to study algorithmic collusion in market making. The framework includes a self-interested market maker (Agent~A), which is trained in an uncertain environment shaped by an adversary, and three bottom-layer competitors: the self-interested Agent~B1 (whose objective is to maximize its own PnL), the competitive Agent~B2 (whose objective is to minimize the PnL of its opponent), and the hybrid Agent~B$^\star$, which can modulate between the behavior of the other two. To analyze how these agents shape the behavior of each other and affect market outcomes, we propose interaction-level metrics that quantify behavioral asymmetry and system-level dynamics, while providing signals potentially indicative of emergent interaction patterns. Experimental results show that Agent~B2 secures dominant performance in a zero-sum setting against B1, aggressively capturing order flow while tightening average spreads, thus improving market execution efficiency. In contrast, Agent~B$^\star$ exhibits a self-interested inclination when co-existing with other profit-seeking agents, securing dominant market share through adaptive quoting, yet exerting a milder adverse impact on the rewards of Agents~A and B1 compared to B2. These findings suggest that adaptive incentive control supports more sustainable strategic co-existence in heterogeneous agent environments and offers a structured lens for evaluating behavioral design in algorithmic trading systems.