arXiv:2602.04616v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As the paradigm of Human-Centered AI (HCAI) gains prominence, its benefits to society are accompanied by significant ethical concerns, one of which is the protection of individual privacy. This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of privacy within HCAI, proposing a human-centered privacy (HCP) framework, providing integrated solution from technology, ethics, and human factors perspectives. The chapter begins by mapping privacy risks across each stage of AI development lifecycle, from data collection to deployment and reuse, highlighting the impact of privacy risks on the entire system. The chapter then introduces privacy-preserving techniques such as federated learning and dif erential privacy. Subsequent chapters integrate the crucial user perspective by examining mental models, alongside the evolving regulatory and ethical landscapes as well as privacy governance. Next, advice on design guidelines is provided based on the human-centered privacy framework. After that, we introduce practical case studies across diverse fields. Finally, the chapter discusses persistent open challenges and future research directions, concluding that a multidisciplinary approach, merging technical, design, policy, and ethical expertise, is essential to successfully embed privacy into the core of HCAI, thereby ensuring these technologies advance in a manner that respects and ensures human autonomy, trust and dignity.

arXiv:2602.04678v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Time series forecasting in real-world applications requires both high predictive accuracy and interpretable uncertainty quantification. Traditional point prediction methods often fail to capture the inherent uncertainty in time series data, while existing probabilistic approaches struggle to balance computational efficiency with interpretability. We propose a novel Multi-Expert Learning Distributional Labels (LDL) framework that addresses these challenges through mixture-of-experts architectures with distributional learning capabilities. Our approach introduces two complementary methods: (1) Multi-Expert LDL, which employs multiple experts with different learned parameters to capture diverse temporal patterns, and (2) Pattern-Aware LDL-MoE, which explicitly decomposes time series into interpretable components (trend, seasonality, changepoints, volatility) through specialized sub-experts. Both frameworks extend traditional point prediction to distributional learning, enabling rich uncertainty quantification through Maximum Mean Discrepancy (MMD). We evaluate our methods on aggregated sales data derived from the M5 dataset, demonstrating superior performance compared to baseline approaches. The continuous Multi-Expert LDL achieves the best overall performance, while the Pattern-Aware LDL-MoE provides enhanced interpretability through component-wise analysis. Our frameworks successfully balance predictive accuracy with interpretability, making them suitable for real-world forecasting applications where both performance and actionable insights are crucial.

arXiv:2602.04735v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) can acquire unintended biases from seemingly benign training data even without explicit cues or malicious content. Existing methods struggle to detect such risks before fine-tuning, making post hoc evaluation costly and inefficient. To address this challenge, we introduce Data2Behavior, a new task for predicting unintended model behaviors prior to training. We also propose Manipulating Data Features (MDF), a lightweight approach that summarizes candidate data through their mean representations and injects them into the forward pass of a base model, allowing latent statistical signals in the data to shape model activations and reveal potential biases and safety risks without updating any parameters. MDF achieves reliable prediction while consuming only about 20% of the GPU resources required for fine-tuning. Experiments on Qwen3-14B, Qwen2.5-32B-Instruct, and Gemma-3-12b-it confirm that MDF can anticipate unintended behaviors and provide insight into pre-training vulnerabilities.

arXiv:2602.04881v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Internet of Things (IoT) deployments operate in nonstationary, dynamic environments where factors such as sensor drift, evolving user behavior, and heterogeneous user privacy requirements can affect application utility. Continual learning (CL) addresses this by adapting models over time without catastrophic forgetting. Meanwhile, contrastive learning has emerged as a powerful representation-learning paradigm that improves robustness and sample efficiency in a self-supervised manner. This paper reviews the usage of \emph{contrastive continual learning} (CCL) for IoT, connecting algorithmic design (replay, regularization, distillation, prompts) with IoT system realities (TinyML constraints, intermittent connectivity, privacy). We present a unifying problem formulation, derive common objectives that blend contrastive and distillation losses, propose an IoT-oriented reference architecture for on-device, edge, and cloud-based CCL, and provide guidance on evaluation protocols and metrics. Finally, we highlight open unique challenges with respect to the IoT domain, such as spanning tabular and streaming IoT data, concept drift, federated settings, and energy-aware training.

arXiv:2505.19414v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: The revolution in artificial intelligence (AI) has brought sustainable challenges in data center management due to the high carbon emissions and short cooling response time associated with high-power density racks. While machine learning (ML) offers promise for intelligent management, its adoption is hindered by safety and reliability concerns. To address this, we propose a multiphysics-informed machine learning (MPIML) framework that integrates physical priors into data-driven models for enhanced accuracy and safety. We introduce an integrated system architecture comprising three core engines: DCLib for versatile facility modeling, DCTwin for high-fidelity multiphysics simulation, and DCBrain for decision-making optimization. This system enables critical predictive and prescriptive applications, such as carbon-aware IT provisioning, safety-aware intelligent cooling control and battery health forecasting. An illustrative example on an industry-grade data center cooling control demonstrates that our MPIML approach reduces annual carbon emissions up to 200 kilotons compared with conventional methods while ensuring operational constraints are met. We conclude by outlining key challenges and future directions for developing autonomous and sustainable data centers.

arXiv:2503.01733v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Smart homes equipped with ambient sensors offer a transformative approach to continuous health monitoring and assisted living. Traditional research in this domain primarily focuses on Human Activity Recognition (HAR), which relies on mapping sensor data to a closed set of predefined activity labels. However, the fixed granularity of these labels often constrains their practical utility, failing to capture the subtle, household-specific nuances essential, for example, for tracking individual health over time. To address this, we propose DISCOVER, a framework for discovering and annotating Patterns of Daily Living (PDL) - fine-grained, recurring sequences of sensor events that emerge directly from a resident's unique routines. DISCOVER utilizes a self-supervised feature extraction and representation-aware clustering pipeline, supported by a custom visualization interface that enables experts to interpret and label discovered patterns with minimal effort. Our evaluation across multiple smart-home environments demonstrates that DISCOVER identifies cohesive behavioral clusters with high inter-rater agreement while achieving classification performance comparable to fully-supervised baselines using only 0.01% of the labels. Beyond reducing annotation overhead, DISCOVER establishes a foundation for longitudinal analysis. By grounding behavior in a resident's specific environment rather than rigid semantic categories, our framework facilitates the observation of within-person habitual drift. This capability positions the system as a potential tool for identifying subtle behavioral indicators associated with early-stage cognitive decline in future longitudinal studies.

The previous article in this series, “Rules fail at the prompt, succeed at the boundary,” focused on the first AI-orchestrated espionage campaign and the failure of prompt-level control. This article is the prescription. The question every CEO is now getting from their board is some version of: What do we do about agent risk?

Across recent AI security guidance from standards bodies, regulators, and major providers, a simple idea keeps repeating: treat agents like powerful, semi-autonomous users, and enforce rules at the boundaries where they touch identity, tools, data, and outputs.

The following is an actionable eight-step plan one can ask teams to implement and report against:  

Constrain capabilities

These steps help define identity and limit capabilities.

1. Identity and scope: Make agents real users with narrow jobs

Today, agents run under vague, over-privileged service identities. The fix is straightforward: treat each agent as a non-human principal with the same discipline applied to employees.

Every agent should run as the requesting user in the correct tenant, with permissions constrained to that user’s role and geography. Prohibit cross-tenant on-behalf-of shortcuts. Anything high-impact should require explicit human approval with a recorded rationale. That is how Google’s Secure AI Framework (SAIF) and NIST AI’s access-control guidance are meant to be applied in practice.

The CEO question: Can we show, today, a list of our agents and exactly what each is allowed to do?

2. Tooling control: Pin, approve, and bound what agents can use

The Anthropic espionage framework worked because the attackers could wire Claude into a flexible suite of tools (e.g., scanners, exploit frameworks, data parsers) through Model Context Protocol, and those tools weren’t pinned or policy-gated.

The defense is to treat toolchains like a supply chain:

• Pin versions of remote tool servers.
• Require approvals for adding new tools, scopes, or data sources.
• Forbid automatic tool-chaining unless a policy explicitly allows it.

This is exactly what OWASP flags under excessive agency and what it recommends protecting against. Under the EU AI Act, designing for such cyber-resilience and misuse resistance is part of the Article 15 obligation to ensure robustness and cybersecurity.

The CEO question: Who signs off when an agent gains a new tool or a broader scope? How does one know?

3. Permissions by design: Bind tools to tasks, not to models

A common anti-pattern is to give the model a long-lived credential and hope prompts keep it polite. SAIF and NIST argue the opposite: credentials and scopes should be bound to tools and tasks, rotated regularly, and auditable. Agents then request narrowly scoped capabilities through those tools.

In practice, that looks like: “finance-ops-agent may read, but not write, certain ledgers without CFO approval.”

The CEO question: Can we revoke a specific capability from an agent without re-architecting the whole system?

Control data and behavior

These steps gate inputs, outputs, and constrain behavior.

4. Inputs, memory, and RAG: Treat external content as hostile until proven otherwise

Most agent incidents start with sneaky data: a poisoned web page, PDF, email, or repository that smuggles adversarial instructions into the system. OWASP’s prompt-injection cheat sheet and OpenAI’s own guidance both insist on strict separation of system instructions from user content and on treating unvetted retrieval sources as untrusted.

Operationally, gate before anything enters retrieval or long-term memory: new sources are reviewed, tagged, and onboarded; persistent memory is disabled when untrusted context is present; provenance is attached to each chunk.

The CEO question: Can we enumerate every external content source our agents learn from, and who approved them?

5. Output handling and rendering: Nothing executes “just because the model said so”

In the Anthropic case, AI-generated exploit code and credential dumps flowed straight into action. Any output that can cause a side effect needs a validator between the agent and the real world. OWASP’s insecure output handling category is explicit on this point, as are browser security best practices around origin boundaries.

The CEO question: Where, in our architecture, are agent outputs assessed before they run or ship to customers?

6. Data privacy at runtime: Protect the data first, then the model

Protect the data such that there is nothing dangerous to reveal by default. NIST and SAIF both lean toward “secure-by-default” designs where sensitive values are tokenized or masked and only re-hydrated for authorized users and use cases.

In agentic systems, that means policy-controlled detokenization at the output boundary and logging every reveal. If an agent is fully compromised, the blast radius is bounded by what the policy lets it see.

This is where the AI stack intersects not just with the EU AI Act but with GDPR and sector-specific regimes. The EU AI Act expects providers and deployers to manage AI-specific risk; runtime tokenization and policy-gated reveal are strong evidence that one is actively controlling those risks in production.

The CEO question: When our agents touch regulated data, is that protection enforced by architecture or by promises?

Prove governance and resilience

For the final steps, it’s important to show controls work and keep working.

7. Continuous evaluation: Don’t ship a one-time test, ship a test harness

Anthropic’s research about sleeper agents should eliminate all fantasies about single test dreams and show how critical continuous evaluation is. This means instrumenting agents with deep observability, regularly red teaming with adversarial test suites, and backing everything with robust logging and evidence, so failures become both regression tests and enforceable policy updates.

The CEO question: Who works to break our agents every week, and how do their findings change policy?

 8. Governance, inventory, and audit: Keep score in one place

AI security frameworks emphasize inventory and evidence: enterprises must know which models, prompts, tools, datasets, and vector stores they have, who owns them, and what decisions were taken about risk.

For agents, that means a living catalog and unified logs:

• Which agents exist, on which platforms
• What scopes, tools, and data each is allowed
• Every approval, detokenization, and high-impact action, with who approved it and when

The CEO question: If asked how an agent made a specific decision, could we reconstruct the chain?

And don’t forget the system-level threat model: assume the threat actor GTG-1002 is already in your enterprise. To complete enterprise preparedness, zoom out and consider the MITRE ATLAS product, which exists precisely because adversaries attack systems, not models. Anthropic provides a case study of a state-based threat actor (GTG-1002) doing exactly that with an agentic framework.

Taken together, these controls do not make agents magically safe. They do something more familiar and more reliable: they put AI, its access, and actions back inside the same security frame used for any powerful user or system.

For boards and CEOs, the question is no longer “Do we have good AI guardrails?” It’s: Can we answer the CEO questions above with evidence, not assurances?

This content was produced by Protegrity. It was not written by MIT Technology Review’s editorial staff.

Nature, Published online: 04 February 2026; doi:10.1038/s41586-025-10087-x

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