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The Anatomy and Boundary of Adaptation under Temporal Tabular Shift

arXiv:2609.12136v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Prequential adaptation of frozen tabular foundation models under temporal drift, with each label revealed only after prediction, helps some deployments and harms others, yet current practice does not predict which. We study the sources and limits of these gains. A diagnostic anatomy attributes gains to four recurring mechanisms under a streaming protocol that removes three optimistic biases and quantifies a fourth. Within an agnostic total-variation drift class, the target conditional is only partially identified: its identified-set diameter, the \emph{wall}, is irreducible from unlabeled data uniformly in sample size. A second, orthogonal $L^2$ projection wall quantifies what the frozen representation cannot express. Two canonical mechanism priors collapse the first wall. Under stated nuisance-rate conditions, the wall can be estimated from labeled historical windows at a $\sqrt N$ rate above the margin threshold $\gamma^\star=d_0/(2\alpha_s)$. At $\gamma=0$, the conditional lower-bound program depends on an open affinity estimate; the positive-margin lower branch also remains open. Semi-synthetic data illustrate the finite-sample mechanism with calibrated exponents. Stream-level proxies on eight industrial streams fall on the difficult side under a stated roughness bound, while the equality case $\gamma=\gamma^\star$ remains unresolved.
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AgentHijack: Visual Patch Attacks on Multimodal Computer-Use Agents

arXiv:2609.09212v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This paper presents an end-to-end evaluation framework for image-triggered command injection against computer-use agents (CUAs). The goal is to test whether a local visual patch can induce verifiable environmental consequences along the full chain of screenshot input, VLM generation, action parsing, and environment execution. We train and deploy patches on author-controlled GitHub Pages pages and a locally deployed CSDN clone, and evaluate them in real environments across five open-source or publicly available GUI-agent or vision-language-model (VLM) backends. Our experiment aggregates 600 instance-level online cases, with T-ASR, TAPR, and E2E-ASR reaching 84.5%, 47.0%, and 20.3%, respectively. Trajectory analysis further shows that in some successful cases the agent first executes a malicious terminal command and then continues the original benign task. These results indicate that optimized local visual signals can affect not only VLM outputs but also propagate through the execution pipeline of open CUAs and create real environmental risk.
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