arXiv:2603.08068v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: While large language models (LLMs) exhibit strong reasoning abilities, their performance on complex tasks is often constrained by the limitations of their internal knowledge. A compelling approach to overcome this challenge is to augment these models with external tools -- such as Python interpreters for mathematical computations or search engines for retrieving factual information. However, enabling models to use these tools effectively remains a significant challenge. Existing methods typically rely on cold-start pipelines that begin with supervised fine-tuning (SFT), followed by reinforcement learning (RL). These approaches often require substantial amounts of labeled data for SFT, which is expensive to annotate or synthesize. In this work, we propose In-Context Reinforcement Learning (ICRL), an RL-only framework that eliminates the need for SFT by leveraging few-shot prompting during the rollout stage of RL. Specifically, ICRL introduces in-context examples within the rollout prompts to teach the model how to invoke external tools. Furthermore, as training progresses, the number of in-context examples is gradually reduced, eventually reaching a zero-shot setting where the model learns to call tools independently. We conduct extensive experiments across a range of reasoning and tool-use benchmarks. Results show that ICRL achieves state-of-the-art performance, demonstrating its effectiveness as a scalable, data-efficient alternative to traditional SFT-based pipelines.

arXiv:2603.04364v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Multimodal web agents that process both screenshots and accessibility trees are increasingly deployed to interact with web interfaces, yet their dual-stream architecture opens an underexplored attack surface: an adversary who injects content into the webpage DOM simultaneously corrupts both observation channels with a consistent deceptive narrative. Our vulnerability analysis on MiniWob++ reveals that attacks including a visual component far outperform text-only injections, exposing critical gaps in text-centric VLM safety training. Motivated by this finding, we propose Dual-Modality Multi-Stage Adversarial Safety Training (DMAST), a framework that formalizes the agent-attacker interaction as a two-player zero-sum Markov game and co-trains both players through a three-stage pipeline: (1) imitation learning from a strong teacher model, (2) oracle-guided supervised fine-tuning that uses a novel zero-acknowledgment strategy to instill task-focused reasoning under adversarial noise, and (3) adversarial reinforcement learning via Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) self-play. On out-of-distribution tasks, DMAST substantially mitigates adversarial risks while simultaneously doubling task completion efficiency. Our approach significantly outperforms established training-based and prompt-based defenses, demonstrating genuine co-evolutionary progress and robust generalization to complex, unseen environments.