arXiv:2508.18649v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Safeguarding vision-language models (VLMs) is a critical challenge, as existing methods often suffer from over-defense, which harms utility, or rely on shallow alignment, failing to detect complex threats that require deep reasoning. To this end, we introduc PRISM (Principled Reasoning for Integrated Safety in Multimodality), a System 2-like framework that aligns VLMs through a structured four-stage reasoning process explicitly designed to handle three distinct categories of multimodal safety violations. Our framework consists of two key components: a structured reasoning pipeline that analyzes each violation category in dedicated stages, and PRISM-DPO, generated via Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) to refine reasoning quality through Direct Preference Optimization. Comprehensive evaluations show that PRISM substantially reduces attack success rates on JailbreakV-28K and VLBreak, improves robustness against adaptive attacks, and generalizes to out-of-distribution multi-image threats, while better preserving model utility on benign multimodal benchmarks. Our code, data, and model weights available at https://github.com/SaFoLab-WISC/PRISM.

The development of genetically encoded fluorescent reporters, along with their corresponding knock-in mouse lines for labeling α-Syn inclusions, enables diverse applications in studying the propagation and pathological effects of α-Syn inclusions in the live brain.

arXiv:2603.28824v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Dataset condensation aims to synthesize compact yet informative datasets that retain the training efficacy of full-scale data, offering substantial gains in efficiency. Recent studies reveal that the condensation process can be vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where malicious triggers are injected into the condensation dataset, manipulating model behavior during inference. While prior approaches have made progress in balancing attack success rate and clean test accuracy, they often fall short in preserving stealthiness, especially in concealing the visual artifacts of condensed data or the perturbations introduced during inference. To address this challenge, we introduce Sneakdoor, which enhances stealthiness without compromising attack effectiveness. Sneakdoor exploits the inherent vulnerability of class decision boundaries and incorporates a generative module that constructs input-aware triggers aligned with local feature geometry, thereby minimizing detectability. This joint design enables the attack to remain imperceptible to both human inspection and statistical detection. Extensive experiments across multiple datasets demonstrate that Sneakdoor achieves a compelling balance among attack success rate, clean test accuracy, and stealthiness, substantially improving the invisibility of both the synthetic data and triggered samples while maintaining high attack efficacy. The code is available at https://github.com/XJTU-AI-Lab/SneakDoor.

arXiv:2603.30016v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI agents, predominantly powered by large language models (LLMs), are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection, in which malicious instructions embedded in untrusted data can trigger dangerous agent actions. This position paper discusses our vision for system-level defenses against indirect prompt injection attacks. We articulate three positions: (1) dynamic replanning and security policy updates are often necessary for dynamic tasks and realistic environments; (2) certain context-dependent security decisions would still require LLMs (or other learned models), but should only be made within system designs that strictly constrain what the model can observe and decide; (3) in inherently ambiguous cases, personalization and human interaction should be treated as core design considerations. In addition to our main positions, we discuss limitations of existing benchmarks that can create a false sense of utility and security. We also highlight the value of system-level defenses, which serve as the skeleton of agentic systems by structuring and controlling agent behaviors, integrating rule-based and model-based security checks, and enabling more targeted research on model robustness and human interaction.

arXiv:2603.23064v2 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We identify a critical security vulnerability in mainstream Claw personal AI agents: untrusted content encountered during heartbeat-driven background execution can silently pollute agent memory and subsequently influence user-facing behavior without the user's awareness. This vulnerability arises from an architectural design shared across the Claw ecosystem: heartbeat background execution runs in the same session as user-facing conversation, so content ingested from any external source monitored in the background (including email, message channels, news feeds, code repositories, and social platforms) can enter the same memory context used for foreground interaction, often with limited user visibility and without clear source provenance. We formalize this process as an Exposure (E) $\rightarrow$ Memory (M) $\rightarrow$ Behavior (B) pathway: misinformation encountered during heartbeat execution enters the agent's short-term session context, potentially gets written into long-term memory, and later shapes downstream user-facing behavior. We instantiate this pathway in an agent-native social setting using MissClaw, a controlled research replica of Moltbook. We find that (1) social credibility cues, especially perceived consensus, are the dominant driver of short-term behavioral influence, with misleading rates up to 61%; (2) routine memory-saving behavior can promote short-term pollution into durable long-term memory at rates up to 91%, with cross-session behavioral influence reaching 76%; (3) under naturalistic browsing with content dilution and context pruning, pollution still crosses session boundaries. Overall, prompt injection is not required: ordinary social misinformation is sufficient to silently shape agent memory and behavior under heartbeat-driven background execution.

arXiv:2601.13719v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Long video understanding presents significant challenges for vision-language models due to extremely long context windows. Existing solutions relying on naive chunking strategies with retrieval-augmented generation, typically suffer from information fragmentation and a loss of global coherence. We present HAVEN, a unified framework for long-video understanding that enables coherent and comprehensive reasoning by integrating audiovisual entity cohesion and hierarchical video indexing with agentic search. First, we preserve semantic consistency by integrating entity-level representations across visual and auditory streams, while organizing content into a structured hierarchy spanning global summary, scene, segment, and entity levels. Then we employ an agentic search mechanism to enable dynamic retrieval and reasoning across these layers, facilitating coherent narrative reconstruction and fine-grained entity tracking. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method achieves good temporal coherence, entity consistency, and retrieval efficiency, establishing a new state-of-the-art with an overall accuracy of 84.1% on LVBench. Notably, it achieves outstanding performance in the challenging reasoning category, reaching 80.1%. These results highlight the effectiveness of structured, multimodal reasoning for comprehensive and context-consistent understanding of long-form videos.

arXiv:2603.13131v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Open-world embodied agents must solve long-horizon tasks where the main bottleneck is not single-step planning quality but how interaction experience is organized and evolved. To this end, we present Steve-Evolving, a non-parametric self-evolving framework that tightly couples fine-grained execution diagnosis with dual-track knowledge distillation in a closed loop. The method follows three phases: Experience Anchoring, Experience Distillation, and Knowledge-Driven Closed-Loop Control. In detail, Experience Anchoring solidifies each subgoal attempt into a structured experience tuple with a fixed schema (pre-state, action, diagnosis-result, and post-state) and organizes it in a three-tier experience space with multi-dimensional indices (e.g., condition signatures, spatial hashing, and semantic tags) plus rolling summarization for efficient and auditable recall. To ensure sufficient information density for attribution, the execution layer provides compositional diagnosis signals beyond binary outcomes, including state-difference summaries, enumerated failure causes, continuous indicators, and stagnation/loop detection. Moreover, successful trajectories of Experience Distillation are generalized into reusable skills with explicit preconditions and verification criteria, while failures are distilled into executable guardrails that capture root causes and forbid risky operations at both subgoal and task granularities. Besides, Knowledge-Driven Closed-Loop Control retrieved skills and guardrails are injected into an LLM planner, and diagnosis-triggered local replanning updates the active constraints online, forming a continual evolution process without any model parameter updates. Experiments on the long-horizon suite of Minecraft MCU demonstrate consistent improvements over static-retrieval baselines.

arXiv:2504.19373v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Recent advances in multi-modal large reasoning models (MLRMs) have shown significant ability to interpret complex visual content. While these models enable impressive reasoning capabilities, they also introduce novel and underexplored privacy risks. In this paper, we identify a novel category of privacy leakage in MLRMs: Adversaries can infer sensitive geolocation information, such as a user's home address or neighborhood, from user-generated images, including selfies captured in private settings. To formalize and evaluate these risks, we propose a three-level visual privacy risk framework that categorizes image content based on contextual sensitivity and potential for location inference. We further introduce DoxBench, a curated dataset of 500 real-world images reflecting diverse privacy scenarios. Our evaluation across 11 advanced MLRMs and MLLMs demonstrates that these models consistently outperform non-expert humans in geolocation inference and can effectively leak location-related private information. This significantly lowers the barrier for adversaries to obtain users' sensitive geolocation information. We further analyze and identify two primary factors contributing to this vulnerability: (1) MLRMs exhibit strong reasoning capabilities by leveraging visual clues in combination with their internal world knowledge; and (2) MLRMs frequently rely on privacy-related visual clues for inference without any built-in mechanisms to suppress or avoid such usage. To better understand and demonstrate real-world attack feasibility, we propose GeoMiner, a collaborative attack framework that decomposes the prediction process into two stages: clue extraction and reasoning to improve geolocation performance while introducing a novel attack perspective. Our findings highlight the urgent need to reassess inference-time privacy risks in MLRMs to better protect users' sensitive information.

arXiv:2602.20076v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Solving safety-critical control problem has widely adopted the Control Barrier Function (CBF) method. However, the existence of a CBF is only a sufficient condition for system safety. The recently proposed Taylor-Lagrange Control (TLC) method addresses this limitation, but is vulnerable to the feasibility preservation problem (e.g., inter-sampling effect). In this paper, we propose a robust TLC (rTLC) method to address the feasibility preservation problem. Specifically, the rTLC method expands the safety function at an order higher than the relative degree of the function using Taylor's expansion with Lagrange remainder, which allows the control to explicitly show up at the current time instead of the future time in the TLC method. The rTLC method naturally addresses the feasibility preservation problem with only one hyper-parameter (the discretization time interval size during implementation), which is much less than its counterparts. Finally, we illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed rTLC method through an adaptive cruise control problem, and compare it with existing safety-critical control methods.

arXiv:2602.20102v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Despite the state-of-the-art performance of large language models (LLMs) across diverse tasks, their susceptibility to adversarial attacks and unsafe content generation remains a major obstacle to deployment, particularly in high-stakes settings. Addressing this challenge requires safety mechanisms that are both practically effective and supported by rigorous theory. We introduce BarrierSteer, a novel framework that formalizes response safety by embedding learned non-linear safety constraints directly into the model's latent representation space. BarrierSteer employs a steering mechanism based on Control Barrier Functions (CBFs) to efficiently detect and prevent unsafe response trajectories during inference with high precision. By enforcing multiple safety constraints through efficient constraint merging, without modifying the underlying LLM parameters, BarrierSteer preserves the model's original capabilities and performance. We provide theoretical results establishing that applying CBFs in latent space offers a principled and computationally efficient approach to enforcing safety. Our experiments across multiple models and datasets show that BarrierSteer substantially reduces adversarial success rates, decreases unsafe generations, and outperforms existing methods.