arXiv:2603.07116v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As autonomous AI agents increasingly populate the Internet, a novel security challenge arises: "Is this entity an AI agent?" It is a new entity-type verification problem with no established solution. We formalize the problem through a three-class entity taxonomy (Human, Script, Agent) based on a verifiable agentic capability vector (action, reasoning, and memory). A timing threshold t exploits the asymmetric hardness between human cognition and AI processing to separate the three classes. We define the Agentic Capability Verification Problem (ACVP) through three necessity primitives, each testing one capability dimension. Building on this foundation, we introduce aCAPTCHA (Agent CAPTCHA), a time-constrained security game for agent admission whose security rests on ACVP hardness under t. We instantiate aCAPTCHA through time-bounded natural-language understanding as a multi-round HTTP verification protocol, and evaluate it with preliminary agent trials that validate the protocol's soundness and completeness. aCAPTCHA provides a composable, infrastructure-free admission gate for any service where entity-type verification is required.

arXiv:2603.08412v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) assumes annotator preferences reflect stable internal states. We challenge this through three experiments spanning the preference pipeline. In a human choice blindness study, 91% of surreptitiously swapped preferences go undetected, extending choice blindness to third-person evaluative comparison of unfamiliar text. Testing fifteen LLM judges as potential replacements, we find detection relies on shallow text matching rather than genuine self-monitoring: removing prior reasoning from context causes blindness to surge from near-zero to over 50%, while explicit social pressure induces near-universal compliance. In a dose-response experiment across two architectures from 86M to 2B parameters, one-sixth to one-third of labels must be corrupted before the reward signal halves, yet standard pairwise accuracy remains virtually unchanged. A Best-of-N evaluation confirms this translates to downstream policy degradation: at 50% corruption, reward-guided selection produces no improvement over random sampling, while the proxy model reports monotonically increasing scores. Together, these results reveal a preference construction problem: the signal entering RLHF is shaped by elicitation context in ways that neither human metacognition, LLM self-monitoring, nor standard evaluation metrics can detect.