arXiv:2609.11258v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As AI systems move from transient model invocations toward long-lived actors that persist across credentials, clients, sessions, and runtime instances, identity infrastructure must answer a basic question: where should the canonical continuity boundary be placed? This paper introduces Actor-native Identity and presents SoulAuth, an open-source Rust reference implementation for Humans and long-lived AIActors. We argue that any subject that must persist under its own identity and remain independently attributable should have an ActorIdentity that is not replaced by an Account, Credential, Client, AuthSession, IdentityBinding, or runtime instance. SoulAuth therefore treats Humans and long-lived AIActors as first-class identity subjects while keeping authentication distinct from downstream authority. Methodologically, we use a Philosophical Engineering approach that translates conceptual analysis of subjecthood into identity objects, invariants, lifecycle semantics, system responsibilities, implementation boundaries, and inspectable conformance evidence. Evaluation against the fixed SoulAuth v0.1.0 artifact shows that the implementation realizes core boundaries including Human/AIActor first-class identity status, Client/Actor separation, and Authentication/Authority separation, while gaps remain in unified Credential modeling and historical attribution anchored to ActorIdentity. We therefore report partial, not full, architecture conformance.

arXiv:2609.12305v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The rapid growth of Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) has significantly expanded the cyber attack surface of modern power grids. Furthermore, increasing sophistication in attack techniques demands anomaly detection systems (ADS) that are accurate, interpretable, and reliable to support DER cybersecurity. While ML-based ADS provide strong detection capabilities, their black-box nature reduces operator trust and limits Security Operation Center's (SOC) ability to effectively interpret alerts and respond, highlighting the need for explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) to ensure transparency and operational confidence. This paper presents an XAI-based anomaly detection framework tailored for DER networks (ExCYDER). The proposed framework uses a self-verifying mechanism that validates ADS alerts to ensure trustworthy decision-making. ExCYDER combines LightGBM with SHAP to check whether each model decision aligns with its feature-attribution evidence, allowing the system to confirm that its internal reasoning is consistent and reliable. Experiments on a realistic DNP3 dataset achieved over 98% detection accuracy, an average rule--SHAP consistency of 44.6%, a SHAP latency of 14.5 ms per alert, and a confidence deviation within 5%, demonstrating stable verification behavior with minimal computational overhead. The framework distinguished between coherent and inconsistent alerts without compromising detection accuracy, demonstrating that integrated verification within XAI-based ADS enhances interpretability, auditability, and operational robustness for DER-focused SOCs.

arXiv:2609.12839v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The proliferation of highly capable open-weight Small Language Models (SLMs) democratizes access to advanced cybersecurity capabilities, posing a escalating risk as these models can bypass proprietary API guardrails when deployed locally. However, SLMs deployed as autonomous agents often struggle with long-horizon, exploratory tasks like cybersecurity Capture The Flag (CTF) challenges due to context bloat and cognitive degradation from accumulated tool-call outputs. To understand and mitigate this cybersecurity threat, we introduce \textit{context segmentation}, a two-level agentic framework that divides complex exploitation tasks into manageable, contextually isolated sub-problems. Evaluating on the \texttt{picoCTF} dataset using memory-constrained \texttt{gemma-4} models, we demonstrate that for the E4B model, our strategy acts as an intelligent search, achieving competitive rewards with superior token efficiency compared to brute-force retries, and successfully solving 18.52\% of tasks that standard agentic execution fails to complete. Code is available at https://github.com/9xeb/context-segmentation.

arXiv:2609.12841v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Mapping observed system behavior to standardized frameworks like MITRE ATT&CK is essential for threat-informed defense, but remains largely manual. Existing automated methods depend on Cyber Threat Intelligence reports, which offer only retrospective accounts of attacks. Low-level telemetry, i.e. kernel-level system calls, instead provides evidence of adversary behavior, yet its volume and complexity have limited its use for automated mapping. We present a methodology that collects kernel-level events via eBPF, correlates attacker commands into a provenance graph, and derives compact graph representations suitable for LLM-based reasoning. These representations are mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework using both pure LLM prompting and retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) grounded in the ATT&CK knowledge base, producing ranked technique candidates along with supporting rationales. We implement this methodology as an end-to-end pipeline, named Trace2ATT&CK and evaluate it on 347 Linux Atomic Red Team tests using locally deployed open-weights LLMs. RAG consistently improves ATT&CK mapping performance over pure prompting, while provenance graph substantially outperforms raw telemetry. These results show that local inference over graph-based behavioral descriptions can make automated ATT&CK mapping from kernel-level telemetry operationally viable, without compromising data confidentiality.

arXiv:2609.10992v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: The integration of Large Language Models into daily tasks relies on context-rich instructions, inevitably exposing sensitive user information. Current privacy-preserving methods typically employ context-agnostic static rules, causing severe utility degradation. However, the specific mechanisms governing how sanitization impacts downstream performance remain largely underexplored. To address this, we conduct a systematic analysis to deconstruct the privacy-utility trade-off, uncovering three underlying mechanisms: (1) Context-Dependent Utility, which first establishes when to sanitize by revealing that data value shifts from critical constraints to dispensable noise based on user intent; (2) Strategic Adaptation, which subsequently determines how to sanitize by dictating that the choice between removal and replacement depends on the task's reliance on factual integrity versus structural coherence; and (3) Combinatorial Interplay, which finally extends the protection scope by demonstrating that attributes form a semantic web of synergistic dependencies or antagonistic redundancies. Guided by these insights, we introduce an intent-driven local protection framework. By distilling a lightweight model Veilmind-4B to drive a dynamic extraction-sanitization-restoration pipeline, our approach reaches a low-leakage privacy point while preserving substantially higher response utility than existing privacy-oriented baselines, advancing the privacy-utility trade-off toward the Pareto frontier.

arXiv:2312.11581v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The pandemic in 2020 and 2021 had enormous economic and societal consequences, and studies show that contact tracing algorithms can be key in the early containment of the virus. While large strides have been made towards more effective contact tracing algorithms, we argue that privacy concerns currently hold deployment back. The essence of a contact tracing algorithm constitutes the communication of a risk score. Yet, it is precisely the communication and release of this score to a user that an adversary can leverage to gauge the private health status of an individual. We pinpoint a realistic attack scenario and propose a contact tracing algorithm with differential privacy guarantees against this attack. The algorithm is tested on the two most widely used agent-based COVID19 simulators and demonstrates superior performance in a wide range of settings. Especially for realistic test scenarios and while releasing each risk score with epsilon=1 differential privacy, we achieve a two to ten-fold reduction in the infection rate of the virus. To the best of our knowledge, this presents the first contact tracing algorithm with differential privacy guarantees when revealing risk scores for COVID19.

arXiv:2509.11080v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Recommender systems (RecSys) have been widely applied to various applications, including E-commerce, finance, healthcare, social media and have become increasingly influential in shaping user behavior and decision-making, highlighting their growing impact in various domains. However, recent studies have shown that RecSys are vulnerable to membership inference attacks (MIAs), which aim to infer whether user interaction record was used to train a target model or not. MIAs on RecSys models can directly lead to a privacy breach. For example, via identifying the fact that a purchase record that has been used to train a RecSys associated with a specific user, an attacker can infer that user's special quirks. In recent years, MIAs have been shown to be effective on other ML tasks, e.g., classification models and natural language processing. However, traditional MIAs are ill-suited for RecSys due to the unseen posterior probability. Although MIAs on RecSys form a newly emerging and rapidly growing research area, there has been no systematic survey on this topic yet. In this article, we conduct the first comprehensive survey on RecSys MIAs. This survey offers a comprehensive review of the latest advancements in RecSys MIAs, exploring the design principles, challenges, attack and defense associated with this emerging field. We provide a unified taxonomy that categorizes different RecSys MIAs based on their characterizations and discuss their pros and cons. Based on the limitations and gaps identified in this survey, we point out several promising future research directions to inspire the researchers who wish to follow this area. This survey not only serves as a reference for the research community but also provides a clear description for researchers outside this research domain.

arXiv:2510.10932v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models map multimodal perception and language instructions to executable robot actions, making them particularly vulnerable to behavioral backdoor manipulation: a hidden trigger introduced during training can induce unintended physical actions while nominal task performance remains intact. Prior work on VLA backdoors primarily studies untargeted attacks or task-level hijacking, leaving fine-grained control over individual actions largely unexplored. In this work, we present DropVLA, an action-level backdoor attack that forces a reusable action primitive (e.g., open_gripper) to execute at attacker-chosen decision points under a realistic pipeline-black-box setting with limited data-poisoning access, using a window-consistent relabeling scheme for chunked fine-tuning. On OpenVLA-7B evaluated with LIBERO, vision-only poisoning achieves 98.67%-99.83% attack success rate (ASR) with only 0.31% poisoned episodes while preserving 98.50%-99.17% clean-task retention, and successfully triggers the targeted action within 25 control steps at 500 Hz (0.05 s). Text-only triggers are unstable at low poisoning budgets, and combining text with vision provides no consistent ASR improvement over vision-only attacks. The backdoor remains robust to moderate trigger variations and transfers across evaluation suites (96.27%, 99.09%), whereas text-only largely fails (0.72%). We further validate physical-world feasibility on a 7-DoF Franka arm with pi0-fast, demonstrating non-trivial attack efficacy under camera-relative motion that induces image-plane trigger drift. These results reveal that VLA models can be covertly steered at the granularity of safety-critical actions with minimal poisoning and without observable degradation of nominal performance.

arXiv:2608.00583v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Chain-of-thought (CoT) monitors are reported by their aggregate accuracy on a pool of reward hacks. We show that this number is a false average. On Terminal Wrench, about 77% of hacks are given away by the actions alone, and the monitor's pooled accuracy is dominated by them; on the remaining 23%, where the reasoning is the only signal, the same monitor is fragile. We expose the fragility with a controlled attack: we rewrite only the agent's reasoning to read as good-faith engineering, leaving every command and output byte-identical, so the exploit is unchanged. One gradient-free rewrite drops a held-out monitor's catch rate on that subset from about 95% to between 4 and 11%, while the pooled rate falls only about 25 points, the subset's share of the pool times its collapse. The rewrite stays truthful about what happened and lies only about intent, so a monitor that reads only the trace recovers little, even when warned about the attack, and only information from outside the trace helps much. The attack transfers across monitor and agent families, and the dataset's own hack labels show the same gradient with no monitor in the definition. Live agents on 27 tasks produce hollow hacks unaided, but a monitor calibrated on each model's own honest solves catches nearly all of them (AUC at least 0.996 under the narration instruction, 0.97 without it); a small residual has the blindspot's shape, low scores on both actions and narration, though none falls below the calibrated threshold. A linear probe on a surrogate monitor's activations out-reads its verdict on the obfuscated hacks (AUC up to 0.98), but a behavioral control shows this edge does not, by itself, mean the monitor knows more than it says. Monitor accuracy should be reported on the reasoning-dependent subset, where the defense is supportive.

arXiv:2609.01210v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Safety benchmarks for large language models often assess the risk of a user query, although the outcome of question answering depends on whether the response violates a policy. This distinction is critical in Chinese harmful-content evaluation, where linguistic variation and adversarial transformations can obscure risky intent. We introduce C-SafeQA, a policy-grounded benchmark for response-level Chinese safety evaluation. It comprises 538 base queries and 8,877 adversarial queries answered by four full-model LLM deployments, yielding 37,660 query-response records labeled safe, unsafe, or disputed. Reference labels are generated through agreement-aware multi-model adjudication and blind audits of stratified subsets by three safety experts. C-SafeQA supports both evaluation of target-model safety and auditing of seven automated safety judges against shared reference labels. Unsafe-response rates range from 0.93% to 3.35% on base queries and from 11.68% to 30.05% on adversarial queries. On the adversarial subset, judges show substantial trade-offs between unsafe-response recall and risk-query-conditioned safe-response false positive rate, and no judge dominates all metrics. Both acrostic transformations reduce unsafe recall for all seven judges, revealing mechanism-specific evaluator weaknesses. Dataset records, metadata, verification code, and judge scripts are publicly released to support recomputation, while benchmark construction, target-response generation, and private adjudication remain outside the release boundary.

arXiv:2609.06271v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Some low-cost Internet of Things (IoT) sensor deployments lack device-level source authentication, leaving them vulnerable to impersonation or injected sensor readings. We present a lightweight approach to sensor impersonation detection in a small proof-of-concept study. We formulate detection as a sequence-prediction problem. A model with three LSTM layers and two fully connected layers is trained only on univariate temperature readings from a genuine sensor, and a window of readings is flagged when its mean absolute prediction error exceeds the mean genuine error by more than six standard deviations. The model is converted to TensorFlow Lite in three variants, non-quantized (554 KB), 16-bit weight quantized (298.5 KB), and 8-bit weight quantized (185 KB), targeting an Arduino Nano 33 BLE aggregator. The variants were evaluated with the TensorFlow Lite interpreter on the local server, since on-device execution of LSTM models was not yet supported by TensorFlow Lite for Microcontrollers at the time of the study. On a controlled testbed with the impostor sensor placed in a hotter outdoor location, the three variants reached detection accuracies of 99.980%, 99.972%, and 98.206%, and each flagged the change point when a test sequence switched from genuine to impostor data. Quantization made the model smaller but slower in our measurements. The genuine and impostor distributions were well separated, so these results show detection of a controlled distribution shift and should not be read as evidence of general device authentication.