arXiv:2603.22846v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Embodied Visual Tracking (EVT), a core dynamic task in embodied intelligence, requires an agent to precisely follow a language-specified target. Yet most existing methods rely on single-agent imitation learning, suffering from costly expert data and limited generalization due to static training environments. Inspired by competition-driven capability evolution, we propose CoMaTrack, a competitive game-theoretic multi-agent reinforcement learning framework that trains agents in a dynamic adversarial setting with competitive subtasks, yielding stronger adaptive planning and interference-resilient strategies. We further introduce CoMaTrack-Bench, the first benchmark for competitive EVT, featuring game scenarios between a tracker and adaptive opponents across diverse environments and instructions, enabling standardized robustness evaluation under active adversarial interactions. Experiments show that CoMaTrack achieves state-of-the-art results on both standard benchmarks and CoMaTrack-Bench. Notably, a 3B VLM trained with our framework surpasses previous single-agent imitation learning methods based on 7B models on the challenging EVT-Bench, achieving 92.1% in STT, 74.2% in DT, and 57.5% in AT. The benchmark code will be available at https://github.com/wlqcode/CoMaTrack-Bench

arXiv:2603.08679v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The celebrated Myerson--Satterthwaite theorem shows that in bilateral trade, no mechanism can be simultaneously fully efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC), and budget balanced (BB). This naturally raises the question of how closely the gains from trade (GFT) achievable by a BIC and BB mechanism can approximate the first-best (fully efficient) benchmark. The optimal BIC and BB mechanism is typically complex and highly distribution-dependent, making it difficult to characterize directly. Consequently, much of the literature analyzes simpler mechanisms such as the Random-Offerer (RO) mechanism and establishes constant-factor guarantees relative to the first-best GFT. An important open question concerns the worst-case performance of the RO mechanism relative to first-best (FB) efficiency. While it was originally hypothesized that the approximation ratio $\frac{\text{GFT}_{\text{FB}}}{\text{GFT}_{\text{RO}}}$ is bounded by $2$, recent work provided counterexamples to this conjecture: Cai et al. proved that the ratio can be strictly larger than $2$, and Babaioff et al. exhibited an explicit example with ratio approximately $2.02$. In this work, we employ AlphaEvolve, an AI-guided evolutionary search framework, to explore the space of value distributions. We identify a new worst-case instance that yields an improved lower bound of $\frac{\text{GFT}_{\text{FB}}}{\text{GFT}_{\text{RO}}} \ge \textbf{2.0749}$. This establishes a new lower bound on the worst-case performance of the Random-Offerer mechanism, demonstrating a wider efficiency gap than previously known.