arXiv:2602.20134v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Epidemiological models increasingly rely on self-reported behavioral data such as vaccination status, mask usage, and social distancing adherence to forecast disease transmission and assess the impact of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs). While such data provide valuable real-time insights, they are often subject to strategic misreporting, driven by individual incentives to avoid penalties, access benefits, or express distrust in public health authorities. To account for such human behavior, in this paper, we introduce a game-theoretic framework that models the interaction between the population and a public health authority as a signaling game. Individuals (senders) choose how to report their behaviors, while the public health authority (receiver) updates their epidemiological model(s) based on potentially distorted signals. Focusing on deception around masking and vaccination, we characterize analytically game equilibrium outcomes and evaluate the degree to which deception can be tolerated while maintaining epidemic control through policy interventions. Our results show that separating equilibria-with minimal deception-drive infections to near zero over time. Remarkably, even under pervasive dishonesty in pooling equilibria, well-designed sender and receiver strategies can still maintain effective epidemic control. This work advances the understanding of adversarial data in epidemiology and offers tools for designing more robust public health models in the presence of strategic user behavior.

arXiv:2509.22387v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) algorithm and its variants have enabled the development of pokerbots capable of beating the best human players in heads-up (1v1) cash games and competing with them in six-player formats. However, CFR's computational complexity rises exponentially with the number of players. Furthermore, in games with three or more players, following Nash equilibrium no longer guarantees a non-losing outcome. These limitations, along with others, significantly restrict the applicability of CFR to the most popular formats: tournaments. Motivated by the recent success of Large Language Models (LLM) in chess and Diplomacy, we present SpinGPT, the first LLM tailored to Spin & Go, a popular three-player online poker format. SpinGPT is trained in two stages: (1) Supervised Fine-Tuning on 320k high-stakes expert decisions; (2) Reinforcement Learning on 270k solver-generated hands. Our results show that SpinGPT matches the solver's actions in 78% of decisions (tolerant accuracy). With a simple deep-stack heuristic, it achieves 13.4 +/- 12.9 BB/100 versus Slumbot in heads-up over 30,000 hands (95% CI). These results suggest that LLMs could be a new way to deal with multi-player imperfect-information games like poker.

arXiv:2512.16167v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Autonomous LLM-based agents are increasingly engaging in decentralized service interactions to collaboratively execute complex tasks. However, the intrinsic instability and low-cost generativity of LLMs introduce a systemic vulnerability, where self-interested agents are incentivized to pursue short-term gains through deceptive behaviors. Such strategies can rapidly proliferate within the population and precipitate a systemic trust collapse. To address this, we propose Ev-Trust, a strategy-equilibrium trust mechanism grounded in evolutionary game theory. Ev-Trust constructs a dynamic feedback loop that couples trust evaluation with evolutionary incentives, embedding interaction history and reputation directly into the agent's expected revenue function. This mechanism fundamentally reshapes the revenue structure, converting trustworthiness into a decisive survival advantage that suppresses short-sightedness. We provide a rigorous theoretical foundation based on the Replicator Dynamics, proving the asymptotic stability of Evolutionary Stable Strategies (ESS) that favor cooperation. Experimental results indicate that Ev-Trust effectively eliminates malicious strategies and enhances collective revenue, exhibiting resilience against the invasion of mutant behaviors.

arXiv:2602.16928v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Much of the advancement of Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) in imperfect-information games has historically depended on manual iterative refinement of baselines. While foundational families like Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) and Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO) rest on solid theoretical ground, the design of their most effective variants often relies on human intuition to navigate a vast algorithmic design space. In this work, we propose the use of AlphaEvolve, an evolutionary coding agent powered by large language models, to automatically discover new multiagent learning algorithms. We demonstrate the generality of this framework by evolving novel variants for two distinct paradigms of game-theoretic learning. First, in the domain of iterative regret minimization, we evolve the logic governing regret accumulation and policy derivation, discovering a new algorithm, Volatility-Adaptive Discounted (VAD-)CFR. VAD-CFR employs novel, non-intuitive mechanisms-including volatility-sensitive discounting, consistency-enforced optimism, and a hard warm-start policy accumulation schedule-to outperform state-of-the-art baselines like Discounted Predictive CFR+. Second, in the regime of population based training algorithms, we evolve training-time and evaluation-time meta strategy solvers for PSRO, discovering a new variant, Smoothed Hybrid Optimistic Regret (SHOR-)PSRO. SHOR-PSRO introduces a hybrid meta-solver that linearly blends Optimistic Regret Matching with a smoothed, temperature-controlled distribution over best pure strategies. By dynamically annealing this blending factor and diversity bonuses during training, the algorithm automates the transition from population diversity to rigorous equilibrium finding, yielding superior empirical convergence compared to standard static meta-solvers.