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  • βœ‡cs.AI, q-bio.NC updates on arXiv.org
  • Equity Promotion in Online Resource Allocation Pan Xu Β· Yifan Xu
    arXiv:2112.04169v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We consider online resource allocation under a typical non-profit setting, where limited or even scarce resources are administered by a not-for-profit organization like a government. We focus on the internal-equity by assuming that arriving requesters are homogeneous in terms of their external factors like demands but heterogeneous for their internal attributes like demographics. Specifically, we associate each arriving requester with on
     

Equity Promotion in Online Resource Allocation

By: Pan Xu Β· Yifan Xu
10 September 2026 at 12:00
arXiv:2112.04169v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We consider online resource allocation under a typical non-profit setting, where limited or even scarce resources are administered by a not-for-profit organization like a government. We focus on the internal-equity by assuming that arriving requesters are homogeneous in terms of their external factors like demands but heterogeneous for their internal attributes like demographics. Specifically, we associate each arriving requester with one or several groups based on their demographics (i.e., race, gender, and age), and we aim to design an equitable distributing strategy such that every group of requesters can receive a fair share of resources proportional to a preset target ratio. We present two LP-based sampling algorithms and investigate them both theoretically (in terms of competitive-ratio analysis) and experimentally based on real COVID-19 vaccination data maintained by the Minnesota Department of Health. Both theoretical and numerical results show that our LP-based sampling strategies can effectively promote equity, especially when the arrival population is disproportionately represented, as observed in the early stage of the COVID-19 vaccine rollout.
  • βœ‡cs.AI, q-bio.NC updates on arXiv.org
  • Incentives to Offer Algorithmic Recourse Matthew Olckers Β· Toby Walsh
    arXiv:2301.12884v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Algorithmic recourse promises to help applicants rejected by automated systems by explaining the changes needed to secure acceptance. What incentive do decision-makers, such as banks and employers, have to offer recourse? We study this question in a screening model in which recourse is both productive and selective: completing recourse improves an applicant's value to the decision-maker, but applicants differ in their cost of completion.
     

Incentives to Offer Algorithmic Recourse

arXiv:2301.12884v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Algorithmic recourse promises to help applicants rejected by automated systems by explaining the changes needed to secure acceptance. What incentive do decision-makers, such as banks and employers, have to offer recourse? We study this question in a screening model in which recourse is both productive and selective: completing recourse improves an applicant's value to the decision-maker, but applicants differ in their cost of completion. The optimal policy is a threshold rule: reject applicants with low scores, offer recourse to an intermediate range of scores, and accept applicants with high scores outright. Because the intermediate range spans the cutoff that would separate acceptance from rejection when recourse is not available, some marginal applicants gain a new path to acceptance, while others---who would have been accepted outright---must now clear a costly hurdle.
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