arXiv:2601.16091v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Clustering is a fundamental problem, aiming to partition a set of elements, like agents or data points, into clusters such that elements in the same cluster are closer to each other than to those in other clusters. In this paper, we present a new framework for studying online non-centroid clustering with delays, where elements, that arrive one at a time as points in a finite metric space, should be assigned to clusters, but assignments need not be immediate. Specifically, upon arrival, each point's location is revealed, and an online algorithm has to irrevocably assign it to an existing cluster or create a new one containing, at this moment, only this point. However, we allow decisions to be postponed at a delay cost, instead of following the more common assumption of immediate decisions upon arrival. This poses a critical challenge: the goal is to minimize both the total distance costs between points in each cluster and the overall delay costs incurred by postponing assignments. In the classic worst-case arrival model, where points arrive in an arbitrary order, no algorithm has a competitive ratio better than sublogarithmic in the number of points. To overcome this strong impossibility, we focus on a stochastic arrival model, where points' locations are drawn independently across time from an unknown and fixed probability distribution over the finite metric space. We offer hope for beyond worst-case adversaries: we devise an algorithm that is constant competitive in the sense that, as the number of points grows, the ratio between the expected overall costs of the output clustering and an optimal offline clustering is bounded by a constant.

arXiv:2602.14321v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Coalition formation concerns strategic collaborations of selfish agents that form coalitions based on their preferences. It is often assumed that coalitions are disjoint and preferences are fully known, which may not hold in practice. In this paper, we thus present a new model of coalition formation with possibly overlapping coalitions under partial information, where selfish agents may be part of multiple coalitions simultaneously and their full preferences are initially unknown. Instead, information about past interactions and associated utility feedback is stored in a fixed offline dataset, and we aim to efficiently infer the agents' preferences from this dataset. We analyze the impact of diverse dataset information constraints by studying two types of utility feedback that can be stored in the dataset: agent- and coalition-level utility feedback. For both feedback models, we identify assumptions under which the dataset covers sufficient information for an offline learning algorithm to infer preferences and use them to recover a partition that is (approximately) Nash stable, in which no agent can improve her utility by unilaterally deviating. Our additional goal is devising algorithms with low sample complexity, requiring only a small dataset to obtain a desired approximation to Nash stability. Under agent-level feedback, we provide a sample-efficient algorithm proven to obtain an approximately Nash stable partition under a sufficient and necessary assumption on the information covered by the dataset. However, under coalition-level feedback, we show that only under a stricter assumption is sufficient for sample-efficient learning. Still, in multiple cases, our algorithms' sample complexity bounds have optimality guarantees up to logarithmic factors. Finally, extensive experiments show that our algorithm converges to a low approximation level to Nash stability across diverse settings.