arXiv:2603.03672v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The Shapley value provides a principled foundation for data valuation, but exact computation is #P-hard due to the exponential coalition space. Existing accelerations remain global and ignore a structural property of modern predictors: for a given test instance, only a small subset of training points influences the prediction. We formalize this model-induced locality through support sets defined by the model's computational pathway (e.g., neighbors in KNN, leaves in trees, receptive fields in GNNs), showing that Shapley computation can be projected onto these supports without loss when locality is exact. This reframes Shapley evaluation as a structured data processing problem over overlapping support-induced subset families rather than exhaustive coalition enumeration. We prove that the intrinsic complexity of Local Shapley is governed by the number of distinct influential subsets, establishing an information-theoretic lower bound on retraining operations. Guided by this result, we propose LSMR (Local Shapley via Model Reuse), an optimal subset-centric algorithm that trains each influential subset exactly once via support mapping and pivot scheduling. For larger supports, we develop LSMR-A, a reuse-aware Monte Carlo estimator that remains unbiased with exponential concentration, with runtime determined by the number of distinct sampled subsets rather than total draws. Experiments across multiple model families demonstrate substantial retraining reductions and speedups while preserving high valuation fidelity.

arXiv:2602.20541v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods when limited sharing is allowed, that is, each good may be allocated to up to $k$ agents, while incurring a cost for sharing. While classic maximin share (MMS) allocations may not exist in many instances, we demonstrate that allowing controlled sharing can restore fairness guarantees that are otherwise unattainable in certain scenarios. (1) Our first contribution shows that exact maximin share (MMS) allocations are guaranteed to exist whenever goods are allowed to be cost-sensitively shared among at least half of the agents and the number of agents is even; for odd numbers of agents, we obtain a slightly weaker MMS guarantee. (2) We further design a Shared Bag-Filling Algorithm that guarantees a $(1 - C)(k - 1)$-approximate MMS allocation, where $C$ is the maximum cost of sharing a good. Notably, when $(1 - C)(k - 1) \geq 1$, our algorithm recovers an exact MMS allocation. (3) We additionally introduce the Sharing Maximin Share (SMMS) fairness notion, a natural extension of MMS to the $k$-sharing setting. (4) We show that SMMS allocations always exist under identical utilities and for instances with two agents. (5) We construct a counterexample to show the impossibility of the universal existence of an SMMS allocation. (6) Finally, we establish a connection between SMMS and constrained MMS (CMMS), yielding approximation guarantees for SMMS via existing CMMS results. These contributions provide deep theoretical insights for the problem of fair resource allocation when a limited sharing of resources are allowed in multi-agent environments.

arXiv:2603.02950v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As AI systems shift from tools to collaborators, a central question is how the skills of humans relying on them change over time. We study this question mathematically by modeling the joint evolution of human skill and AI delegation as a coupled dynamical system. In our model, delegation adapts to relative performance, while skill improves through use and decays under non-use; crucially, both updates arise from optimizing a single performance metric measuring expected task error. Despite this local alignment, adaptive AI use fundamentally alters the global stability structure of human skill acquisition. Beyond the high-skill equilibrium of human-only learning, the system admits a *stable* low-skill equilibrium corresponding to persistent reliance, separated by a sharp basin boundary that makes early decisions effectively irreversible under the induced dynamics. We further show that AI assistance can strictly improve short-run performance while inducing persistent long-run performance loss relative to the no-AI baseline, driven by a negative feedback between delegation and practice. We characterize how AI quality deforms the basin boundary and show that these effects are robust to noise and asymmetric trust updates. Our results identify stability, not incentives or misalignment, as the central mechanism by which AI assistance can undermine long-run human performance and skill.

arXiv:2603.02961v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As AI systems enter institutional workflows, workers must decide whether to delegate task execution to AI and how much effort to invest in verifying AI outputs, while institutions evaluate workers using outcome-based standards that may misalign with workers' private costs. We model delegation and verification as the solution to a rational worker's optimization problem, and define worker quality by evaluating an institution-centered utility (distinct from the worker's objective) at the resulting optimal action. We formally characterize optimal worker workflows and show that AI induces *phase transitions*, where arbitrarily small differences in verification ability lead to sharply different behaviors. As a result, AI can amplify workers with strong verification reliability while degrading institutional worker quality for others who rationally over-delegate and reduce oversight, even when baseline task success improves and no behavioral biases are present. These results identify a structural mechanism by which AI reshapes institutional worker quality and amplifies quality disparities between workers with different verification reliability.