arXiv:2605.24539v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agent harness evolution improves frozen language-model agents by modifying the executable structures around them. We study this paradigm as a form of sample-efficient fast adaptation: instead of updating model weights, an agent can acquire task-specific competence by changing its external harness, while leaving the base model's general capabilities intact. Prior work shows that self-generated rollouts can support harness search, suggesting that agents may acquire new task competence through practice. Yet in long-horizon stochastic environments, self-practice becomes fragile: rewards are sparse, outcomes are high-variance, and failures are hard to attribute to concrete harness mechanisms. We introduce DemoEvolve, a demonstration-bootstrapped approach to harness evolution. When reward-only search is too broad and noisy, competent human trajectories serve as expert reference experience for the coding proposer, guiding harness-level diagnosis and editing. Experiments on Liar's Dice show that self-rollout evolution can work when episodes are short and failures are attributable. In contrast, Balatro exposes a harder long-horizon stochastic regime, where self-rollout evolution is misled by sparse feedback and candidate-selection noise, while tutorial-like textual knowledge alone does not yield stable improvement. Under the same limited budget, DemoEvolve produces more effective and auditable harness edits and achieves better performance. Overall, demonstrations make sparse-feedback harness evolution more diagnosable, localizable, and stable.

arXiv:2602.12224v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Two-sided matching platforms rely on preferences from both sides, yet participants can evaluate only a small fraction of potential partners. In practice, they use low-cost pre-match screening, e.g., interviews, profile views, or trial tasks, to form noisy impressions before committing to applications and offers. We study bandit learning in matching markets with interviews, modeling these interactions as queried \emph{hints}~\citep{DBLP:conf/innovations/BhaskaraGIKM23} that reveal partial preference information to both sides while constraining subsequent applications. Our framework also allows firm-side uncertainty: firms, like agents, learn their preferences and may make early hiring mistakes. To address this, we introduce strategic deferral, a firm-side action that permits temporary vacancy, corrects premature commitments, and enables decentralized learning under coarse anonymous feedback. We design algorithms for centralized and decentralized markets and show that a constant number of interviews per round suffices for horizon-independent regret, improving over the $O(\log T)$ guarantees known without interviews. Our bounds are near-optimal: the centralized guarantee is within a factor $m$ of an information-theoretic lower bound, while decentralized algorithms match it up to polynomial factors in structured markets and remain horizon-independent in general markets.