arXiv:2602.09490v2 Announce Type: cross Abstract: An agent chooses an action based on her private information and a recommendation from an informed but potentially misaligned adviser. With a known probability, the adviser truthfully reports his signal; with the remaining probability, he can send any message. We characterize optimal robust decision rules that maximize the agent's worst-case expected payoff. Every optimal rule is equivalent to a trust-region policy in belief space: the adviser's reported beliefs are taken at face value if they fall within the trust region but are otherwise clipped to the trust region's boundary. We derive alignment thresholds above which advice is strictly valuable and fully characterize the solution in both binary-state and binary-action environments.

arXiv:2609.12486v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We consider an agent acting against a general non-Markovian environment. The agent maintains its agent states, but is free to choose a transition kernel across those states and optimize its state-feedback control policies. We study the bi-level agent design problem that optimizes the transition kernel and the policy it induces, given said kernel with offline data of observations and actions obtained via a behavioral policy. For general environments, we show that a soft $Q$-learning algorithm converges almost surely to the fixed point of a soft Bellman equation defined by the stationary averages that the behavioral policy and the chosen kernel induce, and we delineate what separates the resulting policy from an optimal one. In partially observed Markov decision problems, we analyze convergence properties of parametrized transition kernel design via zero-th order and Bayesian optimization techniques.