arXiv:2508.12479v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Min-max optimization arises in many domains such as game theory, adversarial machine learning, etc. For these problems, gradient-based methods are well understood and enjoy strong guarantees. However, in the absence of convexity or concavity, existing approaches study convergence to an approximate saddle point or first-order stationary points, which may be arbitrarily far from global optima. In this work, we present an algorithmic framework for computing the global minimax value in convex--non-concave and non-convex--concave min-max optimization. For convex--non-concave min-max problems, we use a reformulation that transforms the problem into a non-concave--convex max-min optimization problem with suitably defined feasible sets and objective function. This reformulation can be viewed as an extension of Sion's minimax theorem to the convex--non-concave setting. We then introduce EXOTIC -- an Exact, Optimistic, Tree-based algorithm for solving the reformulated max-min problem. EXOTIC combines an iterative convex optimization solver for the inner minimization with an optimistic hierarchical tree search for the outer maximization, inspired by StroquOOL~\cite{bartlett2019simple}. Unlike StroquOOL, which assumes stochastic zero-mean noisy evaluations, EXOTIC handles deterministic, biased, and budget-dependent evaluation errors arising from finite-time solutions of the inner convex subproblems. We establish an upper bound on its optimality gap. The same framework also applies to non-convex--concave min-max optimization. Empirically, EXOTIC outperforms gradient-based methods on popular benchmarks from the literature. Finally, we demonstrate the utility of EXOTIC by computing security strategies in multi-player games with three or more players -- a computationally challenging task that, to our knowledge, no prior method solves exactly.

arXiv:2603.06977v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) is increasingly used to design learning-enabled agents that interact in shared environments. However, training MARL algorithms in general-sum games remains challenging: learning dynamics can become unstable, and convergence guarantees typically hold only in restricted settings such as two-player zero-sum or fully cooperative games. Moreover, when agents have heterogeneous and potentially conflicting preferences, it is unclear what system-level objective should guide learning. In this paper, we propose a new MARL pipeline called Near-Potential Policy Optimization (NePPO) for computing approximate Nash equilibria in mixed cooperative--competitive environments. The core idea is to learn a player-independent potential function such that the Nash equilibrium of a cooperative game with this potential as the common utility approximates a Nash equilibrium of the original game. To this end, we introduce a novel MARL objective such that minimizing this objective yields the best possible potential function candidate and consequently an approximate Nash equilibrium of the original game. We develop an algorithmic pipeline that minimizes this objective using zeroth-order gradient descent and returns an approximate Nash equilibrium policy. We empirically show the superior performance of this approach compared to popular baselines such as IPPO and MAPPO.

arXiv:2603.06977v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) is increasingly used to design learning-enabled agents that interact in shared environments. However, training MARL algorithms in general-sum games remains challenging: learning dynamics can become unstable, and convergence guarantees typically hold only in restricted settings such as two-player zero-sum or fully cooperative games. Moreover, when agents have heterogeneous and potentially conflicting preferences, it is unclear what system-level objective should guide learning. In this paper, we propose a new MARL pipeline called Near-Potential Policy Optimization (NePPO) for computing approximate Nash equilibria in mixed cooperative--competitive environments. The core idea is to learn a player-independent potential function such that the Nash equilibrium of a cooperative game with this potential as the common utility approximates a Nash equilibrium of the original game. To this end, we introduce a novel MARL objective such that minimizing this objective yields the best possible potential function candidate and consequently an approximate Nash equilibrium of the original game. We develop an algorithmic pipeline that minimizes this objective using zeroth-order gradient descent and returns an approximate Nash equilibrium policy. We empirically show the superior performance of this approach compared to popular baselines such as MAPPO, IPPO and MADDPG.