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  • βœ‡cs.AI, q-bio.NC updates on arXiv.org
  • All Substitution Is Local Nidhish Shah Β· Shaurjya Mandal Β· Asfandyar Azhar
    arXiv:2604.01443v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: When does consulting one information source raise the value of another, and when does it diminish it? We study this question for Bayesian decision-makers facing finite actions. The interaction decomposes into two opposing forces: a complement force, measuring how one source moves beliefs to where the other becomes more useful, and a substitute force, measuring how much the current decision is resolved. Their balance obeys a localization principl
     

All Substitution Is Local

arXiv:2604.01443v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: When does consulting one information source raise the value of another, and when does it diminish it? We study this question for Bayesian decision-makers facing finite actions. The interaction decomposes into two opposing forces: a complement force, measuring how one source moves beliefs to where the other becomes more useful, and a substitute force, measuring how much the current decision is resolved. Their balance obeys a localization principle: substitution requires an observation to cross a decision boundary, though crossing alone does not guarantee it. Whenever posteriors remain inside the current decision region, the substitute force vanishes, and sources are guaranteed to complement each other, even when one source cannot, on its own, change the decision. The results hold for arbitrarily correlated sources and are formalized in Lean 4. Substitution is confined to the thin boundaries where decisions change. Everywhere else, information cooperates. Code and proofs: https://github.com/nidhishs/all-substitution-is-local.

Human Misperception of Generative-AI Alignment: A Laboratory Experiment

arXiv:2502.14708v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We conduct an incentivized laboratory experiment to study people's perception of generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) alignment in the context of economic decision-making. Using a panel of economic problems spanning the domains of risk, time preference, social preference, and strategic interactions, we ask human subjects to make choices for themselves and to predict the choices made by GenAI on behalf of a human user. We find that people overestimate the degree of alignment between GenAI and human choices. In every problem, human subjects' average prediction about GenAI's choice is substantially closer to the average human-subject choice than it is to the GenAI choice. At the individual level, different subjects' predictions about GenAI's choice in a given problem are highly correlated with their own choices in the same problem. We explore the implications of people overestimating GenAI alignment in a simple theoretical model.
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