arXiv:2605.23905v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We show that AI-driven investment strategies are inherently self-defeating at scale. As AI adoption rises, three mutually reinforcing channels -- signal crowding, performative signal erosion, and Red Queen competition -- compress excess returns. We derive the alpha half-life $h(\phi) = \ln 2/[\theta + \delta(\phi)]$, where $\theta$ is the natural mean-reversion rate and $\delta(\phi) = N\phi\rho a/\lambda(\phi)$ is the AI-accelerated decay component, which is convex-decreasing in adoption. At current adoption levels ($\phi \approx 0.7$, $\rho \approx 0.6$), the model implies signal half-lives of 18 months versus 5-7 years pre-AI. We establish four theoretical results. First, the alpha half-life theorem: signal lifespans are convex-decreasing in AI adoption. Second, a signal extinction cascade: beyond a critical threshold $\phi^*$, the decay of one signal class triggers accelerated competition for remaining signals. Third, a Red Queen impossibility: in the monoculture equilibrium, net alpha is identically zero despite heavy AI investment. Fourth, a fragility-efficiency tradeoff: the adoption level maximizing price discovery strictly exceeds the level minimizing systemic fragility. Empirical validation calibrates portfolio convergence to SEC Form 13F filing patterns (99.5 million holdings, 2013-2024), documenting that simulated institutional portfolio convergence increases by 42% over the sample period. We examine simulated hedge fund return dynamics showing declining cross-sectional dispersion among AI-adopting funds, and simulate the 2010 Flash Crash to illustrate fragility consequences.

arXiv:2508.12479v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Min-max optimization arises in many domains such as game theory, adversarial machine learning, etc. For these problems, gradient-based methods are well understood and enjoy strong guarantees. However, in the absence of convexity or concavity, existing approaches study convergence to an approximate saddle point or first-order stationary points, which may be arbitrarily far from global optima. In this work, we present an algorithmic framework for computing the global minimax value in convex--non-concave and non-convex--concave min-max optimization. For convex--non-concave min-max problems, we use a reformulation that transforms the problem into a non-concave--convex max-min optimization problem with suitably defined feasible sets and objective function. This reformulation can be viewed as an extension of Sion's minimax theorem to the convex--non-concave setting. We then introduce EXOTIC -- an Exact, Optimistic, Tree-based algorithm for solving the reformulated max-min problem. EXOTIC combines an iterative convex optimization solver for the inner minimization with an optimistic hierarchical tree search for the outer maximization, inspired by StroquOOL~\cite{bartlett2019simple}. Unlike StroquOOL, which assumes stochastic zero-mean noisy evaluations, EXOTIC handles deterministic, biased, and budget-dependent evaluation errors arising from finite-time solutions of the inner convex subproblems. We establish an upper bound on its optimality gap. The same framework also applies to non-convex--concave min-max optimization. Empirically, EXOTIC outperforms gradient-based methods on popular benchmarks from the literature. Finally, we demonstrate the utility of EXOTIC by computing security strategies in multi-player games with three or more players -- a computationally challenging task that, to our knowledge, no prior method solves exactly.

arXiv:2602.12224v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Two-sided matching platforms rely on preferences from both sides, yet participants can evaluate only a small fraction of potential partners. In practice, they use low-cost pre-match screening, e.g., interviews, profile views, or trial tasks, to form noisy impressions before committing to applications and offers. We study bandit learning in matching markets with interviews, modeling these interactions as queried \emph{hints}~\citep{DBLP:conf/innovations/BhaskaraGIKM23} that reveal partial preference information to both sides while constraining subsequent applications. Our framework also allows firm-side uncertainty: firms, like agents, learn their preferences and may make early hiring mistakes. To address this, we introduce strategic deferral, a firm-side action that permits temporary vacancy, corrects premature commitments, and enables decentralized learning under coarse anonymous feedback. We design algorithms for centralized and decentralized markets and show that a constant number of interviews per round suffices for horizon-independent regret, improving over the $O(\log T)$ guarantees known without interviews. Our bounds are near-optimal: the centralized guarantee is within a factor $m$ of an information-theoretic lower bound, while decentralized algorithms match it up to polynomial factors in structured markets and remain horizon-independent in general markets.