arXiv:2507.20796v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) increasingly act as autonomous agents in markets and organizations, their behavior in strategic environments becomes economically consequential. We document that off-the-shelf LLM agents exhibit systematic deviations from payoff-sensitive behavior in canonical economic games, including excessive cooperation and limited responsiveness to incentives. We introduce a supervised fine-tuning approach that aligns agent behavior with explicit economic preferences. Specifically, we generate optimal strategies under two stylized utility specifications, homo economicus, which maximizes self-interest, and homo moralis, which incorporates Kantian universalizability, and use these utility-implied reasoning and strategies to guide fine-tuning. Fine-tuning on a small, theory-driven synthetic dataset induces persistent and interpretable shifts in strategic behavior. In applications to moral dilemmas and repeated duopoly pricing, agents aligned to different preference structures produce systematically distinct equilibrium outcomes and pricing dynamics. These results frame AI alignment in multi-agent settings as an objective-design problem and illustrate how economic theory can guide the design of strategically coherent AI agents.

arXiv:2603.07444v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) have enabled agent-based systems that aim to automate scientific research workflows. Most existing approaches focus on fully autonomous discovery, where AI systems generate research ideas, conduct analyses, and produce manuscripts with minimal human involvement. However, empirical research in economics and the social sciences poses additional constraints: research questions must be grounded in available datasets, identification strategies require careful design, and human judgment remains essential for evaluating economic significance. We introduce HLER (Human-in-the-Loop Economic Research), a multi-agent architecture that supports empirical research automation while preserving critical human oversight. The system orchestrates specialized agents for data auditing, data profiling, hypothesis generation, econometric analysis, manuscript drafting, and automated review. A key design principle is dataset-aware hypothesis generation, where candidate research questions are constrained by dataset structure, variable availability, and distributional diagnostics, reducing infeasible or hallucinated hypotheses. HLER further implements a two-loop architecture: a question quality loop that screens and selects feasible hypotheses, and a research revision loop where automated review triggers re-analysis and manuscript revision. Human decision gates are embedded at key stages, allowing researchers to guide the automated pipeline. Experiments on three empirical datasets show that dataset-aware hypothesis generation produces feasible research questions in 87% of cases (versus 41% under unconstrained generation), while complete empirical manuscripts can be produced at an average API cost of $0.8-$1.5 per run. These results suggest that Human-AI collaborative pipelines may provide a practical path toward scalable empirical research.

arXiv:2603.07893v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Hundreds of millions of farmers make high-stakes decisions under uncertainty about future weather. Forecasts can inform these decisions, but available choices and their risks and benefits vary between farmers. We introduce a decision-theory framework for designing useful forecasts in settings where the forecaster cannot prescribe optimal actions because farmers' circumstances are heterogeneous. We apply this framework to the case of seasonal onset of monsoon rains, a key date for planting decisions and agricultural investments in many tropical countries. We develop a system for tailoring forecasts to the requirements of this framework by blending systematically benchmarked artificial intelligence (AI) weather prediction models with a new "evolving farmer expectations" statistical model. This statistical model applies Bayesian inference to historical observations to predict time-varying probabilities of first-occurrence events throughout a season. The blended system yields more skillful Indian monsoon forecasts at longer lead times than its components or any multi-model average. In 2025, this system was deployed operationally in a government-led program that delivered subseasonal monsoon onset forecasts to 38 million Indian farmers, skillfully predicting that year's early-summer anomalous dry period. This decision-theory framework and blending system offer a pathway for developing climate adaptation tools for large vulnerable populations around the world.

arXiv:2511.12876v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Economic decision-making depends not only on structured signals such as prices and taxes, but also on unstructured language, including peer dialogue and media narratives. While multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has shown promise in optimizing economic decisions, it struggles with the semantic ambiguity and contextual richness of language. We propose LAMP (Language-Augmented Multi-Agent Policy), a framework that integrates language into economic decision-making and narrows the gap to real-world settings. LAMP follows a Think-Speak-Decide pipeline: (1) Think interprets numerical observations to extract short-term shocks and long-term trends, caching high-value reasoning trajectories; (2) Speak crafts and exchanges strategic messages based on reasoning, updating beliefs by parsing peer communications; and (3) Decide fuses numerical data, reasoning, and reflections into a MARL policy to optimize language-augmented decision-making. Experiments in economic simulation show that LAMP outperforms both MARL and LLM-only baselines in cumulative return (+63.5%, +34.0%), robustness (+18.8%, +59.4%), and interpretability. These results demonstrate the potential of language-augmented policies to deliver more effective and robust economic strategies.

arXiv:2411.16574v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Algorithmic agents are used in a variety of competitive decision-making settings, including pricing contexts that range from online retail to residential home rental. We study the emergence of algorithmic collusion when competing agents employ multi-armed bandit algorithms and competition is modeled as a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game. Notably, agents in our setting perform online learning with no prior model of game structure and have no direct knowledge of competitor states or actions, thus they cannot learn strategies that depend on these factors. These context-free bandits nonetheless frequently learn seemingly collusive behavior, a phenomenon we term naive collusion. Our results reveal that whether naive collusion emerges depends starkly on the choice of behavior policy employed by bandit learners. The mechanism underpinning the emergence of collusive outcomes is synchronicity in agent action plays, where synchronicity captures how often agents play the same action. We show that in the long-run, naive algorithmic collusion never emerges when both agents use a broad class of persistently random algorithms, including the epsilon-greedy algorithm without epsilon decay, sometimes emerges when both agents use greedy-in-the-limit algorithms which feature randomness during exploration but are asymptotically deterministic, and always emerges when both agents use deterministic bandit learning algorithms like those in the well-known upper confidence bound (UCB) family. We highlight market and algorithmic conditions under which one can and cannot predict a priori whether collusion will occur. Our findings have several policy implications: preventing pricing algorithms from conditioning their actions on competitor prices may not preclude algorithmic collusion, symmetry in algorithms may increase collusion potential, and the emergence of algorithmic collusion is path dependent.

arXiv:2601.13286v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The growing adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies has heightened interest in the labor market value of AI related skills, yet causal evidence on their role in hiring decisions remains scarce. This study examines whether AI skills serve as a positive hiring signal and whether they can offset conventional disadvantages such as older age or lower formal education. We conducted an experimental survey with 1,725 recruiters from the United Kingdom, the United States and Germany. Using a paired conjoint design, recruiters evaluated hypothetical candidates represented by synthetically designed resumes. Across three occupations of graphic design, office assistance, and software engineering, AI skills significantly increase interview invitation probabilities by approximately 8 to 15 percentage points, compared with candidates without such skills. AI credentials, such as university or company backed skill certificates, only lead to a moderate increase in invitation probabilities compared with self declaration of AI skills. AI skills also partially or fully offset disadvantages related to age and lower education, with effects strongest for office assistants, for whom formal AI certificates play a significant additional compensatory role. Effects are weaker for graphic designers, consistent with more skeptical recruiter attitudes toward AI in creative work. Finally, recruiters own background and AI usage significantly moderate these effects. Overall, the findings demonstrate that AI skills function as a powerful hiring signal and can mitigate traditional labor market disadvantages, with implications for workers skill acquisition strategies and firms recruitment practices.

arXiv:2508.21285v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Emerging techniques in computer science make it possible to "brain scan" large language models (LLMs), identify the plain-English concepts that guide their reasoning, and steer them while holding other factors constant. We show that this approach can map LLM-generated economic forecasts to concepts such as sentiment, technical analysis, and timing, and compute their relative importance without reducing performance. We also show that models can be steered to be more or less risk-averse, optimistic, or pessimistic, which allows researchers to correct or simulate biases. The method is transparent, lightweight, and replicable for empirical research in the social sciences.

arXiv:2512.17979v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Industrial symbiosis fosters circularity by enabling firms to repurpose residual resources, yet its emergence is constrained by socio-spatial frictions that shape costs, matching opportunities, and market efficiency. Existing models often overlook the interaction between spatial structure, market design, and adaptive firm behavior, limiting our understanding of where and how symbiosis arises. We develop an agent-based model where heterogeneous firms trade byproducts through a spatially embedded double-auction market, with prices and quantities emerging endogenously from local interactions. Leveraging reinforcement learning, firms adapt their bidding strategies to maximize profit while accounting for transport costs, disposal penalties, and resource scarcity. Simulation experiments reveal the economic and spatial conditions under which decentralized exchanges converge toward stable and efficient outcomes. Counterfactual regret analysis shows that sellers' strategies approach a near Nash equilibrium, while sensitivity analysis highlights how spatial structures and market parameters jointly govern circularity. Our model provides a basis for exploring policy interventions that seek to align firm incentives with sustainability goals, and more broadly demonstrates how decentralized coordination can emerge from adaptive agents in spatially constrained markets.